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ABSTRACT

Poetic Justice: Connecting the Modern American Prosecutor to her Rhetorical
Roots explores the gap between rhetoric and the American prosecutor, to eventually
advocate for a more creative, inventive trial practice for prosecutors that embraces the
spirit and methods of narrative, poetics, and Ulmeric mystories, with the prosecutor’s
unique ethical obligations forming the basis of a new prosecutor’s rhetoric. This research
opens with an autoethnographic account of the author’s own path to criminal prosecution,
to give the reader a sense of the author’s ethos, to identify the shortcomings of rhetorical
training in law school pedagogy, and to outline the rhetorical methods that the author has
developed during 15 years as a prosecutor even in the absence of formal rhetorical
training in law school. The techniques of narrative, poetry, and mystory are used
throughout the autoethnographic portions of the study both to substantively inform the
reader and to demonstrate the effectiveness of those techniques. The research continues
with an examination of how and why rhetoric never found a permanent home in the
American law school—notwithstanding the fact that criminal prosecution is explicitly
rhetorical, and that ancient rhetoric arose out of the need to make legal arguments—and
outlines a method to reconnect the prosecutor to rhetoric. A close read of the works of
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian in light of the unique ethical obligations of the
prosecutor reveals an uncanny degree of similarity, and eventually makes the case for the
American prosecutor being the rightful ideological heir to Quintilian’s perfect orator.
This research closes with a course description for ‘A Prosecutor’s Rhetoric: Ethically
Knowing, Doing, and Making Justice’.
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INTRODUCTION
The starting point for any subject worth studying is usually the realization (or at
least, the conjecture) that there is a problem or a shortcoming of sorts. The very existence
of the problem is subject to debate, and that becomes part of the research. Sometimes the
problem that sparks research is something as obvious as, ‘this bridge is cracking and we
need to reinforce it before we fall into the water below.’ Other times, the ‘problem’ may
be less urgent and more nuanced, as when an urban planner concludes that there is a more
efficient method to connect communities and population centers than the current model.
The problem that sparks my research—the need to re-connect American criminal
prosecutors to rhetoric—is somewhere on the spectrum between the bridge is falling and
we can do better, depending on one’s perspective.
In simple terms, my core research interest is to attempt to bridge the gaps among
prosecution and rhetorics and persuasion. Many different scholars have done (or at least
have attempted to do) this kind of bridge-building, so the natural questions that arise are,
who am I to think I can do any better, and what is different about my approach? I am
hopeful that the answers to these questions will give the reader (and the writer) some
sense of the lens through which I view my own work and the work of others, while also
simultaneously highlighting both the utility of my approach, and the perils inherent in this
effort. Of course, this writing—dealing with rhetoric—is itself a rhetorical process, and
as such, giving the reader a sense of my own journey and history (my story /mystory)
should convey the ethos of the author, potentially making this research more persuasive.
This point about ethos should not be thought of as a naked appeal to ‘trust me and take

1

my word for it.’ That approach is completely antithetical to my own philosophy about
problem-solving and conflict, which assumes that the best possible product emerges from
a research process that is subject to criticism and scrutiny, rather than blind acceptance
(see generally, Caves, 2018b). The irony of an explicit discussion of ethos in an explicitly
rhetorical research project (that substantively addresses both ethics and rhetoric), that
simultaneously urges readers not to ‘take the author’s word for it’ while also using a
discussion of the author’s character and ethics to demonstrate the potential benefits that
classical rhetoric offers to modern American criminal prosecution, should not be lost on
readers, as it is not lost on the author.
Chapter one details my own personal, professional and academic journey,
beginning with the trauma of childhood, leading to a career in criminal prosecution, and
then to the study of rhetoric, with parallel and simultaneous progress in creative fields
(such as poetry, narrative, and Ulmeric mystory) that will eventually fold into this
culminating project. The end of chapter one includes a discussion of Gregory Ulmer’s
mystory concept. The mystory concept will be explored further in chapter four, which
explores mystories, narrative, and poetry in the criminal justice system, and again in
chapter five, which discusses a proposed ‘prosecutor’s rhetoric’ (informed by classical
rhetoric as well as by Ulmer’s mystory, among others). In chapter one—and throughout
this text—I will attempt where feasible to use the rhetorical methods of persuasion
discussed herein to introduce the various concepts that inform my research. Although this
bifocal (meta) approach can be cumbersome at first, it can function as a vehicle for
conveying details that are significant to my research, while also demonstrating the
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effectiveness of the various methods that my research seeks to revive and relocate within
the profession of criminal prosecution. The culmination of the journey detailed in chapter
one is this current attempt to leverage rhetoric (and related creative processes from the
humanities) to benefit criminal prosecution.
To start with the easiest question, what is different about my approach is the
intended eventual audience, and where this bridge leads. Who am I building this bridge
for? There may be nothing exceptional about the bridge that I am building. Indeed, other
eminently qualified bridge builders have come before me and constructed bridges that I
can only begin to understand, bridges so shiny and elegant that scholars remark on them
for decades, bridges so massive that they claim to hold up broad and heavy theory across
seemingly endless chasms within specific fields of study and even between fields.
This bridge that I build is not that bridge.
But even this reference to the bridge that ‘I build’ belies the inherently rhetorical
act of this writing. In truth, this is a bridge that we build. Though I may type the words,
they mean nothing without a reader (even an imagined one). Without a reader, without
some understanding in the reader, I will have only succeeded at drafting a blueprint for
this bridge. This idea scratches the surface of the essence of what we build and why, so
that future prosecutors will start to understand the rhetorical nature of trial work before
they are thrust into their first jury trial. We want to improve the design—so we do not fall
into the water—but we also want to connect important theories to the professionals who
need them, so the bridge leads to where it should.
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So, this bridge that we build is not that bridge—that shiny, massive, elegant,
beautiful aberration that holds up entire fields and institutions, across a nearly endless
gulf, whose architects can now spend the remainder of their academic careers lecturing
about that bridge they once helped to build.
What is exceptional about this bridge we build—or at least, what makes our
bridge worth building—is not the strength of the bridge—as it is perilously constructed
and easily destroyed, no stronger than a turn of phrase, and no more stable than the
meaning of the words that inform that phrase—but rather, who will walk across our
bridge, and the connections to which that tenuous bridge may lead. Our bridge, humble
though it may be, is intended to have an impact on the actual practice of pursuing justice
by American prosecutors, though it may be stable just long enough to act as a heuristic,
connecting otherwise distant concepts by chains of loose-fitting metaphors, with the notso-humble goal of meaningfully shaping the actual practice of modern criminal
prosecution in the United States to a greater degree than any shiny Golden Gate bridge
has thus far.
This bridge that we speak of, then, is as fickle—and yet potentially as
revolutionary—as a whisper of a memory of a dream, that could be forgotten five
minutes after waking, or that could be written down, and could eventually change the
trajectory of an entire profession.
My suggestion that our bridge may shape modern prosecution to a greater degree
than those other bridges is not to denigrate the quality or strength of those other Golden
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Gates, but the Golden Gate bridge is largely meaningless to the person stuck on the
jagged rocks near the water, where many law school students can be found, gasping for
air, during their first year, along with brand new prosecutors during their first jury trial.
While we are here dwelling in the idea of floundering in the water, gasping for air, I
should acknowledge that the current tradecraft and method of ‘learning to swim’ in your
first jury trial—as unprepared as you might be—can in fact teach some very valuable
lessons about staying afloat in trial. It is true that every trial is a ‘teachable moment’ of
sorts. Some of the problems with the ‘learning by drowning’ model include the fact that
there are real consequences to the parties when an unprepared prosecutor conducts a trial.
There may be a greater likelihood of an otherwise guilty defendant going free, or worse,
an otherwise innocent defendant being wrongfully convicted.
Aside from the impact on the parties, the value of the lessons learned by the
unprepared prosecutor is also questionable, since the new prosecutor is unlikely to have
the context and perspective to correctly interpret their experience in trial in a way that
results in a lesson that can be generalized to other trials. The real risk here is not so much
that the new prosecutor does not learn anything from their first jury trial, but rather, that
they could learn the wrong things during their first jury trial. For these reasons, and
others, let’s get out of the water, walk up the banks, and return to the bridge if we can.

Those that find their way to the entrance of one of these shining steel and asphalt
expanses may not benefit from the bridge if the bridge does not lead to where they need
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to go, or worse, if the bridge does not lead to the place where they think it leads. As great
as these bridges may be, they may still leave some in the water, while sending others
down the wrong path, or convincing some who are in the water that they are on the
bridge.
Ultimately, this bridge that we build may not be meant for legal scholars to walk
across (not that they would want to, with its ragged rope handrails, rough repurposed
wood planks, and perhaps most repugnant of all, its implicit rejection of any claim of
ownership/ authorship of the very theories that form the raw materials of the bridge). This
bridge is meant for those who would become prosecutors, those who would grow
accustomed to life down in the trenches, and who will undoubtedly develop out of
necessity their own rhetorical practices, even in the absence of formal rhetorical training,
and almost completely disconnected from the classical rhetoric that once formed the basis
of nearly all legal arguments. Chapter two introduces readers to the bricolage
prosecutor’s rhetoric that I developed during my fifteen years as a prosecutor, in the
absence of formal rhetorical training in law school. Chapter three discusses the
development of ancient rhetoric since its exile from legal pedagogy, and draws some
important connections between ancient rhetoric and the modern American prosecutor.
Chapter four discusses the various opportunities for mystory, poetics, and narrative in the
American criminal justice system. Chapter five discusses a training model for a new
prosecutor’s rhetoric.
What about those other Bridges?
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Admittedly, the notion of drawing from other fields to inform our understanding
of law is nothing new. My methodology is unique, in that I do not hold a particular
allegiance to any academic field, and my motivation is to elevate the practice of ethical
effective criminal prosecution rather than to elevate any particular academic field or
theory. This difference in methodology is likely due to how my path to this research
compares to the path of most other legal scholars.
Law-and-economics and law-and-literature are the two major examples that come
to mind where legal scholars have drawn from the work of other academic fields, but
numerous other cross-disciplinary studies have shaped (or attempted to shape) legal
practice over the past century. These two popular cross-disciplinary approaches to law—
that have become movements in their own right—also represent the two different
academic worlds from which most legal scholars flow: the social sciences (specifically,
economics) and the humanities (Kahn, 2016; Dagan & Kreitner, 2011). The economistturned-jurist is largely concerned with utilitarian considerations, such as efficiency, while
the humanist-jurist is concerned with meaning and interpretation, even when it is thick,
cumbersome, tenuous, self-reflective, and anecdotal (Kahn, 2016).
That the prosecutor’s rhetoric should draw heavily on the humanities is due in
large part to the fact that the study of rhetoric—once the very foundation of study for
legal arguments—was relegated to style and cosmetic aspects of literature and writing,
after being excised from ancient legal pedagogy and classic rhetorical roots in the 16th
century (Ramus). Recent efforts to move the field of rhetoric beyond the superficial study
of style, towards a return to a discipline that could actually change minds and reform
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legal, cultural, social, and academic institutions and norms (just as classical rhetoric did
prior to the 16th century) have helped to reconnect modern rhetoric to its classical roots.
Thinkers like Kenneth Burke, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Michel Foucault,
among others, are collectively responsible for a rebirth of sorts of the study and practice
of substantive rhetoric, beyond mere stylistics. Unfortunately, it seems that this turn back
towards a substantive rhetoric—one that has the potential to reframe existing power
structures, as classical rhetoric could—has not triggered a return to classical rhetoric
within the particular discipline from which classical rhetoric first emerged. While more
creative disciplines have witnessed the rebirth and recentering of classical rhetoric, legal
pedagogy in the United States has progressed as it has for the past two centuries,
educating law students in substantive legal concepts and procedures, without explicitly
addressing rhetoric.
In poaching rhetoric from literature and the humanities, the prosecutor’s rhetoric
seeks not only to relocate ancient rhetoric (looking back, as it existed when first orphaned
from legal pedagogy) back into legal pedagogy, but also to leverage both the spirit and
the letter of rhetoric’s evolution within those creative fields (looking forward, as rhetoric
developed independently from legal pedagogy). Creative processes are borrowed from
literature and the humanities and adopted for the prosecutor’s rhetoric on the promise that
a more creative process (than what is normally associated with legal pedagogy) may
afford prosecutors new ways of thinking about factual scenarios, structure arguments, and
generally prepare for the unpredictable nature of criminal jury trials. From the fertile
fields of literature and the humanities, the prosecutor’s rhetoric harvests the power of
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emotion, poetics, and narrative, as well as specific creative writing concepts such as
mystory, remix, and box logic.
I do not mean to suggest that rhetoric’s status as a refugee discipline—temporarily
residing in the humanities after being forcefully removed from the legal academy—
necessarily means that legal pedagogy must suffer going forward, despite suffering the
loss of rhetoric up to this point. Though it is true that modern legal pedagogy (in the
absence of rhetorical training) is entirely inadequate for prosecutors, it also seems logical
to assume that rhetoric has been allowed to develop along creative pathways while
housed in the humanities, and to further assume that much of that unrestrained growth
would have been stifled if rhetoric remained housed in legal pedagogy. If we can
transplant rhetoric back into the legal academy (creative flourishes and all), prosecutors
may yet benefit from that creative growth that could only happen outside of the legal
academy.
That the native environment of criminal prosecution before our intervention can
be stifling is an understatement largely beyond question, but that it must be so is almost
certainly false. The utility of this research project depends on the idea that there is room
in criminal prosecution for some creative practices. Since this research project is nothing
without utility, this project itself depends on the conjecture that there is time and space
for creative processes within the otherwise stifling, rule-driven world of criminal
prosecution. The rules of criminal procedure, evidentiary rules, and constitutional law
(due process in particular) all control the procedures that prosecutors employ. The
creative rhetorical methods that will inform our prosecutor’s rhetoric must yield to these

9

existing rules. Thus, our prosecutor’s rhetoric will outline the scaffolding of these
existing rules in order to find time and space for the reintroduction of rhetoric and related
creative processes, within the matrix of existing rules.
Bridging these creative fields and concepts into the prosecutor’s rhetoric not only
provides alternative methods for prosecutors to think about the factual uncertainties that
make up jury trial practice, but also provides numerous pathways for future research,
both to deepen the connection between the prosecutor’s rhetoric and the humanities, and
to further develop cross-disciplinary methodologies that will make it easier for the
prosecutor’s rhetoric to poach from a broader range of academic disciplines in the future.
My own professional and academic journey deviates substantially from the typical
path for legal scholars, many of whom spend the bulk of their careers as legal scholars
who occasionally practice, rather than legal practitioners who occasionally engage in
scholarship (and even more rare, those restless individuals who are constant scholars and
practitioners). Given this tendency, legal scholarship is often a sort of scholarship by
scholars, for scholars. As such, it can be difficult to find legal scholarship that has
practical application to the daily work of prosecutors. There is a form of tradecraft and
institutional knowledge that shapes the work of prosecutors, but those practices are
informed more by intuition and lived experience than by theory or research. To be sure, a
tradecraft informed by lived experience (that typically begins with the ‘learning by
drowning’ scenario previously discussed) can be exceptionally helpful to the practice of
criminal prosecution (but also carries risks, as previously discussed). However, without a
theorical basis in existing research, it can be difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the
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tradecraft in a meaningful way, that could be generalized to other prosecutors, and
expanded to form the basis of a formal program of study for prosecutors.

Although law-and-economics is arguably the most significant cross-disciplinary
influence in most areas of civil practice, where potential remedies deal primarily with the
cost of making someone whole, it is also clearly outside the scope of my research, with
its emphasis on logic and efficiency. Implicit in my practice of drawing from more
creative disciplines is the acknowledgment of the limits of what we think of as linear
logic, and a general sense that a more creative practice could serve to inoculate a
prosecutor’s potential arguments from the risk of loss in the face of the human—and
necessarily unpredictable—enterprise of persuading jurors. This is not to suggest that
logic (and even notions of efficiency) have no place in my proposed ‘prosecutor’s
rhetoric.’ Indeed, my proposed prosecutor’s rhetoric does value logic and efficiency in
the sense that the entire pedagogy is shaped by the pragmatic realities of prosecuting
criminal cases. However, the process of pursuing justice (as defined by the ethical
obligations of the modern American prosecutor) does not lend itself to what some would
see as the cold, logical efficiency of civil law, a field that can literally put a price tag on
human life and suffering. In that sense, the prosecutor’s rhetoric will still pursue
efficiency and logic, but the measure of efficiency in the prosecutor’s rhetoric is tied to
penal justice—in the sense of punishment and retribution—rather than to financial
justice, in the sense of making an aggrieved party whole.
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Of the existing major cross or transdisciplinary movements in the law, law-andliterature seems most relevant to our current project.
The scholarship that has emerged out of the law-and-literature movement is
essentially divided into two categories: law-in-literature, and law-as-literature (Schneck,
2011). The former is relatively straightforward as referencing the portrayal of law in
works of literature, and this is largely irrelevant to my study. The law-as-literature
encompasses a much broader, more complicated constellation of theories and
perspectives that generally coalesce around the idea that law and literature share some
critical common methods of analysis, particularly in the area of rhetorics.
Although I start within the law-as-literature scholarship as I build our concept of
the prosecutor’s rhetoric, this bridge is in one sense more limited in scope, intended
audience, and end goals than law-as-literature in general, and in another sense, far
broader than the field of law-as-literature, since I owe no allegiance to any particular
academic discipline and will not be so restricted in where our bridge leads. My hope is
that on the one hand this focus could eventually spur real (albeit incremental) change in
how prosecutors engage in legal practice, without diverting into the otherwise fruitful,
more fundamental questions that arise from (or are the natural extension of) most law-asliterature critiques, and on the other hand, the specific lack of allegiance could encourage
additional pragmatic connections across and through academic silos, for the benefit of
criminal prosecutors in the future.
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As I borrow from law-as-literature, I acknowledge that many critical questions
about the nature of justice, the legitimacy of law and legal practice, and the notion of
truth itself, though important to the field, are beyond the scope of any study that attempts
to incrementally change prosecutor training with the specific intent to make prosecutors
more effective at working within the existing legal systems, institutions, and structures.
This is the real challenge of the research, to reconnect prosecutors (through the creation
of a prosecutor pedagogy) to rhetoric, without that narrowly-tailored research being
subsumed or assimilated into the oblivion of very important questions that law-asliterature research, and much of the broader questions asked by humanists of the law.
These important, fundamental questions have a tendency to derail the kind of study that I
am attempting, in part because questions about justice, power, and the nature of truth in
the law are so important that they have their own gravitational pull.
The sort of incremental, relatively minor change I propose is constantly at risk of
being swept up into the larger debates that have defined the law-as-literature
movement(s). After all, what sense does it make to try to improve prosecutorial
performance if the legal system in which they operate is not legitimate, if the “truth” they
seek does not exist, and if the “justice” they pursue is a fiction?
To be clear, this bridge that we build—using the frayed rope remnants and
reclaimed scrap wood from the Ancient Greeks and various disciplines within the
humanities—attempts to poach rhetoric from the humanities, in part because prosecutors
and the systems within which prosecutors operate likely cannot survive the kind of
critical inquiry in which the humanities is invested, and because the sort of questions that
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the humanities would ask of prosecutors will be seen as incompatible with the legal
system. This is true even though many experienced prosecutors might know (but may
never admit) that prosecution is not a perfect science (or a science at all?), that objective
ultimate truth is a fallacy when it comes to actual cases and controversies, and that the
legal system perpetuates fictions to achieve a particular result, that at best will only
approximate some version of a partial form of justice.
Even if prosecution could survive such scrutiny, this feeble bridge that we seek to
build—a series of loose-fitting, overlapping (and sometimes mismatched) metaphors that
will hopefully stay connected long enough to act heuristically—could not survive. This
call for incremental, pragmatic change would be crushed under a tidal wave of doubt if
the full weight of the humanities were allowed to wash over the seawall that separates
law from the humanities.
I am not attempting to bridge the gap between the social science jurist and the
humanist jurist; that is a bridge too far. This does not mean I am advocating for adoption
or rejection (wholesale or piecemeal) of a law-and-economics philosophy when it comes
to criminal justice. While I do not think that pragmatic notions of efficiency should be
ignored by prosecutors (whose salaries are paid by taxpayers), the definition of efficiency
requires a humanistic perspective when we are talking about a person’s life and liberty.
Chapter one establishes the author’s ethos by detailing my personal, educational,
and professional journey, through a mix of narrative, poetry, and Ulmeric mystory.
Chapter two details the tradecraft prosecutor’s rhetoric that I developed during my fifteen
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years as a prosecutor, in the absence of formal rhetorical training in law school. Chapter
three traces the modern American prosecutor’s ideological roots to classic rhetoric, with a
particular focus on the works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Chapter four explores
the opportunities for narrative, poetics, and mystory within the American criminal justice
system. Chapter five outlines a training course for prosecutors that reconnects
prosecution to ancient ideological ancestors while also borrowing heavily from more
modern developments in fields outside of the law, particularly from creative fields.
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CHAPTER ONE
MY NARRATIVE, POETIC MYSTORY

As most of us tend to do (or, as most of us probably should do, having more
interests than time would allow us to pursue), I actively resist paying attention to new
information unless and until I believe that information has some value to me. I tend to
prioritize how and when I pay attention, and I also assume that most readers will do the
same when reading my work. As a writer, and as a reader, I must find what makes a book
or a passage worth reading (or worth writing) before going forward. Sometimes, the
compelling nature of the subject matter may be enough to keep readers reading and
writers writing, and other times, both the writer and the reader will need to be entertained
to be prodded along. I do not see this chapter as self-justifying, nor is it particularly
entertaining, so I have to justify the existence of this chapter before you read the
substance here, just as I had to justify it to myself before I wrote it.

From my own admittedly biased perspective, most of the other chapters in this
work seem to justify their own relevance by the very subject matter that they address. The
titles of the remaining chapters should provide enough incentive to convince the reader to
keep reading, just as those titles provided enough incentive to convince the writer to keep
writing. These other chapters should be an easy read, as they were a comparatively easy
write. This chapter, being mostly autobiographical, is the exception, both for the writer
and the reader.
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So the first question—before we discuss anything more about the author—is, why
does it matter? For much of my academic career I have found a way to avoid addressing
this question entirely, which makes this discussion so critical now, even if only to give
myself permission to write this chapter. The answers to this question are as diverse as
they are compelling, and those answers compel me to write this chapter.

I have avoided any sort of discussion of my own background (particularly, my
childhood) when presenting research because I came to believe early on in my studies
that the background of the researcher should be irrelevant to the research, and that good
research can stand on its own, regardless of who did the research. This preference for
“objective research” (a difficult phrase for me to type now, and nearly impossible for me
to say out loud) grew out of what I saw in other academic fields early on in my studies,
and it was an idea that I embraced, as it offered a way for me to further separate myself
from my own lived experiences, particularly from my own childhood. From my own
nascent academic perspective as a new graduate student in 2004—influenced almost
exclusively by my view of the traditions of empirical research and the scientific
method—I assumed a research process that revealed too much about my background and
explicitly acknowledged how that background has influenced the research would
somehow delegitimize both my work and myself. I realize now that such explicit
acknowledgment is essential to this particular research project. Understanding how I
came to my chosen profession and to this research is essential to a project that seeks to
improve how others arrive at and engage in this same profession.
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Even as a child, I viewed education as the only way for me to escape the violence,
addiction, and poverty into which I was born. Once I began college, the idea of ‘objective
research’ that could be completely removed from the researcher was a way for me to
completely remove my own personal background from the professional persona that I
was building. I tried so hard for so much of my life to fit in (to where I was going, not to
where I came from) and to separate myself from my own upbringing. Looking back on
my own academic and professional journey now, it seems clear that my background
played an important role in shaping my own character, my ideas about the criminal
justice system, and most importantly (at least for this project), my background shaped my
research.

As uncomfortable as it is for me to discuss my personal background, and as much
as I would prefer to exclude many details about my personal background from my
research, I realize that such exclusion would be dishonest to the reader. Excluding my
personal background from a discussion of my research would not be unlike failing to
disclose a source of funding in a scientific paper or failing to acknowledge a potential
conflict of interest that the reader would not otherwise know about. So my background is
important if for no other reason than it can provide those who resist my central thesis
with some ammunition to discount what I have written or why I have written it.

My background is important so that I can expose my own biases and
vulnerabilities (making my work easier to tear down), but my background may also
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provide the reader with a sense of my own character or ethos, so that readers understand
how and why I might be qualified to suggest something as radical as injecting creativity
and rhetoric back into criminal prosecution (potentially making my work harder to tear
down).

The structure of this chapter will catch some readers off guard (although the
actual content of the introduction should have provided some indication that this project
would not fit neatly within a specific research genre, even if the structure of the pages
and the paragraphs looked traditional). Wherever possible, throughout this project I will
attempt to model the creative techniques that I am seeking to integrate into the
prosecutor’s rhetoric. One of the creative techniques that I will address in this and later
chapters is the use of poetry. This chapter will begin in chronological order by addressing
the relevant details of how and why I arrived at this research, through a mix of narrative
storytelling and excerpts from poems. Narrative storytelling and poetry are two important
components of my proposed prosecutor’s rhetoric, as is the general move toward opening
up the legal profession (and criminal prosecution specifically) to more creative practices.
As this project moves closer towards a fully developed prosecutor’s rhetoric, the reader
should view this research as a starting point, not an endpoint. I view the transition toward
a more creative prosecutor’s rhetoric as a long-term effort that will extend far beyond
these pages. As such, the reader should keep in mind that my choice to highlight poetry,
narrative (and later, Ulmer’s mystory concept) is a function of my own personal
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experiences, and should not be seen as a sign that other creative techniques from writing
and literature could not also fit well in the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

As discussed in the introduction, my research seeks not only to reconnect the
modern American prosecutor to her rhetorical roots (and restoring legal rhetoric to its
logical home in legal pedagogy) but also to borrow concepts and heuristics that grew
around rhetoric while it existed as a refugee in the fields of literature and creative writing.

As discussed in the introduction, legal pedagogy can actually benefit from
rhetoric’s exile out of the legal academy, if the prosecutor’s rhetoric is able to find a
home (or at least a pragmatic use) for rhetoric and those creative flourishes that grew
from and around rhetoric while it was housed in literature and creative writing. Like
narrative and poetry, Ulmer’s mystory format is borrowed from the field of literature and
creative writing, and offers similar promise for expanded use in the prosecutor’s rhetoric.
This chapter will close with a discussion of Ulmer’s mystory concept, along with my own
attempt at a mystory that is relevant to my background and this research project.

Poetry from Trauma
I have used poetry since early childhood as a way of viewing and writing about
various traumatic events in my life. For this chapter in particular, including excerpts of
poetry may be the most efficient way for me to demonstrate a type of creative approach
that will eventually inform the direction of a new prosecutor’s rhetoric. Efficiency aside,
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there may also be portions of my background that I need to discuss here, but that I have
not been able to address in any other form of written expression, other than poetry. I have
tried to limit the use of poetry in this chapter to situations where such excerpts are either
efficient or necessary, and in any case, the actual demonstration of poetic expression
should prove helpful as we approach a new prosecutor’s rhetoric.

More than any other form of expression, poetry has allowed me to address issues
that I could not address in any other format or venue. Poetry does not claim any
allegiance to truth. To borrow from Paul Ricoeur, I can write a poem that presents some
aspect of my ‘truth’ under the guise of fiction. Through poetry, I can manipulate
perspective, leverage metaphors, and hide the truth in plain sight, where it will sit until I
can confront issues head-on (if ever). There is also some element of validation when
poems that I have written are published and read by others, although I rarely begin my
poetry-writing process with the end goal of publishing. Over time, as more people have
read my poetry, I find that I am more willing to discuss the traumatic experiences that
prompted my poetry. The promise that I see in poetry’s ability to inform the prosecutor’s
rhetoric is related to how poetry can influence how we think and feel, even without a
claim to truth. This promise exists both in how it may allow prosecutors to consider
theories in a case, as well as how it may allow jurors to consider case theories that they
might normally reject if initially presented with some claim to truth.
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My earliest memories as a child are of my mother, with whom I lived from birth
until I was around eleven years old. I never knew my father (not even a name), which I
realize sounds difficult, but I always felt like growing up without a father from the
beginning was easier than having a father and then losing a father. In some ways, I had
similar feelings about my mother. Although she died when I was eighteen years old
(when she was younger than I am now), after over a decade of drug use, I had been
gradually losing my mother since I was about five or six years old. As long as I knew her,
my mother had always used alcohol and marijuana (when marijuana was still illegal), but
I don’t think the transition to hard drugs like methamphetamine and heroin occurred until
I was around five or six years old. By the time my mother died, I had already been living
physically separate from her for over seven years, and living emotionally distant from her
for longer than that.

Shortly after my mother died when I was eighteen years old, I wrote a number of
poems in an effort to process what happened. I only submitted one of those poems for
publication, and only after a number of years had passed. That poem that I did submit,
titled Burnt Spoons, is included below:

Burnt spoons
I wasn’t completely shocked when
Our spoons were missing
I guess I knew
But never had to see proof
I was used to thin little papers
Scattered across the countertop
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I saw money
Film containers
And baggies change hands
In our apartment
But that leftover campfire
1960’s habit was almost accepted
I still regret staying home from school
Silent, motionless, breathing through my nose
I sat on the floor of my closet/bedroom
Through my parted cloth door
I heard her inhale through clenched teeth
As metal pierced skin below a latex armband
Ten years later
At her funeral
I wondered if life was really so unbearable
Published in the Ignatian (2006)

I know I was in elementary school when I first saw my mother overdose on
heroin, but I don’t know exactly how old I was. Before I saw the overdose—which was
so difficult I could not include it in Burnt Spoons—I usually was less worried about my
mom when she used heroin, at least compared to how I felt when she was on
methamphetamine or when she was trying to get drugs. At least with heroin I knew she
would pass out for a few hours. So for those few hours, I knew where she was and that
she was safe. That perception changed when I saw her overdose on heroin for the first
time. I ran next door to try to get the neighbor to call an ambulance, as we didn’t have a
phone, but he wouldn’t call from his apartment (I assume out of fear of interacting with
the police or being arrested himself). Eventually he took me to a nearby apartment where
a lady called for medical aid.
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My mom survived that overdose, but in that moment I realized that I could not
protect my mother from harm. So I tried to focus on raising myself, and looking for a
way out of an environment that I realized was unhealthy.

As my mother got deeper and deeper into her addiction, I became more
independent, out of necessity. We lived in apartments, shelters, and flop houses. We
stayed with relatives, and ‘camped’ in cars. The most stable living situation we ever had
was in a motel right off a major freeway that was used for drug sales and prostitution. As
I look back on some of my memories from that place, and my mom’s behaviors, I realize
(knowing what I know now, after fifteen years as a prosecutor) that we stayed there for so
long precisely because that location was a market for drugs and prostitution. I also realize
now that my mother’s drug addiction and the market demand for prostitutes at that
location (immediately adjacent to a major freeway) were probably intimately related; I
strongly suspect that my mother was able to afford to continue to feed her drug habit
because men were willing to pay her for sex. Again, I know how this sounds, but to be
fair, I did not completely understand this as a child.

I know she did what she could to try to shield me from what was going on around
me, but I also know now, as a father myself, that as parents we can’t always hide who we
are and what we do from our children, as much as we might try. As a child, I did not
explicitly connect the dots to necessarily realize my mother was a prostitute, but I
realized even then that having so many ‘boyfriends’ go in and out of our room (while I
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went dumpster diving or explored the parking lot of the motel looking for change and
collecting cans to recycle) was not a normal homelife for most kids my age.

Growing up dirt poor, surrounded by drug users, I came to understand a truth that
I continue to see play out in almost every criminal case that I’ve ever prosecuted. That
truth is that those who are poor and who live with drug addicts tend to experience a
disproportionate share of crime and tragedy. This observation is consistent with the socalled ‘law of crime concentration’ and the broader concept of criminology of place (see
generally, Caves, 2020a). This background does inform my work as a prosecutor because
I can identify with many of the victims in my cases, since we have a shared background.
Although I usually cannot identify with the choices made by the various defendants that I
have prosecuted, I can understand the challenges that most of them have faced, growing
up poor, and surrounded by addiction and violence, as I had to face many of those same
challenges in my own life.

When we weren’t in the relatively stable environment of the motel, we would
bounce between different apartments and various party houses. We stayed with one of my
mom’s friends in an apartment complex for a few months during the summer, and there
was another kid my same age in the apartment complex that I would usually run around
with through a nearby wooded area, while both of our moms were still passed out in the
morning. There were about five or six kids that I would hang out with in that
neighborhood, but I was closest to him. We eventually had to move out, but I would still
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go to visit my friend in the apartment almost every day for weeks after we moved. I
didn’t see him for a few days, and eventually my mom told me he died after being hit by
a car.

Later we went to visit his mother, who had recently been released from a
psychiatric facility. I was in an adjoining room when I heard his mother tell my mom that
they found my friend hanging from his bunk bed with a belt around his neck, and they
didn’t know if it was suicide or an accident. He was my age, and my best friend at that
point in my life. I did not really even attempt to process my friend’s death until my own
son was about the same age as my friend who died, and even at that time, I did not fully
process the manner of death. The poem below is based loosely on my childhood friend’s
death, although I could not bring myself to deal with the hanging, so I kept up the fiction
of a car accident.
Shadow Play
chopstick crackle soles plunder the dead leaf floor
cellulous aerosol dulls the few nimble rays
of a very late morning sun
that penetrate the canopy
crowded lungs gasp
sorting the boys
the rear echelon tethered
to family trees of Marlboro men
and coal miners
a cluster of dense growth insulates the sound
shuttered storefronts, dust and rust
dank odor of first rain
radiates from the oily blacktop
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tread has worn thin
cracked edges
slide over rainbow water
mechanics of driving, complicated by texts, mortgages
and the grocery store calculus of beer-or-milk
shoes piled up at the front door
like a derailed train
sourdough socks drape the threshold
greasy palmprint mural lines the wall
Monday morning
Empty desk screams out
Etched in alternating 3rd grade vulgarity
and coded love notes
floor outlined in a size 5 perimeter
Still
I run.

Published in the Amaranth (2019)

During the times that we did not live at the motel, money and food (and I assume
for my mother, drugs) were more difficult to get. During the times that we lived in
apartments—always with one random drug dealing boyfriend or another—we rarely had
food in the house, except for the few food-bank and direct aid food items that my mother
was not able to trade for drugs. I remember bricks of cheese and some generic powdered
drink mix. As a kid, I would bag the powdered drink mix (which came pre-mixed with
sugar) and sell the small baggies at school. My mother did receive food stamps, but
always managed to find a liquor store where I could buy a ten-cent item (usually chiclets)
using a larger food stamp (usually the $10 food stamp) to get cash as change. She usually
sent me because she was either too high or ‘sick’ (not high enough) to leave the house,
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and because the cashiers seemed more likely to bend the rules for a kid than an adult.
When we weren’t able to do the food stamp scam at a liquor store, my mother could
usually find someone who would take food stamps for 50 cents on the dollar, to buy
drugs. In any case, the government aid that we received did not go towards food. So
during the week, I got all my food from school, and on the weekends I would try to stay
over at a friend’s house, or work for food. I realize how that sounds, that a seven or eight
year old kid would work for food, but I did actively market myself to local businesses to
help out with stocking shelves or cleaning, in exchange for food, snacks, or a little bit of
cash.

There were two or three employees that I could rely on to give me a little work.
The best gig I ever had was at a liquor store that also sold hot food. I stocked the shelves
and watched for shoplifters from inside the beer cooler, which was great during the
summer, since we did not have great air conditioning at our apartment during that time. I
got a cold, relatively safe place to spend a few hours during the day, and also got one hot
meal and a few dollars. Looking back, I am surprised nothing really terrible ever actually
happened to me as a kid outside of the home. The only thing I really had to worry about
at home was general neglect when it was just my mom, but when she lived with a
boyfriend, they were sometimes abusive to both of us.

I did spend a lot of time staying with extended family and friends, but the most
stable place throughout my childhood was school. It was the only place where I could go

28

nearly every day for most of the year and know that I would get food and there would be
people who cared about me. School was also the only place where I had exposure to
people who had actually graduated college. I ended up spending a lot of time with one
particular teacher (referenced earlier in the Acknowledgments section) who would visit
me while I was in detention (which happened almost daily). Through our conversations, I
became convinced that I needed to get as much education as possible, to get far away
from the violence, addiction, and poverty that defined my childhood.

I had enough self-awareness as a kid to know that my homelife was not healthy,
but I also believed that I was better off at home (basically, on my own) than I would be in
a group home or in the foster care system. I decided when I was about nine years old that
I would stay with my mom as long as it did not interfere with school. I didn’t really have
any kind of escape plan at nine years old, but I did keep that idea in the back of my mind,
no matter what happened, that I could basically put up with anything as long as it did not
interfere with school, and I did not end up in foster care. A few years later, I was living
with my mom and her drug dealer boyfriend in an apartment when I made the decision
that I had to leave. I recall that I was away for the weekend (probably staying with
relatives or at a friend’s house) and it was shortly after my birthday (in the summer). I
came home and saw that my birthday gifts that I hid in a closet were gone. When I saw
my mom’s drug dealer boyfriend that day, I asked him if he knew where my stuff was.
He laughed and mentioned that he was only able to get $20 for it.
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Now looking back, I know there really is no such thing as a 10 or 11 year old
getting into a fistfight with a full grown man (especially a tiny 10 or 11 year old who
didn’t get enough vitamins and minerals), but that’s how I remember it. In retrospect, it
was child abuse, but in the drug dealer’s defense, I probably did react in a way that would
have caused even a normal person to be upset.

I woke up on the floor in the living room, and when I went to the bathroom I
could see in the mirror that I had two black eyes starting to form, and it was a Saturday.
By Sunday I had two clearly visible black eyes, and I had summer school the next
morning. I had been to school with injuries before, but never anything that couldn’t be
covered up with the right clothing. I knew that if I went to school like this, I would likely
be sent to a group home or foster care, and I knew this would derail my education, which
I still saw as my only way out of that environment. So I made the decision, at age 11, to
leave home. And I did leave. I never returned to live with my mom.

I eventually ended up contacting my aunt, who was in her mid-twenties at the
time, living with roommates and working retail. I lived with her for seven years, and
joined the Army right after high school, a few years before 9/11. My mother died during
my first year in the Army. I continued to use creative writing and poetry to deal with old
and new trauma, while also pushing forward with my education, as I have always felt
(and still feel) only slightly removed from violence, addiction, and poverty. I have no
doubt that these early childhood experiences contributed to my strong personal and
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professional desire to protect victims (particularly children), to encourage education
(whether technical or in the classroom), and to hold people personally accountable for
their own choices (even those who grew up in difficult environments).

I also found some value in what I was lacking. In terms of morals and ethics, I
came to the Army (and later, to the profession of criminal prosecution) essentially as a
blank slate. I had developed my own sense of right and wrong, based on my own limited
worldview, but where many children grow up with a strong sense of morality that is
fostered by their parents or their church, my sense of morality was basically something I
cobbled together or got from sources outside the home, at least while I lived with my
mother. I had some limited exposure to church (particularly those churches that had food
banks, clothing donations, and free meals for kids around Thanksgiving and Christmas),
and I did see moral behavior modeled at school, and that limited exposure did contribute
to my own sense of ethics and morality, but I suspect that I was more of an ethical blank
slate going into the Army than many other recruits. The Army values (loyalty, duty,
respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, personal courage) contributed significantly to
the moral code that I had been intentionally developing for myself from the first moment
I realized that I had to leave the environment into which I was born. While most of my
fellow soldiers likely felt disoriented by the Army lifestyle, for me, my time in the Army
was the most stable living situation I had ever encountered up to that point. For the first
time in my life, I had a safe place to live, food, clothing, medical care, and money. I felt
incredibly fortunate to be in a work environment and a living situation where I could
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succeed based solely on my own hard work and intellect, regardless of the horrible
environment into which I was born. The Army was the ultimate meritocracy, and that
institution allowed me to build a foundation that would afford me the opportunity to get
as far away from poverty, addiction, and violence as possible. In general, I had similar
feelings about my higher education experiences, in that as a student I felt like I could use
education to get out of the environment into which I was born, although that starting
point of poverty meant that my educational options tended to be different from my peers
who were born into intact, financially secure families, since I would always have to have
a paying job while in school. This experience as a ‘working scholar’ shaped my own
practices as an adjunct instructor (see generally, Caves, 2018e).

When 9/11 happened, I was working as an intelligence interceptor and analyst at
the National Security Agency, and I was on a temporary duty assignment outside
Washington D.C. I recall watching the footage from the Twin Towers and assuming that
it was some kind of accident. We tried to continue with our meeting, but very quickly,
most of the intelligence officers in the room were called away. I tried all day to call
friends and family but I could never get through. We tried to meet the following day, but
it was useless, and we could not go more than a few minutes without the presentation
getting derailed. I wrote the poem Downtown Smokestacks to try to deal with what I was
feeling, although as I read it now, what stands out most to me is not that I dealt with what
I was feeling in any meaningful way, but rather, that I did not really ‘deal’ with it at all,
and talked around what was most important to me at that time.
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Downtown Smokestacks
Tuesday was high resolution
That bled through to the rest of the week
Like a hangover
I think the world stopped
And watched from dusty lenses
The fiery conclusion to 8 years of foreshadow
I thought it was unsinkable
Our dry titanic
Whose fate redefined patriotism
Five hours later
Busy signals still throbbed
In my ear
Our morning speaker
Choked on easy words
Giving up mid-sentence
Blurry color motion
Flashed on screen
And our meeting ended
I saw expressions change
Around our table
Mouths gaping
I slept well
I hoped I imagined it
And I felt guilty
It was real Wednesday
When our meeting was
Full of puffy eyes and closed mouths
Published in the Amaranth (2003).
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I continued to push forward with my education while I was in the Army, and I
finished my A.A. and B.A. before I completed my 5-year active-duty contract. I had
never been a straight A student until college, but I was able to consistently maintain and
graduate with a perfect 4.0 grade point average. I can vividly recall my first college grade
report, during that very first semester of community college, and I recalled thinking that
the instructors must have made some mistake. I remember thinking that my grade in
honors English was either a mistake, or perhaps a gift from my professor (referenced
earlier in the Acknowledgments section).
That ‘mistake’ continued through all of my undergraduate education (A.A., B.A.),
three master’s degrees (M.P.A., M.A., LL.M.) a doctorate (J.D., although law school
grades were less than perfect at times, being largely surrounded by overachievers and
having a somewhat unstable living situation and inadequate funding) and a Ph.D. Part of
me is still convinced that it’s all been a series of clerical errors on my grade point
average.

My time in the Army was the first time in my life when I ever felt like I was on
equal footing with nearly all of my peers. For the first time in my life, I had the same
opportunity to succeed as someone who was born into a ‘normal’ family. For the first
time in my life, I had food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and a purpose. The Army was
critical for my character development, and also played an important role both in terms of
my educational progress and my focus on serving a mission greater than myself.
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From Soldier to Prosecutor
The Army wasn’t perfect, but the work I did was incredibly fulfilling, and when I
left active duty in late 2004, I immediately felt a void. I no longer had a mission-driven
profession, where I felt like I was doing good in the world. Many of my classmates
seemed perfectly content to simply seek out the highest paying jobs, but I had a strong
sense that chasing fortune would not turn out to be personally fulfilling for me in the
long-run. When I was in law school a few weeks after I got out of the Army, I quickly
realized in that there weren’t very many attorney jobs would be as personally fulfilling
for me as the job I did in the Army, but when I read the following quote during my first
semester of law school, I knew that I had stumbled onto a profession that would consume
me, and that would be worthy of all the time and attention that I devote to those pursuits
that are important to me:
“The (prosecutor) is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all, and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.”

Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
The unique role and corresponding ethical duties for prosecutors have been
codified in the rules of the American Bar Association as well as the State Bar rules of
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nearly every State (see ABA Rule 3.8; California Bar rule 5-110; Continuing Education
of the Bar – California, 2018). No other attorney has this duty to ‘do justice,’ particularly
not the defense attorneys who oppose prosecutors in court, as highlighted below by
Supreme Court Justice White:

“…but defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain and
present the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be
and is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a
voluntary plea of guilty, we must also insist that he defend his client
whether he is innocent or guilty. The state has the obligation to present the
evidence. He need not present any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the
prosecutor’s case. If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make
him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal
course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put
the State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light,
regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth”.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967).
My early understanding of and appreciation for the role of the American
prosecutor had profound personal and professional consequences. I was so inspired by
the role of the prosecutor that I ended up completing law clerk positions at the U.S.
Attorney’s Office (criminal division for the summer, and then Strike Force assignment
working on human trafficking during the following semester), the San Francisco District
Attorney’s office (under then-DA Kamala Harris, the future U.S. Vice President), and the
Sacramento District Attorney’s office, all while I was in law school. In fact, the only time
during law school that I wasn’t working with prosecutors was during one semester when I
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was a law clerk at a private firm (so I could afford to pay for my books for law school)
and my last semester of law school when I externed for a federal magistrate judge (who
ended up officiating my wedding after law school).
I included that quote from Berger in the first law journal article that I wrote, on
ethics and prosecutorial discretion (see Caves, 2008). I also fashioned my own version of
a prosecutor’s oath from the language in Berger. That oath hung in my office for my
entire fifteen-year career as a prosecutor, usually in a location where it would be in my
line-of-sight whenever I was at my desk. I have included that oath below:

Oath of the American Prosecutor
I am a prosecutor.
Sworn to uphold the highest ethical standards,
my ethical obligations are unparalleled in the legal profession.
As a prosecutor, I realize that I am a representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all
whose interest in a criminal case is that justice shall be done.
I am a servant of the law, whose twofold aim is that guilt shall not escape, nor innocence
suffer.
Although I may strike hard blows, I am not at liberty to strike foul blows.
It is as much my duty to refrain from improper methods,
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction,
as it is my duty to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
As a prosecutor,
I will reflect on this oath often,
to guide me as a navigate the path of truth and justice,
as a humble servant of the law,
always faithful to my obligation.
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Law School / Rhetoric Disconnect
Throughout law school, I recall waiting to learn about rhetoric. I can specifically
remember, at the beginning of every semester, thinking to myself that this was the time
that they would finally teach us about rhetoric, persuasion, and argumentation. That time
never came in law school. At least not in the classroom. And I was not alone in feeling
like rhetoric should have had a prominent place in the law school curriculum. Afterall,
the practice of law is widely accepted as explicitly rhetorical, and trial work is
specifically recognized as a process driven by persuasive legal argumentation (Balkin,
1996; Clements, 2013; Wetlaufer, 1990). In fact, ancient rhetoric was born out of the
need to make legal arguments, and legal education once included significant study in
rhetoric (Balkin, 1996; Conti, 2001). The very notion that rhetorical study and law school
pedagogy is considered interdisciplinary is inconsistent with the historical evolution of
legal pedagogy, as rhetorical training was once an integral part of classical legal training
(Balkin, 1996; Reinard, 2013; Frost, 1999). But by the time I went to law school (and by
the time any lawyer in the US who is still alive today went to law school) rhetorical
education had no real home in the legal academy.
Over the years, I did cobble together my own version of a working prosecutor’s
rhetoric, but that effort was largely disconnected from any formal academic study. The
first time I had an opportunity to really connect the formal study of rhetoric to my work
as an attorney came during my PhD studies at Clemson University.
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I did learn a fair amount about persuasion during my various law clerk positions
since we were thrown into actual cases and were actually appearing in court (under the
supervision of a licensed attorney) and making arguments. Like most other law schools
accredited by the American Bar Association, my law school education included
instruction in substantive legal areas, such as torts, criminal law and procedure, property,
wills and trusts, remedies, constitutional law, ethics and professional responsibility, and
legal research and writing, but there was no formal instruction on rhetoric or persuasion.
This list of typical required courses for American law schools seems largely unchanged
over the past 100 years (see Llewellyn, 1930). It is true that we had one semester of oral
advocacy, as most ABA accredited law schools do (see ABA Standard 303), but my
experience with that single semester was consistent with the research of many other
scholars, and is that the actual training in rhetoric and oral advocacy was severely lacking
in law school, even if there was a course that claimed to provide such instruction (see
Hanrahan, 2003). The required oral advocacy courses at ABA accredited law schools
almost exclusively have students argue legal appellate issues, rather than the factual trial
issues they will face as prosecutors, using a predictable procedure that is well suited only
to appellate practice (Hanrahan, 2003). Those few courses that do address oral advocacy
typically do not include actual instruction in oral advocacy methods, and often throw oral
advocacy in at the end of the course, rather than integrating it in throughout the course
(Hanrahan, 2003). To borrow from Cicero’s description (discussed in chapter 2), the
current state of legal training creates “… a sort of wary and acute legalist, an instructor in
actions, a repeater of forms, a catcher at syllables” (Cicero, De Oratore, Book I, 236).
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This absence of instruction in rhetoric and persuasion seemed odd to me in law
school, since we were supposed to be preparing to become attorneys, a profession whose
work is inherently rhetorical. Although not all attorneys spend their days on their feet
making arguments in front of juries, as most prosecutors do, all attorneys use words in an
attempt to persuade an audience.
When I graduated law school without any formal academic training in rhetoric, I
wondered if I had missed something. In applying to ABA-accredited law schools, there
was no requirement of having completed any formal study in rhetoric or any other kind of
mandatory pre-law courses, aside from the general requirement that the applicant needs
to have earned a bachelor’s degree before beginning law school (see ABA standard 502).
Rather than requiring a formal pre-law program, many schools actually encourage
students with undergraduate degrees from different disciplines to apply to law school. So
wherever attorneys were getting their rhetorical training from, it likely was not in law
school, nor was it during undergrad. But the absence of formal rhetorical education and
training for attorneys does not change the fact that what attorneys do (whether they’ve
been adequately trained for it or not) is rhetorical.
After I finished my Juris Doctor, I took a job as a prosecutor (a deputy district
attorney in California) where I worked for 15 years before transitioning to become a
California Superior Court judge. While working as a prosecutor after law school, I went
on to complete three additional master’s degrees, and eventually, my PhD. In the decades
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leading up to my PhD dissertation, I began to see the gaps in my own legal education,
and to fill in those gaps, I borrowed from other academic disciplines. In so doing, I had
begun to outline my PhD research without realizing it. As I began my dissertation, what
started as a series of diverse and apparently splintered educational endeavors began to
culminate into a coherent, trans-disciplinary approach that formed the basis of my
research around the prosecutor’s rhetoric.
The lack of formal rhetorical education for attorneys is particularly problematic
for prosecutors, who are typically thrown into cases soon after becoming attorneys (and
as in my case, many of us handle actual cases and trials before becoming licensed
attorneys), who carry the highest ethical burden and highest burden of proof at trial
among all other attorneys, and whose mission is to ‘do justice.’ Thus, in a very real sense,
the lack of formal rhetorical training for prosecutors may lead to injustice, for defendants
and victims alike.
My professional and personal writing and research—and indeed, the way I think,
feel, and express myself in every facet of my life—have been influenced heavily by
creative writing and poetry. Creative writing and poetry afford me the opportunity to
address topics and deal with issues that I could not address or deal with through a more
literal method. While working in the field of criminal prosecution both during and after
law school, I continued to use poetry to understand what was happening in my profession
and my personal life. I wrote 1979 (below) as a way to process some feelings I was
having about a cold hit DNA death penalty rape and murder case I worked on in 2005. I
didn’t actually begin to write the poem until over ten years after the defendant in that case
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was convicted and sentenced to death. It was the first serious case I was ever involved in
for the prosecution, and the facts of the case really affected me, so much that I had
trouble sleeping for many years. The poem proceeds in reverse chronological order, not
for any kind of persuasive affect, but because that was the only way I could write it.
1979
Newborns became parents in between
Her last breath
And his condemnation
When science caught up
I remember the smell
A mixture of rust and peat moss
The scent of single malt scotch in a slaughterhouse
Aged nearly 30 years
Evidence bags bore signatures of the retired and deceased
Red-turned-brown, now black
As younger men
They pick through the scene
Like patient vultures
Bagging and documenting scraps
To sleep under dust for decades
A lazy April breeze ricochets off the water
Weaving through overgrown fennel
Resting on her cheek
Now cold
Purple bruises hidden under clotted black hair
His mark reaches through time
Connecting him to this place
Like an umbilical cord
Her screams travel along the creek
Only the animals hear and flee
The sound diluted into highway hum
Before humans can translate
Hummingbird heartbeats
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Eyes flash in front and behind
A whirlwind of thoughts
Heels chopping the soil
The sound of her shoes striking the concrete floor
Echoes through the parking structure at midday
Her gait altered by her condition
He watches
He waits
At sunrise
Family leaves the house as she does
A few months until maternity leave
And life changes
Again.
Published in the Ignatian (2018)

Although most of my poetry is never submitted for publication, actually
submitting and having poems published has been helpful to my process. Most of the
poems that I end up submitting for publication are centered around particularly traumatic
events, but some poems, like Lex Talionis (below) involve events that I just can’t seem to
move beyond. Lex Talionis deals with a not guilty verdict that affected me deeply, as I
knew the defendant was guilty and that he would reoffend (and, he did, a few years later),
even though the evidence of guilt that I was able to produce at trial was very weak, and I
knew before trial started that a conviction would be nearly impossible.
Lex Talionis
The scene spreads over my eyes
like dripping marmalade
on burning toast
in the summer
a Salvador Dali
oil pastel
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in the rain
on a sinking ship
mostly monochrome
focus fleeting
twelve faces shuffle into the box
twenty-two eyes chart the ground
I read the verdict from hers
the only one who sees me
Did they know this wasn’t the first time?
Did they know this wouldn’t be the last?
Would that change anything?
Her eyes narrowed and read the floor
He smiled when we heard the words
I counted the syllables of Hammurabi on my fingertips
Published in Penumbra (2018)

Trauma-Informed Prosecutor
I was able to escape the violence, addiction, and poverty that defined my
childhood (even though I often still feel like I am just one step away from that
environment), but many of my friends and family never got out. Nearly ten years after I
became a prosecutor, my younger brother Marcus was stabbed to death. I wrote the poem
Marcus in an attempt to deal with his murder, but as I realized when I found myself
incapable of speaking at his murderer’s sentencing hearing (despite speaking about crime
for a living), I still have a long way to go in dealing with my younger brother’s murder.

Marcus
I was your older brother
Where was I
When you slept under a bridge
wearing the thick odor of urine and sweat
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Wrapped in newspaper like fresh fish
Skin chapped and red, stretched over your bones like hide on a drum
Chasing the same high that took our mother?
I remember wrestling
Sticking to plastic chairs in summer
Running from dogs and stealing oranges
Teasing the tweakers in the alley
Dreaming about what we would do as adults, when we could escape this town
Could you have lived a lifetime in thirty years?
After years on Honor Guard, I’d carried more coffins than I could count
But this was the heaviest
And not just because the cheap handles cut into my hands
Or because you shared my sweet tooth
The bodies never look right
They never get the face right
They had 16 years to improve
But yours was as bad as hers
Those last few years I didn’t know you like I should have
But whatever you were
That leathery graying flesh is not you
Wrinkled deflated balloon
Where was I
As you bled out
Tarred gravel and dirt on your cracked heels?
After nearly a decade as a prosecutor, I had read thousands of police reports
Did the detective realize how closely we would read this one
How we would recite every word, tracing the font with our fingertips
Imagining what it felt like to stumble on the side of the road as life left our bodies?
You were my younger brother
Where were you
When I returned from overseas
When my sons were born?
I thought we would catch up
When things were normal
at a wedding
A funeral?
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You are my brother
Where are you?
Published in Into the Void (2017)

Before Marcus died, I did keep my distance from him, because I knew he was
using drugs and I could not risk having my own young family around him. I had many
relatives and friends who struggled with addiction at some point, and thankfully, most
eventually got clean, and then we were able to reconnect. The real tragedy with Marcus is
that he was not a lost cause. If he had lived a few more years I think he would have
gotten clean, and his murderer denied our family the chance to embrace our brother.
Obviously I still feel a fair amount of guilt for his death, but at the same time, I don’t
know what I could have done differently, knowing that violence tends to occur around
addiction and drug use, and that I have to protect my own children from that
environment.
The last two poems featured in this chapter both deal with a more recent trauma.
My daughter Eleanor (who has two older brothers) was born months premature, about a
year after a previous miscarriage. My wife and I stayed at the hospital with her for
months, and during most of that time, Eleanor’s condition seemed to get worse every day.
She eventually recovered and is now very healthy, but those months in the hospital were
extremely difficult for the entire family. Masks addresses the trauma of birth and
hospitalization, and draws parallels between those events and the demands placed on my
wife (a nurse in the emergency room) and our family during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Science of Eleanor is focused on those months in the hospital.
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Masks, Old and New
They need me.
The nurse ran from the hallway as my wife bled out
Her face turned white
Even as she squeezed my hand, white knuckled
Alarms chirped and sang over a mechanized buzzing
I told her we would get through this
Even as I contemplated trying to raise three kids without her
Even as they rushed our third child to the pediatric intensive care unit
For months we lived in the hospital
Watched our baby girl under blue lights, with tubes down her throat
Even as our two boys stayed home, waiting to meet their sister
Our four-year-old said a prayer for Ellie
Nurses rotated through our glass room, behind masks
Some offered hope
Even as she stopped breathing
Even as the baby next door lost her pulse
They need me.
Our boys clung to me
When I arrived in the middle of the night
Mom still miles away, watching our baby girl in a plexiglass box
Even as she tried to recover from giving birth
A few hours until I returned
Feeling guilty about having a hot shower, guilty about being away from Ellie
Guilty about leaving my boys
Two years later, Ellie is thriving
Mom is working overnight in the Emergency Department
Where I almost lost my two girls
Between the fights over food and bedtime
Broken dishes and color crayon murals on the wall
I can’t imagine doing this alone
Even as mom is gone most nights
Even as she falls asleep mid-sentence
They need me.
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She looks up from her phone, during her only day off
Don’t we count? Don’t we need you? I think.
After five nights in a row, caring for patients suffering from a new kind of virus
I told her we would get through this
She disappears into the nights
As I contemplate trying to raise three kids without her
We need you.
Published in Northern New England Review (Front/Lines, 2020)

The Science of Eleanor
Would it be easier not to name it yet?
If we don’t name it, maybe the loss won’t be real
We lie to ourselves
“it” had a name the moment we met
And it was perfect and beautiful
The bottom of the paper coffee cup
grew soft and living, paper pulp reborn
black coffee breakfast
And lunch
And whatever this was
I imagine the tile grid around us
As a wireframe model
The walls as one-way windows
Why couldn’t this be an experiment?
Why couldn’t this pain be fiction?
The rhythm of the machines collectively unpredictable
Constantly, inconsistently syncopated
Intervals spinning, shifting oblong gears
The squared beat turned apeirogon
Not parallel, but still never intersecting
Remember the first one we lost?
I could not say it, and I hoped she would not
This same building. This same room?
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My mind made it identical
Telling me loss was a forgone conclusion. Again.
I trace the curves of her profile
With my fingertip on my wife’s open palm
I imagine her tiny fingers gripping mine
Would we frame her sonogram portrait above a tiny casket?
Even less than that?
We made so many private bargains with God
And whatever would listen
In that plastic beeping room
We were dying
If only
When the boys asked
Where is my baby sister?
What would we say?
As her future slipped away from us
Even as theirs remained
This was not a ripple
A typhoon. Seismic cratering
Fracturing us from ourselves
From the world
From each other?
Three days
Three nights
She is risen
We are bathed in her light
We are reborn
Published in the Amaranth (2021)

Long before I began to outline my concept of a prosecutor’s rhetoric—that
leverages creative practices, built around strict ethical requirements—I knew that poetry
and creative writing were important outlets for me, not only to deal with the trauma of
my childhood and family life, but also to deal with the trauma that surrounded my day
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job. I did not live the trauma of my day job in the same way that I lived the trauma of my
childhood, but I certainly experienced a form of trauma with each serious case that I
prosecuted. As I saw in the years leading up to writing the poem 1979, the facts of
particularly tragic cases tend to stick with me. So I understood how poetry and other
creative processes could help me deal with my own personal feelings that arose as I
grappled with horrible crimes (even though those crimes happened to someone else), but
it would still be some time before I could see how poetry and other creative processes
might actually make me better at my job.

As I continued to develop my own tradecraft as a prosecutor (discussed in detail
in chapter 2), I also began to incorporate into my professional practice some creative
features from my personal writings, such as poetics, and narrative. Finally, I began to see
how my professional work as a prosecutor could benefit from pattern formation,
especially where I felt like my case had reached the natural limits of linear logic. During
my Ph.D studies, I came to learn that pattern formation and the limits of linear logic were
two of the hallmark features of Gregory Ulmer’s mystory concept. The remainder of this
chapter focuses on Ulmer’s Mystory, which along with poetics and narrative, are three of
the concepts that the prosecutor’s rhetoric borrows from the fields of literature and
creative writing.

MyStory
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Although I am no expert when it comes to Greg Ulmer’s MyStory concept, the
basic premise (along with the core assumptions of Ulmer’s approach) seems generally
compatible with my vision of the prosecutor’s rhetoric. I realized as I learned about
Ulmer’s work (after I had already been a criminal prosecutor for over ten years) that the
mystory concept has much to offer the prosecutor’s rhetoric. In later chapters I will fold
the mystory concept, along with poetics and narrative, into the prosecutor’s rhetoric. For
now, it makes sense to introduce the concept, and attempt to demonstrate what my
MyStory might look like. The mystory technique can assist with both the making and the
study of rhetoric, and the making and studying of theory (Gye, 2003).

Even the word ‘technique’ as used above is somewhat problematic in the sense
that it could convey the impression that Ulmer’s mystory is meant to be a template that
can be reproduced, and this idea runs counter to Ulmer’s writings. The mystory is
designed to challenge the dominant linear model of writing and learning; rather than
leading to an ultimate finding or conclusion, the mystory is about invention and
generating multiple paths (Rath, 2009). The mystory should not be looked at as a rigid
format that should be copied or a blueprint to be reproduced (Gye, 2003). Indeed, the
structure or components of a mystory shift from author to author, and even within
Ulmer’s own work, particularly when comparing the description in Teletheory (1989) to
the one Ulmer gives in Internet Invention (2003). This variance is less troubling when we
consider that Ulmer saw the mystory as a place of invention and inspiration, that was not
intended to be mimicked (Tofts & Gye, 2007).
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The general outline for a mystory typically will include some discussion of
academic study or discipline, popular entertainment, and personal narrative or
autobiography (Magolda, 1999; Hill, 2008; Rust & England, 2018). Through this process,
writers and readers can arrive at invention and self-discovery (Mauer, 2013). I use the
rough mystory format to inspire this research project, by adapting the structure to my
needs.
Mystory arose out of a recognition that the way that people learn and
communicate has changed with technology (Gye, 2003). The same changes that have
influenced learners have also influenced jurors, and since jurors are the ultimate finders
of fact and the most important audience for a prosecutor’s oratory, it makes sense that the
prosecutor’s rhetoric should account for the mystory method, since a successful
prosecutor will adapt her oratory style to fit the needs of the jury. The logic behind the
compelling need for changing how we present to juries also applies to how we teach
prosecutors, and in this way, the mystory offers promise not only for the substance of the
prosecutor’s rhetoric, but also for how we teach that rhetoric to prosecutors.

Mystory was born out of a recognition that the way in which people learn and
communicate has shifted from literacy (printed word) to a more dynamic, technologically
driven form that is more visual (Ulmer, 1989; Ulmer, 1994; Ulmer, 2003; Gye, 2003;
Gye, 2012). As juries in the United States come from the community-at-large, the shift in
learning and communicating that Ulmer referred to that was affecting students as early as
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1989 has also affected jurors. Ulmer’s shift in teaching techniques, in response to
widespread changes in popular or dominant methods of learning and communicating,
foreshadows the changes to come for all professions (including the profession of criminal
prosecution) whose successes depend on their ability to communicate with the public,
and Ulmer’s mystory provides a method for generating and teaching the prosecutor’s
rhetoric, as well as a method for generating and studying the theory/ies that support it.

While the structure presented in Ulmer’s mystory format can be helpful, the spirit
of the mystory is perhaps even more beneficial to the prosecutor’s rhetoric, and that spirit
pushes us toward recognizing the limits of linear logic and the potential that we open up
when we look at pattern formation, or what Ulmer refers to as “dream logic” (Ulmer,
2003). This approach intentionally moves away from the conclusion-driven essay style,
where alternate interpretations are shut down, toward a more inventive methodology that
actively encourages the generation of new ideas and different ways of thinking (Gye,
2003).
With these core concepts in mind, acknowledging that the spirit of the mystory is
likely more important than boilerplate-like formatting, I have included my attempt at a
mystory below.

The personal:
My brother was stabbed in the heart after a dispute related to my brother’s drug use. He
died when he was 30 years old. My mother died 16 years earlier, from heart failure, after
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using drugs for over a decade. She was 39 years old. My grandfather died from a heart
attack when I was 16 years old, leaving my grandmother as a widow. My grandmother
died on the day that I turned 39, from COVID-19. Shortly before she got sick, we filmed a
short documentary about my mother’s drug use. That was the first time I heard my
Grandmother speak honestly about how my mother’s drug use affected her.

Poetry and Creativity:
I use my poetry and creative writing to write around the edges of loss, mapping and
setting waypoints for the outer boundaries of painful memories, without ever going
inside, without ever looking the pain in the eye. The pain is intense enough that just
seeing the outer boundaries can cause me to experience the event again, in small pieces,
compartmentalized, the only way that I can. Writing is how I make meaning and build
something more permanent. Something that will live longer than 16 years, or 30 years, or
39 years, or 62 years, or 81 years.

Discipline or profession
I joined the Army a few weeks after I turned 18 years old, to move as far away as possible
from the violence, addiction, and poverty of my childhood. Five years later, weeks after I
returned from overseas, I began law school, convinced that I wanted to do any type of
law other than criminal law. After completing law clerk positions at four different
criminal prosecutor offices, I began to work as a prosecutor for the next 15 years, where
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nearly every single case read like something out of that childhood environment that I
tried to escape.

Education
I needed to get away from the station that I was born into, and as a malnourished,
uncoordinated teenager under 6 feet tall, basketball wasn’t going to cut it. Education was
the stabilizing factor in my life. School was where I got most of my meals, and it was the
safest part of my day. I saw education as my way out, and after a Bachelor’s degree,
three master’s degrees, a professional doctorate, and now a Ph.D., I am just beginning to
feel like I am far enough removed from that environment that I can stop pursuing
degrees.

In my own mind, I imagined each of these four areas as distinct, but this research
project has made it clear to me that all of these areas are related and interdependent. I
probably would not have had the drive to join the Army and get my education if my
homelife hadn’t been surrounded by so much pain and loss. I probably would not have
wanted to fight for justice as a prosecutor if I hadn’t experienced injustice as a child. I
would not have had the motivation to pursue my PhD if I didn’t already have enough
experience as a prosecutor to realize that something essential was missing from the
training that prosecutors receive.
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CHAPTER TWO
TRADECRAFT RHETORIC IN THE CONTEXT OF PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS

Although I never received any formal education in rhetoric until I started my Ph.D
program at Clemson—after having been a prosecutor for over a decade—I did actively
engage in rhetorical persuasion, even in the absence of formal education in rhetoric. Over
the years, while I developed my own tradecraft for my profession, my poetry and creative
writing also developed, although I did initially push back against my poetry influencing
my day job, and also resisted my day job influencing my poetry. I thought of my pursuit
of justice as a prosecutor as something that was a noble profession and an essential social
service that also provided an adequate standard of living for myself and my growing
family. I considered my poetry and creative writing to also be essential to my own
emotional and spiritual health. It wasn’t until my PhD studies that I began to view my
creative and professional endeavors as complementary, although as I look back on how
both of those disciplines developed and often overlapped in my own life, it seems
obvious now, and as if I should have been leveraging both intentionally all along.

When most people hear that a profession like criminal prosecution—that is both
socially important and inherently rhetorical—lacks a formal academic program for
rhetoric, they wonder what has taken the place of formal instruction in rhetoric for
prosecutors. The answer is probably a little different for each prosecutor. Over the years I
came to be very successful at trying very difficult cases, using a self-styled bricolage
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prosecutor’s rhetoric, honed from lessons learned in my own criminal jury trials. As I
developed my own prosecutor’s rhetoric, that was heavily influenced by the ethical
standards that govern American prosecutors, I began to lower the wall that separated my
creative side (expressed through my poetry and narrative creative writing), and my
professional side (expressed through criminal jury trials as a prosecutor). In so doing, I
began to see how my professional practice was benefiting from the kind of creative
processes that served me so well outside of my day job. I also began to see how the
trauma of my own childhood helped me to understand the vulnerable populations that I
served, not only in the highly visible role of criminal jury trials, but also in the various,
less public tasks that I conducted as a prosecutor, such as reviewing cases for filing, and
reviewing the fatal use of force by police officers. Connecting to vulnerable populations
proved critical to my ability to review fatal use of force cases as public scrutiny on these
kinds of cases increased during the later part of my career. Fatal use of force by police
officers gained renewed attention in the United States particularly in 2014 and later (see
generally, Caves, 2018d).
As this transition occurred, I found myself more open to letting other creative
practices (in addition to poetry and narrative storytelling) influence my work as a
prosecutor. Within the broader fields of the social sciences, other researchers were also
addressing the promise that narrative offered to the criminal justice system, and had been
doing so for some time (see generally, Bandes, 1996; Braithwaite, 2006; Champion,
2017; Hajdu, 2019; Pemberton, Aarten & Mulder, 2017; Presser & Sandberg, 2019).
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As I became more open to how my creative practices could improve my
performance as a criminal prosecutor, I kept in mind the unique ethical requirements
outlined in Berger that inspired me to become a prosecutor in the first place. Just as my
rhetorical skills (even in the absence of any formal academic education in rhetoric) were
constantly tested as I attempted to convict the guilty, my moral compass was also
constantly tested, as I worked to fulfill the high ethical mandate of ‘doing justice’ as a
prosecutor. As was suggested by the language in Berger, whenever the need to convict
conflicts with the need to ‘do justice’ (using just means), the need to ‘do justice’ must
trump the drive for a conviction. The following story conveys this point well.

Many years ago I prosecuted a murder trial that had some very challenging proof
issues. A girl and her boyfriend lived off the grid in a small trailer on someone else’s
property, and they worked with a guy who also lived on the property, some distance
away, in a house. They all did drugs together on a regular basis, and lived a sort of outlaw
lifestyle, in an area that was very far away from any city or law enforcement agency. One
day the guy in the house brought a woman home, and she hung out with the group over
the course of a few days, usually at the house. This woman had a very short temper, and
one night they were all supposed to have dinner up at the house, but the boyfriend and the
girlfriend were late. So the guy in the house drove down the hill, along with the shorttempered woman, to convince the boyfriend and girlfriend to come up to the house for
dinner. When the man from the house arrived at the trailer and honked his horn, the
boyfriend came out and explained that the girlfriend did not want to come, and after a

58

short dispute, the girlfriend came out of the trailer and also began to argue. The shorttempered woman in the car grabbed a gun from the car and shot the girlfriend in the head,
and shot at the boyfriend as he ran away into the hills. When the man in the house and the
short-tempered woman got back in the car, the woman said, “well, that’s that.”
At trial, the boyfriend—who was very difficult to understand and had trouble
responding to questions—described the murder, and said he spent two days running in the
mountains, until he eventually got a ride into town, where he called the police. The man
in the house testified that the day after the shooting, he saw the boyfriend come back to
the trailer to get some items, saw him take a shower, and even gave him some drugs and
money and asked him not to tell the police about the shooting. After the man testified, the
boyfriend was recalled to the stand, and still claimed that he never came back to the
trailer to shower and never saw the man again, as he was scared the man would try to kill
him because he witnessed the murder. After about two more weeks of evidence and
testimony from forensic experts and law enforcement witnesses, we were set for closing
arguments. Five minutes before closing argument, the boyfriend called me on my cell
phone and told me that he wanted to apologize for lying, and that he did actually go back
to the trailer to shower before he called the police.

I told the judge and defense counsel what the boyfriend told me, and I offered a
stipulation that would be read to the jury, that conveyed what the boyfriend said. After
hearing the stipulation, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, the case resulted in a hung
jury, and a mistrial was declared.
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This might seem like an extreme example, but the real-world practice of criminal
prosecution is replete with constant ethical challenges that often pit two competing
interests against each other. Without a solid understanding of prosecutor ethical
obligations infused into every part of practice, prosecutors could easily forget about the
phone call to achieve a conviction. In this way, ethics had to permeate every corner of my
own rhetorical tradecraft.

One of the many downsides to a self-styled prosecutor’s rhetoric that has
developed organically, through repeated trials (and sometimes errors) is that instead of
fitting into a tidy, logically organized academic discipline, the prosecutor’s rhetoric is a
perennial work-in-progress whose structure is disjointed and sometimes incoherent. I’ve
attempted to organize the outline of my bricolage prosecutor’s rhetoric around central
themes below, and for each, I have included a discussion of how and why these
techniques developed.

In every criminal case, there is always at least one narrative or storyline that the
defense tries to craft that is intended to work against a conviction. I know this will
happen in every criminal case that I prosecute. I also know, as each defense attorney
knows, that I have an absolute ethical obligation to ‘do justice,’ regardless of what I can
prove at trial. This means that in the rare cases (and I have had a few such cases over the
past 15 years) where a defendant is actually not guilty (as a factual matter) of a particular
charge, I have an ethical obligation to dismiss that charge as soon as possible. This
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ethical obligation does not end with the trial; if a conviction has already occurred, I have
an affirmative obligation to try to remedy the injustice. Because of this unique ethical
obligation, there are a few assumptions that I can usually use to my advantage as I
prepare for a trial. These assumptions are starting points in my trial preparation and allow
me to prepare for trial so that I can anticipate the various ways a defense attorney or a
defense witness will try to derail my case. Though anecdotal in nature, these assumptions
only work within the strict ethical requirements that anchor the duties of the American
Prosecutor, and these assumptions are consistent with the move towards incorporating
poetics, narrative, and other creative processes into a formal prosecutor’s rhetoric that
will be detailed in later chapters. Finally, these assumptions have only been useful in my
trial practice in conjunction with significant pretrial research and preparation that
naturally flows from these assumptions.
So much of my trial preparation involves setting traps that are never needed and
anticipating surprises that never come. This preparation allows a quick-thinking
prosecutor to improvise solutions in trials that are often unpredictable. The skill of
improvisation is critical to my tradecraft prosecutor’s rhetoric, as much of the job entails
reacting quickly to last-minute changes. Improvisation has long been recognized as
critical to oratory and rhetoric; Quintilian described improvisation as the ‘crown of the
study’ of rhetoric (Holcomb, 2001). This line between classical rhetoric and the modern
American Prosecutor will become clearer as these chapters unfold.
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Below I describe the ten assumptions that tend to guide my trial preparation. The
first two assumptions are somewhat foundational in that the later assumptions tend to rely
on the first two assumptions for their own validity.

Assumption Number One: The Defense Case is Focused on What is Plausible, not
what is True.
This assumption—that regardless of the truth, the defense will likely always
attempt to develop a plausible version of the evidence that points to innocence—is the
starting point in preparation for any criminal prosecutor. This first assumption should not
be seen as a pessimist’s jaded indictment of defense attorneys; this realist perspective not
only has a factual basis in my own lived experience, but this position is also by design,
according to the ethical rules that govern a defense counsel’s obligations at trial. Defense
counsel is obliged to help criminal clients avoid responsibility for their crimes, even
where the attorney knows her client to be guilty. The language from Justice White in U.S.
v. Wade (1967) quoted earlier in this chapter captures defense counsel’s duties
succinctly, and bears repeating here:

“…but defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain and
present the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be
and is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a
voluntary plea of guilty, we must also insist that he defend his client
whether he is innocent or guilty. The state has the obligation to present the
evidence. He need not present any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the
prosecutor’s case. If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make
him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal
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course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put
the State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light,
regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth”.

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967).
The criminal justice system in the United States is really designed around this
obligation. While the prosecutor can only ethically pursue charges that they believe to be
true, the defense duty is not similarly prohibited from pursuing defenses that they do not
believe to be true. Understanding this, it made sense for me to develop various alternative
theories for every case that I took to trial, so that I could anticipate what the possible
defenses would be, and begin preparing to rebut those defenses if needed. That way,
when the defense ‘surprises’ me at trial with a new witness and a new theory on the case,
I have rebuttal witnesses of my own ready to go to refute whatever last-minute claims the
defense makes. My experience writing poetry makes preparing for the untruthful but
plausible defense a comfortable process.

Paul Ricoeur (in describing Aristotle’s Poetics) initially describes poetry as a sort
of simulation or imitation (mimesis) of reality, without a claim of truth (Ricoeur, 2004, p.
42). Adopting this perspective to trial preparation, I can prepare for anticipated defenses,
even though I know them to be untrue. A prosecutor that prepares only by focusing on
what is true, without anticipating the false but plausible defenses that will come up at
trial, will be at a disadvantage at trial.
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Ricoeur goes on to describe how Aristotle’s description of mimesis in the context
of poetics differed from Plato’s, with Aristotle’s definition of mimesis describing not
mere simulation or imitation, but ‘making’ (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 42). Aristotle’s concept of
mimesis is a better fit for how to anticipate the various plausible defenses that come up at
trial, since the most effective of these defenses do not merely imitate or resemble the
truth, these theories actually make their own truth (and their own evidence) in trial.

Assumption Number Two: Last Minute Witnesses are Always Lying.
The degree to which this assumption holds true depends on the strict ethical
framework for prosecutors. This assumption has always held true for me, but it may not
hold true for all prosecutors, as it depends entirely on the ethos (or perhaps more
accurately, the ethos of the prosecutor as perceived by the defense attorney) of the
individual prosecutor. Afterall, a defense attorney that feels a particular prosecutor is out
for a conviction no matter what, regardless of the truth, has little incentive to provide
evidence early in the process to show the prosecutor that the defendant is innocent, since
that hypothetical prosecutor would not be expected to dismiss the charges even in the
face of overwhelming evidence of innocence, so the defense attorney would only be
giving the prosecutor a tactical advantage by affording her notice and time to prepare
based on the defense’s anticipated evidence.
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Because most defense attorneys likely understand that if they convinced me their clients
were not guilty I would immediately drop the charges (and this has happened to me a
handful of times), last minute witnesses at trial usually come about because if I had more
time to investigate the claim, I would be able to prove the witnesses were lying. If
somehow a truthful witness came about on the eve of trial, and that witness proved the
client was not guilty, most defense attorneys would continue the trial to give the
prosecutor a chance to review the evidence and dismiss the case before trial. Assuming
the prosecutor’s ethos is consistent with the high ethical standards imposed on them, and
assuming the defense attorney has that same impression of the prosecutor’s ethos, we can
assume that last minute witnesses with testimony that exonerates the defendant are lying.
Knowing this is powerful, and in conjunction with other assumptions, this can give the
prosecutor the ability to effectively react to surprise witnesses.
Although I can think of about a hundred examples of where the last-minute witness
turned out to be false, I’ll use one example here that is narrowly focused on the last
minute nature of the lying witness. About ten years ago I took a handoff carjacking case
(where the assigned prosecutor was unavailable for trial and the defendant would not
waive time for trial, so unless I took the case to trial, the case would be dismissed for lack
of speedy trial) and at our first meeting (a few days before jury selection began) the
defense attorney gave me a transcript of a phone call that he said completely exonerated
his client. On the face of the transcript, the “victim” in the case seemed to be explaining
to the defendant that she gave the defendant permission to take her vehicle and that she
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was sorry she called the police on him, and that she would contact law enforcement as
soon as possible to drop the charges.
I told the defense attorney that if his client wanted to waive time for speedy trial,
I would have the opportunity to review the actual phone call and if this turned out to be
legitimate, of course I would drop the carjacking charges. He explained that his client
was not interested in waiving time. I asked the defense attorney for a copy of the audio
for the phone call, and he said he would get it to me, but he never did. I knew there was
probably something suspicious going on with the phone call, so I tracked down a copy of
the call myself (the defendant was in custody at the time of the call and the phone call
was recorded). As soon as I heard the call, I knew it was a setup. The alleged victim (who
sounded nothing like the actual victim in the case) did a fairly good job in the phone call,
but I could tell the defendant was reading from a script in the phone call, as he was not a
strong reader, and he struggled with certain words. There were pauses in the audio where
the defendant could be heard going to the next page in the script. In the end I was able to
prove that the call was scripted, and eventually, I was able to track down everyone who
assisted with creating the phone call, which forced the defense attorney to conflict off the
case, triggering the defendant to waive time for trial (so he could come up with a
different scheme that might work on another prosecutor).

Assumption Number Three: Liars Cannot Stay in Character all the time, and
Nearly Every Liar has a Tell.
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For most witnesses, even those who routinely lie, there is still a performance
aspect to the lie. This performance takes time and energy, and just like actors on stage or
in live sketch comedy, most liars eventually break character, provided they are exposed
to the right mix of time and stress, especially when they think the audience isn’t paying
attention. I have used this assumption to my advantage in trials and contested hearings
numerous times. I’ll highlight one example here from an attempted murder case that
happened in a prison about ten years ago.
I had a sense going into the case that the defendant would claim self-defense. The
victim (who the defendant claimed was the initial attacker) was over a foot taller than the
defendant and weighed about 70 pounds more than the defendant. While in prison, the
defendant was assigned numerous medical devices to aid in mobility, including a
wheelchair, a cane, and crutches. Knowing that this would be the claim, I contacted the
various prisons where the defendant had been housed and requested copies of any reports
or witness statements that included a mention of any of these medical devices. I also told
my investigator to take note of whether the defendant used a cane at any point in the trial
or appeared to have difficulty moving. A few weeks into trial, the defendant chose to take
the stand. When he did so, he made a dramatic show of how he struggled to even walk to
get up to the witness stand in front of the jury. This was the first time the jury had ever
seen him walk, but it looked much different from what my investigator and I witnessed
every single morning of the trial, before the jury arrived, and every afternoon after the
jury left. After his dramatic show getting up to the witness stand, the defendant explained
his mobility issues, and told the jury that he had been shot years before (of course, the
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jury didn’t get to hear that he was shot by the police, after he shot at the police first) and
had to use a wheelchair, cane, and crutches at various times while in prison just to get
around. That apparent weakness was key to his claim of self-defense. He later told a story
about how he was afraid of the victim and heard the victim was going to attack him, and
thought he would be killed because the victim was so much larger than he was, and
because the defendant had this severe mobility limitation. At the end of his direct
examination testimony, I think at least half the jury probably believed it was self-defense
when he sliced the victim with a razorblade.
On cross-examination, I first set out to eliminate any wiggle room he might have
to later explain away his overacting. I asked him to describe his mobility here in court.
He detailed how difficult it was to get to the witness stand. I asked him to compare his
difficulty here in court to how he was on the day of the incident. He mentioned that he
was actually having a good day today in terms of mobility, and that usually his mobility
is much more limited. I asked him to verify the names of the prisons where he had lived
and mentioned some of the names of prison officials who had witnessed him with his
medical devices. Then I asked him about five different in prison events where the inmate
was seen using the medical devices as a weapon or doing activities that he claimed he
could not medically do, like running, jumping jacks, pushups, and dips. He denied it all.
Finally, I asked him if he has had as much trouble walking every day of trial as he had
today, and again he mentioned that most days were worse, but today was comparatively
good. My last question was whether he recalled seeing my investigator in court every
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morning, every lunch break, and every evening as the inmate walked to and from counsel
table each day. The defendant did not answer.
On my rebuttal case, my investigator described how the only time he ever saw the
defendant struggle to walk was in front of the jury, and every other time the defendant
seemed to move and walk just fine. The bailiff and transportation officer both testified
similarly. Finally, prison officials testified that the defendant did not appear to actually
need any of the medical devices that he was assigned, but since he requested them and
since he did have a documented leg injury in his past, they assigned him the medical
devices because the prison was concerned about civil liability. We heard testimony that
the inmate outran a correctional officer in the prison yard, and that just before the
attempted murder, the inmate threw his cane down and ran at the victim. The jury
eventually convicted the defendant, but the best part of the case was when he was done
testifying, and I had already exposed his lie, he was still in front of the jury and still
continued his show. As he limped back to counsel table, he shrugged his shoulders at me,
as if to say he tried, and he had to stay fully committed to the show while the jury was
present.

Assumption Number Four: Lying Witnesses (and those who Coach Them) Cannot
Possibly Prepare for every Supporting Lie that Logically Flows from their Initial
Testimony.
I’ve watched a few legal dramas that have mentioned the idea that you should
never ask a question in trial that you don’t already know the answer to, or where you
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don’t know how the witness will answer. I can understand why most attorneys would be
afraid of giving witnesses room to say something that the attorney cannot anticipate. For
assumption number four to work, attorneys have to set that fear aside, and get
comfortable with the idea of getting a witness who you know is lying to keep talking.
Knowing the witness is lying, and having a sense that you can probably eventually prove
that something they tell you is a lie, puts you at an advantage, assuming you know your
case well, that you can think quickly on your feet, and that the judge will give you some
latitude on cross examination (and most do). Most witnesses who lie on the stand spend a
significant amount of time preparing for the lie that they need to tell (the one that points
to not guilty) but they almost never prepare for all the other things that would also have
to be true for the jury to believe that first lie. Assumption number four has worked to my
advantage in dozens of jury trials, in a variety of different cases, from a simple drug sales
case, an in prison weapons case, a relatively complex white collar embezzlement case, to
a first degree murder case.

About fifteen years ago, I had a really strange possession of cocaine for sales case
where we couldn’t actually prove the defendant ever possessed the drugs. An undercover
police officer called the defendant’s cell phone and in a recorded conversation, she told
the defendant she heard from a friend that he could hook her up with some cocaine, and
after some back and forth, they agreed to meet at a food truck, in an area known for
narcotic sales. The defendant never actually agreed to sell drugs to the undercover

70

officer, but he did agree to meet with her. The Officer did all the talking when it came to
the amount and the price.
The police were watching the food truck area, and as soon as the defendant arrived, they
arrested him. He didn’t have any drugs or indicia of sales on his person. They did find
cocaine hidden in a metal pole near the food truck. On these facts, my case was not
terribly strong in terms of proving the defendant actually possessed the cocaine. All of
that changed when the defendant took the stand.
The defendant told the jury that it was him on the phone, but he only agreed to
meet the woman so that he could tell her in person to stop calling his phone. He explained
that he only had the phone for a few weeks and he was constantly getting phone calls
from women in the middle of the night asking to buy drugs, and each time he got a phone
call from a woman, his girlfriend would go crazy. He told them to stop calling, but they
kept on calling, and in order to get the calls to stop, he agreed to meet this person, but his
plan was to tell her once and for all to stop calling because his girlfriend was going crazy.
I knew the story was a lie, and initially I just wanted the jury to see how ridiculous it was.
I got the defendant talking about how crazy his girlfriend was, that she was always
watching him, always knew where he was, always watched who called, and went crazy
any time he spoke to another girl. Eventually I asked something to the effect of, “so your
girlfriend goes crazy if you talk to a girl on the phone, but she’s okay with you meeting
up with a girl in the middle of the night on the side of the road?” There was a long pause,
and eventually he explained that she didn’t know about this meet up because he had a
soccer game that night and that’s where he was right before this happened, so his
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girlfriend thought he was at the soccer game. I knew this was probably a lie too, but I got
the sense that he hadn’t prepared for this lie, so I tried to keep him talking, knowing that
at some point I would probably be able to definitively prove that something he said was a
lie.

I asked him question after question to get him locked into an impossible story. I
knew the general area of the food truck and knew there weren’t any parks or soccer fields
nearby, but I didn’t want him to be able to wiggle out by saying it was in someone’s
backyard. I told him that I assumed it was just a pick up game with friends at someone’s
house, and he eventually replied that it was a real league, where they played at a real
soccer field, with real uniforms and everything, but then he was quick to point out that he
took off his soccer jersey and borrowed a friend’s shirt before he went to the food truck.
There was an actual soccer field about two miles from the food truck, so I wanted to
narrow down the transportation part, and make it logical for him to lie about that. I asked
him whether he was afraid that his girlfriend would see his car on the side of the road
when he was supposed to be at the soccer game (the apartment he shared with his
girlfriend was a few blocks away from the food truck). He paused and said he left his car
at the game, and ran over to the food truck. I asked, doesn’t that damage the cleats, to run
on the road for two miles? He responded and demonstrated for the jury how you can run
on the street without damaging the cleats as long as you keep your soles flat and
relatively parallel to the ground. Then I introduced photos of the shoes he was wearing
when he was arrested, including the flat rubber soles of the shoes. In my closing
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argument, I discussed the lie that he told about running in cleats, and how that seemingly
trivial detail was actually critical to his entire defense. I outlined the progression of lies,
from the most important (that he did not possess the drugs) to the one that I could
actually prove was a lie (that he wore cleats), and in the end, the jurors agreed that he
must have been lying about not possessing the drugs, as the only alternative theory was
one that we knew was false. The jury convicted the defendant as charged.
Later I had an in-prison weapons case that occurred during a riot that involved
hundreds of inmates. At the end of the riot, prison officials found about ten different
weapons, most of them stuck in shoes. Many of the weapons (and the shoes) looked very
similar, and given all the chaos of the riot, it was difficult to keep the weapons straight.
Nine of the ten defendants pled guilty to possessing weapons, and I took the tenth one to
trial. At trial, a last-minute defense witness showed up and explained that the weapon that
the correctional officers found was his, that he threw it in the defendant’s shoe (which
came off during the riot) so that the inmate wouldn’t be caught with it. Now this inmate
witness was already doing life in prison for murder, so he wasn’t really risking more time
in custody by taking the fall for the defendant, who but for this new case was scheduled
to be released from prison in a few months. On cross examination I tried to confuse the
witness, but it soon became clear to me that he had studied the evidence very closely. At
the end of his testimony, most of us in the courtroom (including myself and likely the
jury) felt like the defense witness could identify the evidence in the case more accurately
than the officer that was in charge of documenting the evidence. The other evidence in
the case made it clear that the main officer who was in charge of documenting all the
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evidence was unable to see for at least a minute, due to the deployment of pepper spray
during the riot. The inmate was able to fit his weapon-hiding trip neatly within that oneminute window. I asked him why he didn’t just throw the weapon instead of tossing it in
another inmate’s shoe, where that inmate could get caught for the weapon. He explained
that he didn’t want to give up the weapon if he didn’t have to, so he hid it temporarily,
expecting to be able to retrieve it later. He also explained that he felt like the location of
the shoe in relation to the riot made it unlikely that it would get searched, and that having
the weapon under the shoe insert meant it would escape detection if correctional officers
were doing a cursory search. He had an answer for everything. But I guessed he had not
prepared to demonstrate how he put the weapon in the shoe. I was right.

The weapon was found under the sole insert of the shoe. I got a prison shoe with
the same style sole and made a model weapon out of metal covered in duct tape, and
asked him to demonstrate for the jury how he placed the weapon in the shoe. He tried ten
times and could never get the weapon to stay under the insert in the manner that he
described. The jury convicted the defendant as charged.
I had a white collar embezzlement case about 14 years ago that was particularly
sad and difficult to prove. A husband and wife owned a small contracting business, and
the wife convinced the husband to hire her sister. After a few years of working there as
the book keeper, there was over $100,000 missing, and the husband could not account for
it. The husband was unable to pay taxes that the business owed, and during an extensive
investigation by the State Franchise Tax Board, the husband killed himself. The husband
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explained in the suicide note that he didn’t know what happened to the money, that his
business was ruined, and his family would be better off without him. Of course, the
suicide note could not be admitted as evidence in the trial. Shortly after his death, police
learned that the bookkeeper was writing larger-than-authorized payroll checks to herself.
When she testified at trial, she claimed that some of the checks were just her extra pay
(that the business owner wanted to pay her but that he didn’t want to pay payroll taxes
on) and other checks were loans on top of her normal compensation, which he would
routinely do. The payroll tax issue caught the jury’s attention, since they already heard a
reference to a payroll tax investigation of the business owner, and they knew the business
owner would not be testifying (but they did not know why he wouldn’t be testifying). On
cross examination, after I destroyed her story about extra compensation (see below under
Assumption Number Seven), her only remaining out was the loan theory, and since the
person who would have authorized the loan was dead, it was going to be pretty difficult
to disprove. I asked her why she was the only employee receiving these loans as part of
her normal payroll checks, and she said everyone was receiving them. I asked her to give
the name of anyone else who she knew received these, and she gave me a name.

That night I found the person she mentioned and he testified the following day.
He said he did work at that company for a few years, and the owner did routinely loan
money to his employees, but the loan was always in a separate check, was never included
in a payroll check, and there was always a description of the loan in the memo section.
He also brought a photocopy of a check to show the jury that he said was written from the
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owner, and said it was a loan for $200, and in the memo section it clearly indicated that it
was a loan and when the first payment was due. The defense attorney asked why he
would have kept a copy of that check and held on to it for so long, and he said he carried
it in his wallet because he never got a chance to pay back the entire loan, because the
owner died and the business shut down before he finished his second payment. Needless
to say, all of the defendant’s extra payments were included in her payroll checks, and
none of them had any reference to a loan in the memo line. The jury convicted the
defendant as charged.
The final example that involves Assumption Number Four occurred in a murder
case I prosecuted about six years ago. The evidence was pretty clear that the victim was
beaten severely and then strangled with a ligature, and about halfway through the trial, it
became clear that the defendant was going to testify and claim it was self-defense. On
direct examination the defendant described how he heard the victim was going to try to
kill him, and just before the beating, the victim rushed the defendant as if he was going to
attack him. One of the really difficult parts about getting a first-degree murder conviction
in California is that you have to prove the crime was done with premeditation and
deliberation, essentially that the defendant decided to kill after weighing the
consequences. Of Course, if the jury believed the defendant’s testimony on direct
examination, his actions were self-defense, which would mean he would be not guilty of
all the charges, including all of the lesser included charges that fall under first degree
murder (2nd degree murder, manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, battery).
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On cross examination, I asked the defendant to describe what kind of threat the
victim presented to him as he rushed him. The defendant described in detail what he
expected would happen if he didn’t defend himself, and even talked about seeing the
victim with a weapon earlier in the day. I asked the defendant to describe how long the
initial fight lasted, and he said it was very quick. I asked him if he continued to fight once
the victim could no longer fight back, and the defendant was quick to say he stopped
punching as soon as the victim was nonresponsive. During cross examination I began to
speak faster, as did the defendant, and he was getting animated and responding almost
instantly, without thinking. He was getting agitated, and I used that to my advantage.
Finally I asked him what kind of threat the victim presented to the defendant when the
victim was lying face down in a pool of his own blood, before the defendant strangled
him with the ligature. The defendant responded quickly that the victim was a bigger
threat at that moment than at any other time. When I asked him to explain, the defendant
said that with his own criminal history, SBI and murder meant the same thing. I clarified
and asked if he was saying that given his own criminal history, he felt he would face the
same punishment for assault with Serious Bodily Injury as he would for murder, and after
weighing the consequences of killing the victim or letting him live, he realized that if he
let the victim live, he had a greater likelihood of being caught for the crime, so he
decided to kill him, and he said yes. During a one-hour cross-examination session, the
defendant went from a complete claim of self-defense (which would mean he’s not guilty
of all charges) to basically admitting to first degree murder.
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The defendant fell into a pattern of answering quickly, and each time, justifying
how the victim was a threat, and when confronted with the scenario in which the victim
could not have possibly been a physical threat to the defendant, he quickly justified how
the victim posed a threat to him as a potential witness, so he had to kill him. By the time
we got to that critical question, the defendant had already locked himself into the
underlying facts that took away the credible threat that the victim might have otherwise
posed. The defendant wanted it to seem like he stopped the fight quickly, using no more
force than necessary, so he basically admitted that the victim became non-responsive
when he said that’s when he stopped hitting the victim. The jury convicted the defendant
of first-degree murder.

Assumption Number Five: No One Takes the Fall Unless they have a way out.
I’ve prosecuted thousands of criminal cases during my fifteen years as a
prosecutor, and I’ve never had anyone come forward to take the fall for a crime if they
thought that doing so would actually expose them to any criminal liability. I’m sure it
happens, I’ve just never seen it. I have had the experience where a defendant is dead to
rights on a crime and so he tries to take credit for the entire crime and completely exclude
the co-defendant, but at that point the defendant isn’t exposing himself to any additional
liability.
I’ve had inmates who are doing life in prison try to take credit for other people’s
crimes, knowing that they can’t do more than life in prison. I’ve seen co-defendants who
were previously found not guilty come in and try to take credit for a crime, knowing that
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the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution prevents us from prosecuting them again
for the crime. I’ve also had people take credit for crimes to help someone out, where the
person taking credit has a complete defense to the charges that we might later file against
them. One of those cases involved a mother and son who operated a cocaine sales
operation out of a rehab facility that the mother owned. The mother got paid by the State
to operate this rehab facility, and drug addicts would live there, attempting to get clean,
only to find a drug dealer operating in the facility. The son was on probation, subject to
search terms, so they kept the drugs locked in the mom’s room. Since the mother kept her
door locked and had no criminal history, it seemed unlikely that the drugs would be
discovered by law enforcement. But somehow, they were, and I got the case against the
mother. The son was tried separately.

After I had finished calling all of my witnesses to testify, the defense called the
name of a person to the witness stand who I had never heard of in my life. He wasn’t
mentioned anywhere in the police reports, and the defense gave me no notice of the
witness at all. What he had to say was a complete surprise to me. The witness took the
stand and claimed the cocaine found in the room belonged to him, that he hid the drugs in
that room and that the defendant didn’t know anything about the drugs. He explained that
he was at the house doing some repairs for the defendant when he saw his parole agent
pull up to the house, so he ran inside and stashed the drugs in the room. As soon as I
heard his story, the only thing I could think was, even if this were true, why would he
admit to it, unless he had a defense to the drug sales case that I could file against him,
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based on his testimony. I texted my investigator from the courtroom to run his criminal
history while I questioned him, and learned that because of his criminal history, any
felony conviction (even for simple possession of controlled substances, based on thenexisting law in California) could get him sent to prison for life. So I knew logically he
must have a complete defense to any subsequent case that we file against him. The only
defense I could come up with was that he could somehow later prove that his statement
was incorrect, that he was in custody at the time, or could somehow definitely prove that
he was not where he claims he was at that time to hide the drugs. My investigator did not
see any new convictions around the time of the offense that would have had him in
custody, but I was confident we would eventually be able to prove he was in custody. So
I got him boxed in to a particular date for his statement. I asked him how he knew it was
on this particular date that he hid the narcotics (the actual date of the incident) and he said
because that’s the day before his daughter’s birthday. I asked him how he knew it was
that particular year (two years had passed since the crime) and he pulled up his sleeve to
reveal a date tattooed on his shoulder, and he said that was the same year a friend of his
was murdered. I questioned him for the rest of the day about the location of the drugs and
how they were packaged, and he answered perfectly. It was clear that he had studied the
evidence. Finally, I got him to admit that the only person he knew at that house was the
defendant, and that he considered her to be a good friend.

By the next morning, I was able to get a hold of one of the witness’s parole
agents, who eventually was able to tell me that although the witness did not suffer a new
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criminal conviction around the time of the offense, he was in State custody for a parole
violation during this incident, and that custody began three months before this incident
and continued for an additional 6 months after. I provided this information to the defense
as soon as I got it, and of course they asked the judge to exclude it from trial. The judge
allowed me to impeach the witness. The jury convicted the defendant of possession of
cocaine for sale. I later filed perjury charges against that witness for lying under oath, and
he eventually pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 6 years in prison.

Assumption Number Six: All Witnesses Have Value in a Criminal Case…Even
Those who Lie.
Some trial attorneys assume that a witness who lies is useless to a criminal case,
but it is not improper for the jury to consider why a particular witness lied, and in most
cases, a witness’s lie can open the door to other evidence that likely would have been
excluded from trial otherwise. As with most of these assumptions, the key to taking full
advantage of assumption number six is thorough preparation before and during trial.
In the previous example with the mother and son drug sales team, I did not argue that the
jury should disregard that perjured testimony. To the contrary, I asked them to consider
why he would have lied to protect the defendant if the defendant was actually not guilty,
and to ask themselves where he would have gotten such detailed information about the
location of the drugs, since we know he wasn’t there, and we know his only contact at
that house is the defendant. Similarly, in the earlier example of the carjacker who
fabricated a phone call with the alleged victim, I actually intended on using that phone
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call as part of my case, to show consciousness of guilt. The argument is that only a guilty
person would go through the effort of creating that false evidence. Based on that single
phone call, I pulled all of the defendant’s in custody calls, and eventually found contact
with another person who recently got out of jail. I interviewed that person and played the
‘victim’ phone call for him, and he eventually admitted the ‘victim’ on the call was his
girlfriend, that the defendant paid him to have her make the phone call, and that the call
was in fact scripted. I also found a call where the defendant could be heard talking to the
defense attorney about this fabricated phone call. The defense attorney was smart not to
discuss it on the recorded call, but the defendant was not as cautious, as he mistakenly
believed the call could not be recorded because the attorney was on the line (these
communications are normally privileged and can’t be recorded, but the defendant
contacted his attorney using a three-way calling feature with his mom, which waives the
privilege). Based on that recording, the defense attorney was forced to withdraw from the
case as he could now be called as a witness to this fabrication of evidence.
I had an attempted murder case about ten years ago where the defendant took the
stand to claim he was not the one who tried to kill another inmate that he was serving
time with. Normally in a criminal case in California, I cannot introduce any evidence of a
defendant’s bad character (like prior crimes or prior bad acts), but I can do so to rebut or
impeach a defense claim that the defendant has a good character (at least for the same
character trait, like honesty, non-violence, etc). So a defendant’s bad character cannot
normally come in unless the defense first ‘opens the door’ to such evidence by claiming
the defendant has a good character. During the defendant’s cross examination he claimed
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he wouldn’t have tried to kill the victim because the defendant was “a good Christian.”
This blanket lie opened the door to so much more evidence than a more narrow lie would
have. For example, if he said he was an honest person, that wouldn’t necessarily open the
door to prior violence. This blanket statement opened the door to any evidence I had that
would be inconsistent with the actions of a good Christian. I was able to ask so many
questions that would have otherwise been excluded. Were you a good Christian when you
raped an 8 year old boy? Were you a good Christian when you threatened to kill two
different cellmates? The jury convicted the defendant as charged.
The point of all this is that a lying witness can still bring something valuable to a
criminal case, as long as the prosecutor can effectively reveal the lie, and then ask the
jury to consider logical questions about how and why the lie came about.

Assumption Number Seven: The motive to lie is time and place-specific.
Just as we saw with the staged limping in front of the jury, testimony that is
untruthful is staged, and as such the lie tends to only exist when the show is going on.
This means that with enough preparation, the well-prepared prosecutor may be able to
find a document or a statement from the lying witness (from a different time or in a
different context) that contradicts their testimony on the stand. The key to this sort of
preparation is making logical assessments based on a witness’s motive to lie, recognizing
that the motive to lie that exists while testifying may not exist at a different time or in a
different context. The two examples that come to mind to highlight how assumption
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number seven works in practice come from a white collar case that was discussed earlier
and a drug sales cases that hasn’t been discussed yet.

In the white-collar case discussed earlier, the two lies that the defendant initially
told were that the extra pay was either legitimate salary that she earned (but the owner
wanted to avoid payroll taxes, which was consistent with what the jury heard about a
payroll tax investigation) or was a loan authorized by the owner (who was dead at the
time of trial and unable to rebut defendant’s claims). After the owner committed suicide
and the business closed, but before the defendant was a suspect in the embezzlement
case, the defendant got a new job. When trial started, I had a theory that the defendant
might have been starting a new financial scheme, and I was able to get ahold of her
application materials at that new job, and in those materials, the defendant wrote her
actual authorized salary at the contracting business (exactly $45,500 per year), and not
the total amount that she actually paid herself (around $100,000 per year). Before
confronting her with this discrepancy, I got the defendant to admit that she understood
that her salary history could be used to calculate her starting salary in her new position
(thus, if anything, she had a motive to make that number seem as high as possible, unless
it would incriminate her), and that given the owner’s death and the posture of the
contracting business at the time she applied to her new job, there really was no way for
her new employer to verify the salary history. After I confronted her with the salary
history issue, she then claimed that the money was a loan. The jury convicted the
defendant as charged, but it should be noted here that the information I obtained from the
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defendant’s new employer is not a normal part of criminal discovery. I sought that
information out on my own based on the assumption that she might have been engaged in
some kind of new financial scheme at her new place of employment, based on the
assumption that people who commit fraud or are dishonest tend to engage in similar
schemes and dishonesty over and over again, in all aspects of their lives. I could not
prove that she was stealing from her new employer, but obtaining that additional
otherwise-irrelevant evidence eventually paid off, albeit in an unexpected way.

Here we see that often times, a prosecutor’s success relies on improvisation, that
at first glance might look like dumb luck. Sure, I was lucky that the defendant made a
statement (about her salary) that I could disprove (due to the application materials at the
new job), but I would not have been able to take advantage of that opportunity if I hadn’t
earlier requested those records (before I knew they would even be relevant to my case)
and had enough familiarity with the records to cross-examine the defendant.
The second example that highlights assumption number seven is a drug sales case
that will be discussed again under assumption number eight. I had a drug sales case about
15 years ago where the officer conducted a parole search of the defendant’s home, while
he was present, and found an amount of methamphetamine that was consistent with
possession for sales. The officer and the defendant worked out a deal where the officer
would not submit the case for prosecution if the defendant would provide information to
the officer about his suppliers. The defendant delayed the officer month after month, and
after six months of not producing, the officer arrested the defendant on that original
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possession for sales charge. By the time the officer arrested the defendant, he had moved
out of that apartment, and as stupid as it sounds, the defense at trial was mistaken
identity. In other words, the defense was claiming it was someone else who was
originally contacted six months prior. At the defendant’s apartment. For defendant’s
parole search. This case took place long before officers in my county were using body
cameras, and no photographs were taken of the defendant at the time that he was
originally found with drugs.
Among the parade of false and misleading witnesses that the defense produced to
try to show the defendant did not live at the house at the time that he was first contacted
with drugs by the officer, the defense called the defendant himself, and the apartment
maintenance manager. The defendant claimed he had moved out of the apartment in
January, and could not have been present in the apartment when the officer found drugs
in it in May. Among various records that I pulled before trial was a signed declaration
under penalty of perjury that the defendant signed in April, in which he swore he still
resided at the apartment where the crime took place (this affidavit was required for him to
receive public benefits for caring for a special needs child), as well as a bus schedule with
a signed affidavit for a special accommodation with the school district for that special
needs child that was up to date as of May, indicating that the child and the defendant still
lived at that house in May. These documents are not a normal part of a criminal
investigation for a drug charge, but as a prosecutor, I routinely pulled all the documents
that I could think of in a criminal case, knowing that it could be relevant at some point.
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The defendant had no answer for how his daughter was getting home from school,
but testified that they lived together, that he was her caretaker, and admitted that his own
vehicle could not safely transport her with her wheelchair. In closing arguments to the
jury, I asked them to consider which version of the defendant’s move-out date made more
sense, the one that the defendant and his daughter used to get transportation to and from
school everyday and to get financial assistance, or the one the defendant came up with in
court to escape a conviction, since the move out dates were mutually exclusive. The jury
convicted the defendant as charged.

Assumption Number Eight: Sometimes it is the Attorney who is ‘Lying’.
This is a sensitive area for trial, since technically I cannot hold an attorney’s lies
against his client (and neither can the jury), so I can’t argue some kind of malfeasance by
the client based on the attorney’s actions, the way that I could argue if it were the
defendant lying on the stand. But when the attorney does lie, or when I suspect the
attorney is trying to mislead the jury, myself, or the judge, that suspicion can help me
focus my limited time and resources in trial on the issues that are likely to pay off. So
while I cannot affirmatively hold the attorney’s lies against the client, those lies make it
easier for me to find the actual evidence that is most probative with regard to the
defendant’s guilt. I’ll use three cases to highlight how assumption number eight has
benefited me in trial. Two of these cases have been discussed previously.
In the case involving the drug dealer with the special needs daughter who claimed
he was moved out of the apartment by the time the cops found drugs in the apartment, the
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attorney produced a surprise witness after I destroyed the defendant’s claim of moving on
cross examination. When the defense attorney called the apartment maintenance manager
to the stand, with no notice whatsoever, I assumed the witness would probably be lying
(see assumptions above), but to my surprise, I was wrong. The witness was actually
honest, but the defense attorney was not.

The maintenance manager did not speak English, and the defense attorney did not
speak Spanish. Nonetheless, through a translator, the defense attorney asked the witness
if he had earlier met with the defense attorney to discuss the defendant’s living situation.
The witness admitted that he had. The defense attorney asked the witness if he
recognized the defendant in court as someone who once lived at the apartment complex,
and the witness agreed that he did recognize the defendant as a former resident of the
apartment complex. The defense attorney then pulled a piece of paper out of his own
pocket and showed it to the witness and asked (still through a translator) whether the
signature on the paper was the witness’s signature, and he agreed that he had signed it.
Those were all the questions the defense asked. The defense attorney grabbed the piece of
paper and put it back in his pocket, and I asked the judge to order the defense attorney to
allow me to inspect the paper and use it on cross examination if I chose to do so. I did not
know what I would find, but I knew that given the cryptic questioning and exhibit, the
defense attorney seemed to be trying to mislead us and possibly the witness.
I assumed the defense attorney would try to ‘show’ this paper to the jury during
closing arguments even though it had not been admitted as evidence (a trick that is
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absolutely unethical even for a defense attorney, but would have been entirely consistent
with this particular defense attorney’s modus operandi).

The court agreed to my request, and when I looked at the piece of paper, I noticed there
was a fold line above the signature, and on the other side of the fold line was a statement
(written in English) that declared under penalty of perjury that the defendant moved out
of the apartment in January and did not live there in May. I asked the witness to read the
writing that was on the paper and he said (through a translator) that he could not read it. I
asked him if he could see any writing on the paper when he signed it, and he said it was
blank, it was just a folded slip of paper. I asked the witness what the attorney told him to
get him to sign a blank piece of paper, and he said he thought the attorney said if he
signed the paper he wouldn’t have to come to court, but he could not be sure because he
could not really understand him, given the witness’s limited English. I asked the defense
witness when the defendant moved out of the apartment complex, and he said he thought
it was in July, but he knew it was during summer break because he remembered that the
defendant’s daughter took a special bus to and from school during the spring for that
school year. The jury convicted the defendant as charged.
The next case example that highlights the application of assumption number eight
involves the carjacker who (likely working with his attorney) fabricated a phone call with
a pretend victim. When the defense attorney presented me with a transcript of the call,
but not the actual audio, and refused to waive time to give me a chance to investigate the
claim that if true would seem to completely exonerate his client, I strongly suspected that
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there was something suspicious about the proffered evidence. That instinct led to the
discovery of a conspiracy to fabricate evidence that would provide powerful proof at trial,
tending to show the defendant was guilty of the carjacking.
The final example of assumption number eight in action involves a particularly
brutal kidnaping, torture, extortion, and rape in concert case that I had for trial, involving
two victims and three defendants. The alleged kidnapping, torture, extortion, and rape of
the two victims occurred at a medical marijuana shop. I was assigned to the case on the
eve of trial, after the defense attorneys were successful at getting the prior prosecutor
removed from the case. There were a substantial number of video clips from the shop
surveillance program, and as soon as I got the case I began reviewing those clips. When
we were sent to trial, the defense asked the judge to demand a stipulation or agreement
from me that indicated that the defense had all the surveillance that was seized in the
case, and that I be prohibited from using any video surveillance that was not included in
the defense attorney’s exhibit. I told him that if he gave me a copy of his exhibit I could
check it against my file, but he refused. The incident stuck out in my mind as we began
trial, and I assumed the defense was attempting to hide portions of the video.
When the defense attorney introduced the video at trial, I had my investigator
copy the exhibit and compare it to the discovery that we sent to the defense. Out of 22
video clips, there were three missing from the defense exhibit. In one of those deleted
videos, a defendant could be heard on the phone describing how he had one of the
victims stripped down to his boxers and chained to a bolt in the floor like a dog. Another
deleted video showed one of the defendants forcing one of the victims into the bathroom,
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where she says she was raped. In a third deleted video, the defendants were seen
disabling the video surveillance system and beginning to remove the hard drive for the
recorder, before the video cut out. Assumption number eight allowed me to begin
focusing my attention and time on those three videos that the defense attempted to
exclude. In all three examples, the fact that the defense was trying to hide something or
mislead the court or counsel gave me a clear indication of where to look for evidence that
was most probative as to each defendant’s guilt.

Assumption Number Nine: No Amount of Evidence can Overcome the Narrative
that each Juror Builds in their own Mind.
The ninth assumption has less to do with witnesses and evidence, and everything
to do with how the jurors process that information. I can try to weave the evidence
presented in a way that presents a coherent narrative that points to guilt, but in the end, it
is each juror’s own version of the case that controls their decision in the case. Even the
process of trying to lead the jury to build a narrative must itself be informed by the
expectations of the jury. Kenneth Burke described the challenge of persuasion as follows:
"[y]ou persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture,
tonality, order, image,
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his." (Burke, 1931, at 55, as quoted in Conti,
2001, at 460).
Instead of forcing a narrative that may or may not be accepted by the jurors, I try
to present information in a way that is most likely to lead each juror to build their
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narrative around a story that points to guilt. Each juror may have a different image in
their minds when discussing a topic for which the evidence provided no image. The
impact that images have on how an audience perceives an issue and interprets facts is
well documented (Denham, Cacciatore & Caves, 2021; Gibson & Zillman, 2000). For
critical images, I try to use actual pictures and videos, and for those areas where the
evidence may be ambiguous or open to each juror’s interpretation, instead of trying to
force a particular narrative in closing argument, which a juror may accept or reject, I try
to highlight those facts in closing arguments that are most likely to lead to each juror
building their own version of a guilty narrative. The narrative that each juror builds will
‘feel’ more reasonable to each juror than anything that I craft, based on my own life
experiences and bias, but in highlighting the relevant facts that are most likely to lead to a
guilty narrative, there are some techniques I have used to emphasize particular facts and
feelings. Most of these techniques related to decision making and thinking are covered in
Daniel Kahneman’s book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, but the two related concepts that I
have used with some success in my bricolage prosecutor’s rhetoric are primacy and
salience. Both concepts deal with how the order that we receive information impacts how
it affects our decision making. Primacy deals with the cognitive effect of the order in
which information is presented, while salience has to do with how we attend to things
that appear new, unique, or prominent, and priming refers to the impact of hearing or
seeing a concept shortly before you are presented with a scenario in which that concept
could apply (Berger, 2013).
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As is the case with many of the techniques that influence our decision-making
processes, those techniques that go unnoticed are often the most effective, as the
techniques impact the audience without the audience even being aware of how those
techniques are impacting them, so they cannot guard against that impact. I’ll use a single
example of how I have effectively used timing in trial to try to influence a jury.

Seven years ago I tried a murder case in front of a jury. After weeks of jury
selection and a few days of witness testimony that was largely dry and procedural,
especially for a murder case, I decided to call my pathologist at 4:00pm on a Friday.
Knowing that the court would break at 4:30pm, and that I would essentially have half an
hour to have the pathologist discuss the injuries in the case (and knowing the injuries
were our strongest evidence in this brutal murder) and that the jurors would likely spend
all weekend thinking about those injuries and images, I felt like I could use that timing
and the weekend break to allow the strongest parts of the case to really sink in, without
the defense having the opportunity to try to mitigate the impact of those facts or images
before the weekend break. In this way, the weekend break in evidence worked to my
advantage as the jury would likely dwell on the most powerful evidence in my case over
the weekend. During this process, many jurors would also try to make sense out of the
evidence by building their own narratives, and this helped me achieve a conviction. In
this case, the two day gap in testimony would actually help my case, as I could fill up the
entire half hour with the strongest evidence possible, with no opportunity for the defense
to cushion the blow through cross examination before the weekend, and then on Monday,
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I could go through the evidence methodically, without any time constraints, knowing that
most of the jurors likely spent the weekend thinking about the extent of the injuries.

Just before the jury returned a guilty verdict for murder, my supervisor who had
been watching the case said she felt like perhaps my presentation should have been more
organized, and she felt like calling the pathologist at 4pm on a Friday was a mistake. I
knew that if my own supervisor (who was technically an attorney) did not see what the
tactical advantage was in presenting on a Friday, and then rehashing on Monday, then it
was unlikely that lay jurors would have picked up on the technique.

Assumption Number Ten: Unethical Behavior Tends to Snowball, and Cannot
Usually be Compartmentalized.
The final assumption is related to how I have come to view unethical defendants,
witnesses, defense attorneys, and even a few unethical prosecutors. My experience has
been that in general, someone who is unethical in some aspect of their life is likely
eventually going to be unethical in other aspects of their life. Although this may not
always be true, it has been my experience that this is the case. Every time I encountered
someone who was unethical only in their personal life, it was only a matter of time before
I saw something unethical in their professional practice as well. Knowing this to be true
has helped me to expect dishonesty from particular defense attorneys in all that they do
(such that I refuse to be alone with those particular attorneys unless I have a witness with
me), and has also taught me to treat the few unethical prosecutors that I have encountered
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with a similar degree of suspicion and to keep those people at a distance whenever
possible. This lived experience will be relevant in Chapter Two, when we consider
whether the Aristotelian, Ciceronian, and Quintilianic notion—that a good orator should
first be a good person—is really that naïve and unrealistic, or whether this assumption
that someone who is a bad person on their personal life will likely be unethical in their
professional life as well, makes the ‘good person speaking well’ standard more
appropriate, particularly for American Prosecutors.
The anecdotal assumptions above were developed over the past fifteen years of
working as a prosecutor, in the absence of formal rhetorical education. In future chapters,
I will address what a formal prosecutor’s rhetoric would look like, having the benefit of
rhetorical education that has been removed from the legal academy for the past few
hundred years.

The assumptions listed above give the reader a sense of what my own self-styled
prosecutor’s rhetoric looked like in the absence of any formal academic education in
rhetoric. In addition to a tradecraft that embraces the spirit (though not always the form)
of poetics and acknowledges the power of narrative storytelling, my own amateur
prosecutor’s rhetoric acknowledges the limits of linear logic and recognizes pattern
formation as an alternative method of persuasion. As I indicated in my introduction, most
of my research involves borrowing or relocating concepts from other academic fields to
be used for the benefit of the American Prosecutor. Since most of these concepts are not
native to the legal field (although some, like rhetoric, were once part and parcel of legal
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pedagogy), some of these concepts may not map well to criminal prosecution, or at least
to the role that American Prosecutors envision for themselves. For example, an admission
of the limits of linear logic within the context of criminal prosecution may not sit well
with most prosecutors at first blush. However, most prosecutors have experienced these
limits firsthand, whether from an unexpected jury verdict, an unpredictable witness, or
even a judge who seems to deviate from what appears to be black letter law. Other
concepts from creative fields, such as pattern formation as an alternative method of
persuasion, translate surprisingly well to the field of criminal prosecution. I have
personally used some version of pattern recognition and formation in most of my trials.
I’ll discuss two brief examples from my own career where pattern formation led to a
guilty verdict.

The first example comes from the cold hit DNA rape and murder that inspired the
poem 1979. Due to the age of the case, we had very little live testimony available
regarding the actions of the defendant by the time we got to trial in 2005. In fact, the
defendant was not even a suspect in the case until a cold hit DNA match linked him to the
crime in the early 2000s. This meant that unless the prosecution could find some creative
way to bring the facts to life in the form of live testimony, jurors would basically hear
about two sets of facts; one set of facts from a few decades prior, dealing only with the
victim, and then another set of facts dealing only with how the defendant’s DNA matched
samples found on the victim’s body. There wasn’t much else connecting the defendant to
the crime. It is true that since the murder and rape in 1979, the defendant had been to
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prison and convicted of numerous violent crimes against women, but typically the jury
would be prohibited from hearing about such prior bad acts, due to the general
prohibition against character evidence to prove conduct on a particular date. In
California, that prohibition on character evidence is codified in California Evidence Code
section 1101(a). However, under Evidence code 1101(b), those prior bad acts can be
introduced for another purpose, such as to prove the identity of the perpetrator, but this
admission is subject to a balancing test by the judge, and most judges hesitate to grant
1101(b) motions as an improper admission of character evidence could form the basis of
a successful appeal (assuming there is a conviction in the first place). The attorney who
supervised me assigned me to write the 1101(b) motion, and informed me that it was
highly unlikely that the motion would be granted. Without getting into the details of the
law surrounding a successful 1101(b) motion, the motion depends on pattern formation.
If the judge finds that the similarities between the prior bad acts and the current offense
are so great and so unique, that a person looking at the defendant’s old crimes and the
new case would say that the new case bears the hallmark or signature elements of the
defendant’s unique method of committing crimes, and that those methods are so unique
to the defendant and so common among his offenses that those similarities can actually
be used to identify him as the perpetrator, then (and only then) can those prior bad acts be
admitted as evidence to the jury.
I spent a significant amount of time finding as many similarities as possible
between the defendant’s prior bad acts and the instant offense, and by the end of the
motion, I had convinced myself that the pattern was so unique to him and that the
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similarities among the bad acts were so pervasive that it would have to be enough to
overcome the general prohibition on character evidence. To my surprise, and the surprise
of my supervising attorney, the judge felt the same way, so the jury heard about how the
defendant left his girlfriend for dead in the trunk of her own car, and how he carjacked a
woman with her kid in the car near the Mexican border. Each one of these similarities
seem like relatively minor coincidences, but when presented together, the defendant’s
crimes told a powerful story. I won’t recite the details of the motion here, except to say
that some of the common details were as innocuous as all of the crimes involved the use
of a car, within ½ of mile of a major freeway, to something as specific as, all of the
victims were women, who were particularly vulnerable due to the presence of children or
pregnancy, where he harmed or threatened to harm the victim’s neck, and where he
discarded the victim along a public street or waterway.

About a decade after the conviction and death verdict in that case, I had a prison
weapon case where the deck really seemed to be stacked against me. In this case, I used
pattern recognition, where the limits of linear logic failed me. The basic scenario is two
inmates were passing through a metal detector and the metal detector indicated that they
each likely had a weapon hidden somewhere, probably in their anal cavities. The metal
detector results could not be revealed to the jury due to an issue with witness availability
and some machine calibration issue, but the jury did hear that the two were suspected of
concealing weapons and were put on contraband surveillance watch for 72 hours, where
an officer would monitor their bowel movements to see if they had weapons. At the end
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of the 72 hours, both inmates demanded to be taken back to their cells and both were able
to pass through metal detectors without any alerts, but a metallic weapon was found
hidden inside the mattress that was in each of the two cells.
The defense called 19 different officers to the stand, and they all testified that
during their shift, they watched each inmate, and did not see any movements consistent
with removing a weapon from inside their bodies or hiding a weapon inside a mattress,
and if they had seen such movements, they would have noted such activity in the log,
which was admitted as evidence by the defense. In my closing argument, I had the logs
enlarged and displayed on a big screen, and in addition to discussing how unlikely it is
that a person watched another person for 8 or 12 hours straight, without interruption or
distractions, without going to the bathroom, taking a break, sleeping, reading, or
otherwise looking away, I highlighted the portions of the log where there was only a
single observer for both inmates, and I also highlighted the portions in that log where
there was single coverage and one of the inmates engaged the single observer in
conversation. Through this detailed pattern formation, I was able to show during closing
arguments, using the defenses’ own exhibits, where each defendant engaged a single
observer in conversation, while the other defendant would have been free to hide a
weapon, and to show that both engaged a single observer before a weapon was found in
the other inmate’s mattress, and only when both inmates would have had the chance to
hide their weapons did they both say that they didn’t have any weapons and they
demanded to go through a metal detector to return to their cells. The jury eventually
returned guilty verdicts for both defendants.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LOST HISTORY OF LAW SCHOOL AND THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR

This chapter will dig deep into the history of classical rhetoric, explore the
reasons why rhetoric no longer has a permanent home in law school pedagogy, and
explore the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian to find the ideological roots of
the philosophy behind the ethical duties of the modern American prosecutor. As alluded
to in Chapter One, I will attempt where appropriate to model those methodologies that
are relevant to prosecutor’s rhetoric throughout this research project. Consistent with this
project’s focus on narrative storytelling, the MyStory concept, and a general
autobiographical approach (that demonstrates the author’s ethos), this modeling will
include narratives and descriptions of what led the author to particular conclusions and
points of analysis.

The notion that we would need a bridge to connect legal education to rhetoric
seems strange, since the practice of law is widely accepted as explicitly rhetorical, and
trial work is specifically recognized as a process driven by persuasive legal
argumentation (Clements, 2013; Balkin, 1996; Wetlaufer, 1990). Many researchers have
noted that rhetoric was born out of the need to make legal arguments, and education in
rhetoric once made up a significant portion of the field of legal pedagogy (Conti, 2001;
Balkin, 1996). The very notion that rhetorical study and law school pedagogy is
considered interdisciplinary is inconsistent with the historical evolution of legal
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pedagogy, as rhetorical training was once an integral part of classical legal training
(Frost, 1999; Balkin, 1996; Reinard, 2013).

Over time, persuasion was removed from rhetoric, and rhetoric was removed from
legal studies. During the Enlightenment period, persuasion was viewed skeptically, and
within rhetorical study, persuasion was relegated to secondary importance, while issues
related to taste and sympathy took center stage (Hogan, 2013). Beginning in the 16th
century, rhetoric came under concerted attack, and eventually, persuasion would be
stripped from rhetoric (Hogan, 2013). The desire to purge persuasion from rhetoric, and
the general skepticism of rhetoric, grew out of fear that public opinion could be
manipulated by clever, persuasive rhetors (Hogan, 2013). This attack on rhetoric seems
reminiscent of the ancient moves against the sophists. Collectively, the work of Kant,
Hobbes, and Rousseau eventually served to banish rhetoric from the realm of public
politics to literary disciplines (Hogan, 2013). The political motivation for this sort of
academic excising makes sense; those in power feared what a skilled orator could do to
upset the status quo.

The true irony of using the persuasive aspects the law-as-literature movement to
re-situate a rhetorics of persuasion within legal pedagogy is that ideologically, and—but
for the political pressure to stifle the growing power of persuasion—historically,
persuasion and rhetoric should have a permanent home in legal pedagogy. We call it
‘law-as-literature’ even though it is really ‘law-as-rhetoric’, and but-for the forcible
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removal of persuasion from rhetoric, what we refer to here as law-as-literature would
simply be called law. Of course, this discounts the important contributions that literature
has made to the development of rhetoric in the intervening time period since persuasion
was excised from rhetoric, and rhetoric was exiled to literature. Some of these postdivorce contributions from literature and the humanities will be important to our
prosecutor’s rhetoric. The specific post-divorce contributions include Ulmer’s mystory
concept, narrative storytelling, and poetics, among others. Among the many goals of the
proposed prosecutor’s rhetoric is to reconnect the modern American Prosecutor to those
classical rhetorical roots, and also leverage rhetorical developments from the humanities
(such as Ulmer’s mystory, narrative, and poetics) to enhance the prosecutor’s rhetoric. It
seems clear enough that we can find a way to connect the modern American Prosecutor’s
rhetoric to classical rhetoric, but as this research has asked throughout these chapters,
should we do so, and if so, why?

There is value in connecting prosecutorial rhetoric to its ancient roots, and in
comparing that rhetoric to what we see in the humanities. There are immediate and longterm benefits to explicitly tracing the prosecutor’s rhetoric to its ancestral roots. In terms
of immediate benefit, there are a number of ancient rhetorical concepts that still have
relevance to modern legal practice (Hogan, 2013). Two examples of ancient rhetorical
concepts that have stood the test of time are analogy and commonplaces or topics. That
the analogy—in all its various forms—has broad application in modern legal practice is
widely accepted as true (Brewer, 1996; Berger, 2013; Goodrich, 1984).

102

Likewise, the ancient concept of topics or commonplaces still has applicability in
modern legal practice, although the topics themselves have changed (Balkin, 1996). With
regard to narrative storytelling, law is literally created from storytelling, and the
profession has been infused with storytelling since the birth of ancient rhetoric (Edwards,
1996). From the witness’s storytelling on the stand, through the prosecutor’s storytelling
in closing arguments, to an appellate judge’s storytelling in a written opinion, the trial
process is replete with storytelling, and for good reason: storytelling brings to life for the
jury a series of events that they did not witness themselves but that they are nonetheless
required to judge. Narrative storytelling is integral to the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

In terms of long-term benefits, tracing the historical roots of the prosecutor’s
rhetoric provides context that allows us to locate the sources of and inspiration for the
various ideas that shape the prosecutor’s rhetoric. This locational information is not
merely some historical triviality; naming the sources of inspiration for the prosecutor’s
rhetoric will allow future scholars to situate their own discourse into a broader historical
and cultural context, enabling interdisciplinary studies, while also affording the field of
prosecutorial rhetoric the orientation that it needs in order to expand and evolve. Such
locational information could also be helpful to the academic dismantling/ humanistic
critique of the prosecutor’s rhetoric.
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At the outset, this chapter should dispel any misconception that the author
believes that the role of the modern American Prosecutor actually evolved from the
written works or philosophies of Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian. To be clear, this chapter
is not attempting to chart the evolution in fact of the role of the American prosecutor
from ancient Greece to the modern American legal system. What this chapter will do is
discus the origins of classical rhetoric, address the reasons why rhetoric now finds itself
wholly outside the walls of the legal academy, and finally, highlight some language from
the works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian that resonates with the ethical duties of the
modern American Prosecutor. To borrow from Ulmer here, with regard to the
relationship among Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and the American Prosecutor, this
chapter uses pattern recognition and formation to draw parallels where such connections
would be out of reach for linear logic, and ultimately, this chapter will show that the
American Prosecutor is the proper (and only) heir to the ancient concept of the orator as a
priest of the law, doing justice. There is no other role in modern American society that is
consistent with the orator (a good person speaking well, and a priest of the law, doing
justice). Thus, although the American Prosecutor cannot in fact trace the lineage of her
role in the justice system to Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian, their collective concept of the
orator as a good person speaking well, and as a priest of the law, doing justice, is
nonetheless the ideological ancestor of the modern American Prosecutor.

Thus, having outlined the practical benefits of reconnecting the modern American
Prosecutor to her classic rhetorical ancestors, the remainder of chapter two will detail
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how and why rhetoric was reduced to mere style and relegated to the humanities, and will
close with a pattern analysis of sorts, comparing the role of the modern American
Prosecutor to the Aristotelian, Ciceronian, and Quintilianic(?) concepts of the ideal orator
as a good person, speaking well, as a priest of the law, doing justice.

Rhetoric, Rhetoric, Wherefore Art Thou, Rhetoric?
Given what we know about how the art and science of rhetoric came to be, and
what we know about the actual work of modern attorneys (and American prosecutors in
particular), it seems hard to believe that formal coursework in rhetoric is not a
fundamental component of required legal education in the United States. Rhetoric and
persuasion form the very basis of virtually all legal arguments. From the inception of
what we know to be the teaching and study of rhetoric, during the fifth century in
Syracuse, the need to make legal arguments has been a primary focus of rhetoric (Frost,
1999). The earliest records of the teaching and practice of rhetoric connect those
practices to the desire of individuals in Syracuse who wanted to try to claim back land
that had been taken by tyrants of Sicily (Frost, 1999). The need to make legal arguments
was the impetus for the birth of rhetoric as we know it.

Today, effective persuasion and rhetorical skill are the lifeblood of the legal
profession. Persuasion and rhetoric allow attorneys to right wrongs in court, and in terms
of the impact or limits of persuasion and rhetoric in the context of attorneys, these skills
have upended the status quo, removed politicians from office, and ended segregation. In
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terms of consequences, persuasion and rhetoric can mean the difference between life and
death (in a death penalty prosecution). So the reader is left to wonder, if persuasion and
rhetoric are so essential for lawyers to be able to harness the power of the law and the
legal profession, why has rhetoric been kicked out of law school and relegated to the
humanities?

The answer to this question, as it turns out, is that it is precisely the potential
power of rhetoric and persuasion to upend the status quo that led to its expulsion from
law school. As was the case with the sophists centuries earlier (Hunt, 1965), leaders
during the 16th and 17th centuries came to fear the idea of a well-spoken rhetorician, and
the potential that such an orator (even one who did not speak from a position of privilege
or authority) could upend the status quo (Hogan, 2013). Peter Goodrich (1984) describes
the inherent danger of rhetoric and the perennial threat that it posed to privileged classes,
thus necessitating its relegation into futility, as follows:

Without entering into any of the disputes as to the precise
periodization of the various mutations and indeed
mutilations of the rhetorical domain, it does at least seem
clear that the status of rhetoric has always been the subject
of philosophical attack. Before it became futile, rhetoric
was dangerous…rhetoric was a great leveller (sic) of
discourse; all discursive activity was to be analyzed in
terms of its fundamental equality. (Goodrich, 1984, p. 100).

As political fanaticism grew during the 16th and 17th centuries, a movement that
some have called the early “modern attack on rhetoric” began (Garsten, 2006; Hogan,
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2013). Contemporary philosophers including Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant promulgated
various theories on rhetoric that had, when taken together, the cumulative effect of both
downplaying the role of individual judgement and persuasion in government and
removing rhetoric from the political realm and reclassifying rhetoric as a literary
enterprise (Garsten, 2006; Hogan, 2013). While Hobbes championed a ‘rhetoric of
representation,’ Rousseau pursued a rhetoric of ‘prophetic nationalism’, and Kant
promoted his own ‘rhetoric of public reason’ (Garsten, 2006; Hogan, 2013).

Though their philosophies and methods may have differed, impact on the field of
rhetoric was unmistakable; the concept of private citizens weighing in on public
discourse and politics—the predominate means of rhetorical practice for the average
citizen—became irrelevant.

The shift in rhetoric from persuasion to literature and aesthetics reached a
crescendo during the 18th and 19th centuries (Garsten, 2006; Hogan, 2013). The transition
to the focus on aesthetics and away from invention in rhetoric was most obvious in the
belletristic movement, led by George Campbell and Hugh Blair in the late 18th century
(Hogan, 2013). This transition significantly expanded the scope of rhetoric, to include
literature, creative writing, and the so-called ‘polite arts’ (Garsten, 2006; Hogan, 2013).
As rhetoric found its permanent home in literature, it lost its place of prominence in the
law.
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Although early in our Nation’s history the practice of law was influenced by
English legal traditions, legal education in the United States took place in Universities,
while the English system of training lawyers had historically occurred in ‘Inns of Court’
through apprenticeship (Harno, 2004). Apprenticeship inevitably involved learning the
common law from judges (Harno, 2004). Common law is a form of binding precedent
that is promulgated through the courts by judges in the form of a case opinion, rather than
through a legislative branch in the form of a code or statute.

In the United States, law school eventually found its home in universities (as
opposed to Inns of Court), although early colonial legal training took place largely
through apprenticeship (Harno, 2004). It wasn’t until the creation of chairs of law at
universities that legal education in the United States began to transition from a disjointed
constellation of piecemeal apprenticeships to a more formal academic study (Harno,
2004). Arguably the most notable of these chairs of law was created at Willaim and Mary
College in 1779 under the guidance of Thomas Jefferson (Harno, 2004). The trend
toward creating chairs of law and dedicated departments and faculty for law continued at
major universities, with Harvard appointing its first law professor in 1815, and the
University of Maryland establishing its first law professor position the following year
(Harno, 2004). As legal education spread to various U.S. universities, the method of
teaching law also continued to evolve (Harno, 2004). The next major legal education
milestone in the United States occurred with the rise of the case method of teaching law.
This method was championed by Christopher Columbus Langdell in U.S. law schools in
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the early 1870’s, and was defined by study of common law, not unlike the English
tradition (Harno, 2004).

The move toward the so-called case method of teaching law in the United States
influenced how we teach law even today (Harno, 2004). Of note is that the case book
method does not contemplate any formal instruction in rhetoric or persuasion. Karl
Llewellyn described the case method as follows: “We have learned that the concrete
instance, the heaping up of concrete instances, the present, vital memory of a multitude of
concrete instances, is necessary in order to make any general proposition, be it a rule of
law or any other, mean anything at all” (Llewellyn, 1930).

Given the timing of persuasion’s excise from rhetoric, and rhetoric’s (at least,
what was left of it) subsequent relegation to the ‘polite arts,’ and the years that it took for
the American law school to transition from apprenticeship to a more formal academic
study in a university setting, it seems clear that rhetoric didn’t actually lose its home in
the American law school. Rhetoric never had a home in the American Law school to
begin with, making the intervention of a prosecutor’s rhetoric all the more necessary.

Some would argue that since the practice of law is inherently rhetorical,
applicants to law school should already have adequate formal training in rhetoric before
even beginning law school. The logical assumption is that rhetoric would be incorporated
into undergraduate work through pre-law education, but most law schools in the United
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States require only a bachelor’s degree, in any subject (ABA Standard 502, 2018). There
may have been a time in the United States when law schools required or expected
applicants to complete a pre-law educational program that included rhetorical training,
but those requirements no longer exist, according to the current educational standards of
American Bar Association.

The gap in required pre-law rhetorical education has not been filled by required
law school education. Required curriculum for law school includes substantive areas,
such as professional responsibility, but does not include rhetorical training (ABA
Standard 303, 2018). ABA standards do require some sort of clinical placement or
experiential learning opportunity (ABA Standard 304, 2018). However, there is no
assurance whatsoever that those working hours will include any instruction in rhetorical
methods. Simply put, there is no guarantee that new lawyers have ever had the kind of
rhetorical training that they will need by the time they graduate law school and pass the
bar exam. In short, the required curriculum at American law schools seems woefully
inadequate when it comes to training and education in rhetoric and oral advocacy
(Hanrahan, 2003).

Against this backdrop, there has been a broad educational and social shift away
from traditional civics education In the United States, with less opportunity for public
debate and discussion among everyday citizens (Hogan, 2013). So new law students are
entering law school without having completed any required education in rhetoric, at a
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time when the practice of informed public debate is increasingly on the decline, only to
eventually graduate from law school without any required formal instruction in rhetoric.
Not surprisingly, after spending three years in a learning environment that does not
emphasize persuasive oral advocacy and rhetoric, law school graduates tend to rank
rhetoric and advocacy as among the least important skillsets for new lawyers (Hanrahan,
2003).

There are particular fields of law and particular careers for attorneys that do not
necessarily demand attorneys to have a mastery of rhetoric. Some fields and some careers
are such that attorneys can learn as they go, without significant social costs. Unlike most
transactional and research attorneys, prosecutors (and public defenders) are immediately
thrown into trial after passing the bar (and in many cases, even before passing the bar,
under the supervision of an attorney). The compelling need for a formal rhetorical
training for prosecutors seems readily apparent. It is true that most public defenders are
also thrown into trial soon after law school, but the differences in the ethical duties
between a prosecutor and a public defender arguably make the need for rhetorical
training for prosecutors more pronounced than the need for such training for public
defenders, although clearly that need still exists.

A number of researchers have advocated for introducing various forms of
rhetorical training and concepts into legal education (see generally, Pangle, 1989;
Greenhaw, 1995; Hanrahan, 2003; Luke, 2019), with some specifically advocating for a
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revival of classical rhetorical methods in law school (Hanrahan, 2003), but few have
focused specifically on prosecutors.

In my experience, criminal prosecution is not one of those career fields where
new attorneys will have time to ‘learn to be competent’ after being hired, in large part
due to the ethical requirements and tremendous responsibilities of the modern American
prosecutor. Because of the substantial discretion that the prosecutor enjoys in the context
of the criminal justice system, a poorly trained prosecutor has the potential to do more
damage to the causes of justice—to hurt victims, defendants, and undermine the very
legitimacy of the entire legal system—than a similarly situated (poorly trained) defense
attorney could. So much of a prosecutor’s duties take place without oversight from the
court or defense counsel, and our system depends on the prosecutor’s exercise of restraint
and good judgment as she pursues justice. Without rhetorical training specifically
designed around a prosecutor’s unparalleled ethical mandate, the path to justice seems
less certain for the prosecutor.

The Role of the Modern American Prosecutor
The role of the American prosecutor has been defined as one who seeks justice,
using appropriate means to achieve just results, impartially and fairly, and who is
obligated to punish the guilty and protect the innocent (Caves, 2008; Berger v. U.S.,
1935). This role is not merely an aspirational description, it is a legal imperative that
must guide the actions of prosecutors in their professional practice, including production
of discovery, contact with witnesses, direct and cross examination, sentencing arguments,
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statements to the media, and even post-conviction actions. The ethical obligations of
prosecutors are unique among attorneys; all other attorneys have a duty to their client,
while the prosecutor’s duty is to the sovereign itself. That difference in ethical duties
between the prosecutor and the defense attorney means that a defense attorney is actually
obliged to defend even clients the attorney knows to be guilty, and seek to confuse or
undermine the testimony of witnesses the attorney knows to be truthful, if it will help his
otherwise guilty client avoid a conviction (U.S. v. Wade, 1967).

In contrast, the prosecutor cannot bring charges against a defendant unless those
charges are supported by probable cause (ABA rule 3.8; CA Bar Rule 5-110). The
prosecutor is obligated to disclose any information known to the prosecutor or the
prosecution team that could be exculpatory for the defendant (evidence that could tend to
indicate the defendant might not be guilty), while the defense has no similar obligation to
disclose evidence that may tend to show the defendant is guilty (U.S. v. Wade, 1967). In
fact, such a disclosure by the defense would likely be misconduct, and as strange as it
might sound, the disclosure of facts by the defense tending to show the guilt of their
client would violate that attorney’s ethical duties.

The role of the American prosecutor (particularly, as distinguished from the
defense attorney) has been defined by case law, statutes, and legal rules in the United
States. Perhaps the most well-known definition of the role of the prosecutor came from
Supreme Court Justice Sutherland in 1935:
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“The (prosecutor) is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all, and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.”
Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78 (1935)

This single passage from Justice Sutherland has been codified and enshrined in
subsequent case law and various ethics opinions and rules, and is as accurate a
description of the proper role of American prosecutors today as it was at the time that it
was first written, over 80 years ago. This passage in particular is worth closer analysis, as
we will later seek to draw some similarities among how Justice Sutherland defines the
American prosecutor, and how Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian collectively describe the
high priest of the law, the orator as a good person speaking well, doing justice.

In the first sentence, we see that while every other attorney represents an ordinary
party to a case or controversy, the prosecutor actually represents the government, where
the government itself has a duty to govern impartially. That duty to govern impartially is
so important that the absence of impartial governance would seem to delegitimize any
basis for governing at all. Basically, if the sovereign cannot govern impartially, it should
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not govern at all. We see in that first sentence that the prosecutor actually draws her
legitimacy from that representation, and with that legitimacy comes obligations that are
unparalleled among attorneys since she represents the sovereign, and not an ordinary
party to a controversy. In other words, duty of the sovereign to govern impartially flows
to the prosecutor, as an arm of the sovereign. In fact, that duty to govern impartially is so
important that it actually supersedes the need to win a case! The overriding interest and
obligation of both the client (the sovereign) and the attorney (the prosecutor, in her
representative capacity and also as an arm of the government) is to do justice, and to
ensure that justice is done.

Implicit in this last part of the first sentence of the passage is the notion that there
may be times when winning a case would actually be inconsistent with ‘doing justice’ or
otherwise inconsistent with impartiality, and where there is an inconsistency, the
prosecutor must always choose justice and impartiality, even if that means actually losing
a case. More than that, we learn that even in the absence of a conflict, the prosecutor’s
only interest is in pursuing justice and doing so impartially.

The second sentence begins by identifying the prosecutor as a servant of the law.
In this role as a representative of the sovereign and as an arm of the government, charged
with the duty of ‘doing justice,’ we see language that explicitly tells us that the prosecutor
is a servant. Implicit in this label is the idea that despite her position of authority and her
righteous mission, there is an expectation that the prosecutor remain humble. Even where
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her advocacy demands passion and vigor, the expectation is that she will remain levelheaded and stoic in her judgment as she fulfills her obligations. This role as a servant of
the law is consistent with the expectations that we have for the ethos of our American
Prosecutors. We also see in this second sentence another reminder that there is nothing
ordinary about this role or its duties, in that the prosecutor is a servant of the law, “in a
peculiar and very definite sense.” These duties are definite, and unique among all other
attorneys.

The second sentence tells us that the two fold aim of the prosecutor, as a servant
of the law, is to hold the guilty accountable and to prevent the innocent from suffering.
The fact that the aim is two-fold tells us that the prosecutor should not pursue the guilty
at the expense of the innocent. We also do not see any clarification or limitation on who
is innocent in this sentence, and the implication is that not only does the prosecutor need
to protect the victim in a case from suffering, but where ANY party is innocent (including
the defendant) the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to prevent that innocent party from
suffering.

The third sentence reminds the reader that the prosecutor is still an advocate and
will still be expected to be effective. The prosecutor should prosecute with earnestness
and vigor, and sometimes that means striking hard blows, but she cannot strike foul
blows. This sentence dispels any notion the reader might have had that the duty to do
justice (even if it means not winning a case) could somehow be used to justify a lack of
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advocacy, in that this servant of the law is expected to prosecute with vigor. That vigor,
however, cannot use improper means, even if the end results would still be consistent
with the righteous mission of ‘doing justice.’

If there were any confusion about whether a prosecutor could use unjust methods
to achieve an otherwise just result, the fourth and final sentence removes all doubt: it is
as much the prosecutor’s “duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.” So
prosecutors must use legitimate means in every case, regardless of the outcome, and their
goals must also be wholly consistent with the interests of impartial justice. Improper
methods cannot be justified by the pursuit of a just result.

It is impossible for me as a prosecutor to read these lines and not draw inspiration
from them, and to feel proud of my profession and the work that I have been able to do,
even during those times when I did not achieve a conviction. In some ways, the occasions
that stick out most in my mind are those times when there was a clear choice between
doing justice or doing what would ensure a conviction, and in those moments I know
definitively that I have always chosen what was right over what was expedient. I realize it
would be naïve to assume that all prosecutors understand or follow these guidelines to the
extent that I do, but in my experience, most prosecutors do. There may be some variation
in how we define an amorphous term like ‘justice,’ but for the most part, most
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prosecutors that I have worked with have tried to use just means to pursue just results.
Finally, most (but not all) have tried to be humble servants of the law.

Justice Sutherland’s definition of the role of the prosecutor is clear enough, and
that definition has led to countless ethical opinions and binding rules of practice for
attorneys, but it could be helpful to our understanding of the role of the American
Prosecutor if we compare that role to the role of defense attorneys. Justice White did
exactly that in the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Wade, quoted here
in relevant part:

“Law enforcement officers have the obligation to
convict the guilty and to make sure they do not convict the
innocent. They must be dedicated to making the criminal
trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts
surrounding the commission of the crime. To this extent,
our so-called adversary system is not adversary at all; nor
should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable
obligation to ascertain and present the truth. Our system
assigns him a different mission. He must be and is
interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but,
absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we must also insist that he
defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The state
has the obligation to present the evidence. He need not
present any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information
to help the prosecutor’s case. If he can confuse a witness,
even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage,
unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to
put the State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst
possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be
the truth.”
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United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (Justice White, concurring and
dissenting).
Justice White’s first sentence is interesting because it seems to begin by drawing
parallels between law enforcement officers and prosecutors. We know that prosecutors
have this two-fold duty to convict the guilty and to not convict the innocent, but here we
see the possibility that law enforcement officers have that duty as well. In the context of a
criminal jury trial, this means there are witnesses (law enforcement officers) who share
that duty of the prosecutor, to not convict the innocent. Given the context of the rest of
the passage though, it appears that Justice White is actually referring to prosecutors as
law enforcement officers, since sworn peace officers do not have an affirmative duty to
convict, and they have no affirmative duty to control criminal procedures at trial. The line
comparing ‘law enforcement officers’ to defense attorneys makes it clear that Justice
White is probably referring to prosecutors, as the comparison between prosecutors and
defense attorneys (both advocates at trial) seems more logical than the comparison
between sworn peace officers (who testify at trial) and defense attorneys (who advocate
at trial).

Referencing a prosecutor as a law enforcement officer is somewhat misleading
here. We know prosecutors have a duty to be independent and have specific duties to the
court that sworn peace officers generally do not have. By applying a label to prosecutors
that more accurately describes sworn peace officers, there is also an implication that both
serve the same function, which is problematic in the context of most jury trials, since the
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police give testimony at trial (and are prohibited from advocating in cases where they are
witnesses) and prosecutors advocate (and are prohibited from testifying in their own
cases). This lumping together of distinct roles implies that prosecutors may somehow
create evidence and that police witnesses may somehow advocate for one side. This is
also consistent with a popular accusation that is leveled against members of law
enforcement, that everyone in the process basically colludes to make sure people get
convicted. Again, it would be naïve to think this never happens, but it isn’t anything that
has happened in my cases.

Assuming Justice White is referring to prosecutors here and not sworn peace
officers when referencing law enforcement officers, we see that while the prosecutor is
concerned with making sure the jury hears the truth about a particular crime, the defense
attorney has no comparable obligation as it relates to the truth. In this way, as Justice
White correctly notes, our criminal justice system is not adversarial, since the
prosecutor’s obligation to ascertain the truth exists even where it could work against a
conviction, while the defense attorney has an obligation to exonerate her client even
where she believes or knows him to be guilty. In fact, the defense attorney has an
affirmative obligation to confuse witnesses or make them appear in the worst possible
light if that might help exonerate the client, even if the defense attorney knows or
believes that witness is actually truthful.
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Justice White also clearly states that the defense attorney has no obligation to
furnish information to help the prosecution’s case, and this is another example of how the
system is not truly adversarial, in the sense of two parties simply fighting against each
other. The prosecutor has the obligation to seek truth and justice, using only proper
means, and that obligation extends to providing helpful information to the defense.

Justice White’s quote indicates that the defense doesn’t have to provide
information to help the prosecutor’s case, and that’s true, but somewhat misleading, as
the defense in most cases will actually be ethically prohibited from providing information
to help the prosecutor’s case. In contrast, prosecutors actually have an affirmative ethical
obligation to provide information that could be relevant to exonerating the defendant or
otherwise caste doubt on whether the defendant committed the crime. This obligation
extends to the entire prosecution team, and that knowledge is imputed to the prosecutor,
which means if anyone on the prosecution team (which includes law enforcement
witnesses) is aware of information that is exculpatory, the prosecutor has an affirmative
ethical obligation to disclose that information to the defense (even if the prosecutor
herself is personally unaware of such information). This obligation is commonly referred
to as a Brady obligation, named for the U.S. Supreme Court case that spawned the rule,
Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

In Brady, the court held that evidence that could potentially be exculpatory, or is
otherwise material to either guilt or punishment, must be disclosed to the defense by the
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prosecutor, and a failure to disclose such evidence violates the Due Process clause of the
Constitution (specifically, the right to a fair trial), whether on not the prosecutor acted in
good faith [Brady vs. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 at 87]. This obligation to turn over
the information to the defense exists even if the defense never requests the information
[U.S. v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97], and failure to turn over this information violates the
Due Process clause of the Constitution whether the failure was intentional, negligent, or
inadvertent [People v. Superior Court (Merez) (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 28, 47-48].
In the years since the Brady decision, courts, legislatures, and executive
committees have expanded the prosecutor’s Brady obligations, and the consequences for
violations of those obligations.

It is important to note how broad the definition of ‘exculpatory’ is under Brady,
and the fact that the defendant’s actual guilt is not material to whether Brady evidence
should have been disclosed; the fact that a defendant is actually guilty of the charge does
not create a safe harbor for the prosecutor who fails to disclose Brady evidence. In
general terms, Brady evidence is any evidence that could help the defense case or hurt the
prosecution’s case, regardless of the fact that the defendant is actually guilty [J.E. v.
Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1335]. This obligation to disclose exists
even if the source of that information is such that is appears false or not credible on its
face [In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 577].
In the example that I gave in Chapter One about the witness who called me to let
me know he actually did return to the trailer to take a shower after the murder, that
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statement was absolutely Brady even though it did not change my opinion that the
defendant committed murder. Since that evidence would be relevant to the jury in
assessing the witness’s credibility, it had to be disclosed.

In addition to common law, various rules of practice for attorneys have reiterated
and clarified the ethical obligations for prosecutors that was originally outlined in Berger.
American Bar Association rule 3.8 outlines the special responsibilities of a prosecutor in
the United States, while California Bar rule 5-110 specifies the special responsibilities for
prosecutors in California. Both rules are included below:

American Bar Association rule 3.8
“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to,
and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to
obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial
rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;
(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present
evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent
of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain
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from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening
public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent
investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement
that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the
defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation,
to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a
defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant
did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

Cal Bar rule 5-110
“Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
(Rule approved by the Supreme Court, effective Nov. 2, 2017)
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(A) Not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;
(B) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to,
and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to
obtain counsel;
(C) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial
rights unless the tribunal has approved the appearance of the accused in propria
persona;
(D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt
of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor
is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and
(E) Exercise reasonable care to prevent persons under the supervision or direction of the
prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other
persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an
extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule
5-120.
(F) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the
defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
(1) Promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
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(2) If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
(a) Promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
(b) Undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation,
to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
commit.
(G) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a
defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant
did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.”

As we see in the rules above, the prosecutor actually has an affirmative duty to
make sure a defendant is advised of his rights, and to protect that defendant’s rights.
Failing these duties can result in cases being dismissed by the court (at the trial court
level, or overturned on appeal), and can also result in discipline for the prosecutor
(including suspension from the practice of law, or in extreme cases, disbarment). Within
both the ABA rules and the California Bar rules for prosecutors, we see echoes of Berger
and Brady. When taken together, these rules and case law give the reader a sense of the
breadth and depth of the unique ethical obligations of the American prosecutor. It’s
important to acknowledge that for most of the ethical duties of the prosecutor, there is no
restriction or end to the prosecutor’s ethical obligations, although as a practical matter,
the State Bar probably only has the ability to institute discipline against someone who is
still a licensed attorney.

To use the example of a Brady obligation in relation to both the ABA and the
California Bar rules specific to the special duties of a prosecutor, let’s assume that
someone works as a prosecutor for a year, and then spends the next 25 years as a
corporate attorney. Let’s assume that during that single year as a prosecutor, the
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prosecutor achieves a murder conviction, and then 25 years later, while working as a
corporate attorney, he is out drinking with a friend, and that friend discloses that they
committed a murder 25 years prior, and the details of the confession are such that the
attorney (former prosecutor) believes it to be credible that this person, and not the
defendant, actually committed the murder, and that evidence is clear and convincing.
Even in that scenario, 25 years later, the former prosecutor likely still has an affirmative
ethical obligation to try to remedy that wrongful conviction, even though he is no longer
a prosecutor, and even though this ‘evidence’ was disclosed in the course of his personal
life, without any connection or reference to his profession as an attorney.

Despite the use of gendered language that was typical of his time (particularly as
it relates to prosecutors, and to a lesser extent, attorneys more generally), U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson’s description of the role of the prosecutor seems fitting
in all other respects:

“The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as
impossible to define as those which make a gentleman. And
those who need to be told would not understand it anyway.
A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps
the best protection against the abuse of power, and the
citizens safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with
human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who
serves the law and not factional purposes, and who
approaches his task with humility.”

United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, April 1, 1940.
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The first comment for ABA Rule 3.8 also fits well within the ethical structure that the
case law has outlined for the prosecutor:

“ A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant
is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence.” (ABA rule 3.8 – Special Responsibilities of Prosecutor, Comment 1).

Finding the Modern American Prosecutor in Aristotle
That we should go back to the classic philosophers when developing a
rhetoric to help prosecutors ‘do justice’ seems particularly appropriate given the central
role that the concept of ‘justice’ played in the first Platonic academy; Ulmer identifies
justice as the first concept to emerge from Plato’s Academy, where it was viewed as a
way of organizing the world (Ulmer, 2003). It seems fitting that we would first look to
Aristotle as we define the role of the American Prosecutor, a role that is at once explicitly
rhetorical, and at the same time necessarily restrained (or empowered) by broad and deep
ethical obligations that are unique among all other attorneys. Aristotle is credited with
creating the first comprehensive theory of rhetorical discourse, and much of his work was
concerned with using rhetoric to pursue justice (Dillard & Pfau, 2002; Hogan, 2013).

Although Aristotle did not outline a particular role –as Quintilian’s perfect orator
or Cicero’s ideal orator and high-priest of the law (both discussed below)—that resonates
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with the modern American prosecutor, many of Aristotle’s ideas about justice are
consistent with the ethical requirements of the American prosecutor, and do not have a
parallel in the role of any other modern American attorney. First, no other attorney has an
obligation to do justice; all other attorneys are obliged only to represent their client’s
interests.

Aristotle posited that it was better to let a guilty person go free than to convict an
innocent person, and that bringing a false accusation could actually be worse than
committing a crime (Aristotle, book XXIX, Problems connected with Justice and
Injustice). This concept is wholly consistent with the role of the modern American
prosecutor, as previously discussed. This point becomes clearer when we consider how
that role fits within the American Criminal Justice System, where the burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence, and the right to a defense all work together to prevent the
conviction of an innocent person, even though those factors may also make it harder to
convict the guilty. In fact, Aristotle specifically wrote that since a criminal defendant is at
a disadvantage when he enters a court already accused of a crime, he must be given some
advantage to put him on a level playing field and overcome the presumption of the
accusation (Aristotle, book XXIX, Problems connected with Justice and Injustice).

What Aristotle has described is the very sentiment behind the Constitutional
protections that the prosecutor is obliged to honor, such as the right to a fair trial, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and the presumption of
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innocence. As we saw in the discussion of the role and rules of the prosecutor, the
obligation for the prosecutor to put the defendant on a level playing field is not merely
passive; where the prosecutor fails to follow those rules, cases are dismissed and thrown
out of court, convictions are overturned, and more frequently, prosecutors are disciplined.

Aristotle’s theories on justice are also consistent with the duties of the prosecutor,
the only attorney with an obligation to ‘do justice.’ Aristotle articulated a multifaceted
concept of justice, that accounted for retribution, distribution, equity, legality, and
reciprocity (Winthrop, 1978; Chroust & Osborn, 1942; Johnston, 2011; Cooper, 1996;
Lockwood, 2006; Pattantyus, 2018). Finally, Aristotle’s justice also has a social and
political element, in that justice is described in one sense as the rules that govern how
citizens interact with each other, and how they interact with the sovereignty (Huang,
2007; Pattantyus, 2018). Aristotle also makes it a point to align justice with his concept
of truth, and to define injustice as something that is false (Pattantyus, 2018).

In book 5 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies justice as the greatest of all
virtues, particularly in the sense of what is fair and lawful. Aristotle goes on to explain in
book 5 that although some forms of justice must distribute honors proportionately, rather
than equally, a victim of a crime should be compensated whether that person is a good or
a bad person, as the court is concerned with the nature of the unlawful act, and justice
should be afforded to all, regardless of class or character. Given the nature of the client
that the prosecutor represents—'a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
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as compelling as its obligation to govern at all’—it makes sense that only a multifaceted
concept of justice would suffice in serving that client. No single aspect of that
multifaceted definition of justice would adequately describe the sort of justice that the
American prosecutor is required to pursue.

Aristotle’s language about equal justice for victims regardless of class or
character also seems consistent with the prosecutor’s obligation to pursue justice
impartially. Aristotle’s point that justice also concerns how citizens interact with the
sovereign echoes the prosecutor’s role as a servant of the law and a representative of the
sovereignty, doing justice. Finally, that Aristotle defined justice as something that is true
and injustice as that which is false, seems reminiscent of the prosecutor’s duty to use the
trial to expose the truth, so that justice can be served.

Even the temperament and humble disposition that we expect from the American
prosecutor is consistent with Aristotle’s concept of the ethical rhetor:
“it is improper to warp the judgement of a juror by exciting him to anger or
compassion, as this is like making the rule, which one is going to use, crooked”
(Aristotle, Rhetoric, book I). Aristotle’s point here is that the presentation must be
audience and genre appropriate, and for Aristotle, that appropriateness was an ethical
imperative (Goodrich, 1984). This appropriateness seems consistent with what we expect
from a prosecutor, whose qualities may be difficult to define, but who approach their
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tasks with the humility of a servant of the law, who does not strike foul blows, and whose
stoic judgment is impartial and even-handed.

Aristotle’s concept of a virtuous person, as addressed in book 2 of Nicomachean
Ethics, is a result of habit as much as of nature, and that a virtuous person can become
more virtuous by doing good, and among those good deeds that seem most relevant to
becoming more virtuous, Aristotle seems most concerned with ‘doing justice.’ Aristotle
also relates virtue in book 2 to moderation and restraint.

These concepts of moderation, restraint, and doing justice, are wholly consistent
with the ethical role that we outlined for the modern American prosecutor, in her position
as a humble servant of the law, who restrains herself from striking foul blows as she
‘does justice’.

A number of scholars have specifically advocated for going back to Aristotle in
school, specifically in law school, to help lawyers understand the various forms of justice
that go beyond mere distributive or economic justice, to address the greater good that
Aristotle discussed (Pangle, 1989). Ulmer himself recognized the importance of going
back to Aristotle’s rhetoric when teaching English and writing courses, because even
though parts of Aristotle’s philosophy may seem outdated, Aristotle and others actually
invented practices that allowed students to exploit language, and that model of invention
still has value (Ulmer, 2003). For Ulmer, that model proves essential as he labors to
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invent both a new way of categorizing as well as a way to teach and apply that
categorization (Ulmer, 2003). As we will discuss in later chapters, like Ulmer, and like
Aristotle before him, I also have to invent a different way for people to perceive, analyze,
and organize (through the prosecutor’s rhetoric), as well as a way to teach and apply that
method (pedagogically, in undergraduate study or law school).

Examining the American Prosecutor Under Cicero’s Gaze
While much of Aristotle’s written works on ethics, justice, and politics seem
entirely consistent (though not always entirely similar) with the role of the American
prosecutor, and largely inconsistent with the role of any other modern American attorney,
many of Cicero’s writings, when taken in the proper context, seem to be speaking
precisely about the American prosecutor, and this role could not possibly apply to any
other modern American attorney.

Of all of Cicero’s writings, De Oratore (books I and II) and De Officiis (books I,
II, and III) are most revealing about Cicero’s thoughts on virtue and justice, and how
those concepts relate to the orator and the lawyer. The following quotes from Cicero
demonstrate his belief that the best orator is as a ‘high-priest’ of the profession whose
two-fold aim is to expose the guilty to punishment and to shield the innocent from
punishment, whose duty is to the sovereign state itself. Cicero goes on to describe justice
as the sovereign “queen of all virtues” and that a person cannot falsely prosecute the
innocent without becoming a criminal themselves. Finally, with regard to prosecution,
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Cicero indicates that it should be a rare occurrence and should only be done on behalf of
the sovereign or to avenge wrongs. When taken together, the resemblance to the role of
the modern American prosecutor is uncanny.

For we are not contemplating, in this discourse, the
character of an everyday pleader, bawler, or barrator, but
that of a man, who, in the first place, may be, as it were, the
high-priest of this profession…who, likewise, is able, by
means of his eloquence, to expose guilt and deceit to the
hatred of his countrymen, and to restrain them by penalties;
who can also, with the shield of his genius, protect
innocence from punishment.
(De Oratore, Book I, 202)

Here, as in Berger, we see that this advocate is not ordinary. There is something
exceptional about the pleader, not only in skill, but also in ethics, such that they are
considered a high priest of the profession. The implications of the label ‘high priest of the
profession’ are of an advocate like the prosecutor described by various Supreme Court
Justices, who is a humble servant of the law; not an advocate that represents an ordinary
party to a controversy, but someone who is charged with being impartial, to search out
the truth in the causes of justice, and though this advocate can use eloquence to strike
hard blows, she may not strike foul ones, and her two-fold aim is to punish the guilty and
protect the innocent. Cicero’s distinction between the high priest of the law and the
everyday pleader or bawler is also reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s description of the
prosecutor having the same qualities of a gentleman. In this vein, we also see that
consistent with the ethical duties of the prosecutor (that are not restricted to a particular
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time, place, or manner), it may not be possible to be a bad person and yet still be an ideal
orator. Like the American Prosecutor, the ideal orator is held to a higher standard at all
times. Finally, the reference as a high priest of the law seems entirely consistent with the
prosecutor’s role as a ‘minister of justice’ as described in comment 1 of ABA Model rule
3.8.

This ideal orator who is a high priest of the law should also be someone who acts
not just for his own honor, but the welfare of the entire State, just as the American
Prosecutor does, as a representative of the sovereign:

“…For I consider, that by the judgment and wisdom of the perfect orator, not only his
own honour, but that of many other individuals, and the welfare of the whole state, are
principally upheld.”
(De Oratore, Book I, 34)

No other modern attorney role could possibly be argued to be the ideological heir
to Cicero’ s high priest of the law, except the American prosecutor. All other attorneys
represent their own clients, to the exclusion of other loyalties. Only the prosecutor acts on
behalf of the welfare of the entire state, to both punish the guilty and protect the innocent,
avoiding the foul blows that are characteristic of the everyday bawler and pleader, and
still striking eloquent, hard blows, for the righteous causes of justice.
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Outside of the law, their may indeed be other roles and jobs that can fulfill some
(though not all) of the ethical mandates that Cicero spells out for his high priest of the
profession, but in the following quote Cicero makes it clear that his High Priest must be
an orator well-versed in the law:

“knowledge of the … law is indispensable to those who would become
accomplished orators” (De Oratore, Book I, 197).

It seems clear that if we were to look for Cicero’s high priest of the law today, we
would be looking for an attorney, but this high priest is not just any attorney. There is
something special about the orator, both in terms of skill and eloquence, and as we will
see throughout Cicero’s work, also in terms of ethics and morality:

For if you were to say, that he who is a lawyer is
also an orator, and that he who is an orator is also a lawyer,
you would make two excellent branches of knowledge,
each equal to the other, and sharers of the same dignity; but
now you allow that a man may be a lawyer without the
eloquence which we are considering, and that there have
been many such; and you deny that a man can be an orator
who has not acquired a knowledge of law. Thus the lawyer
is, of himself, nothing with you but a sort of wary and acute
legalist, an instructor in actions, a repeater of forms, a
catcher at syllables; but because the orator has frequent
occasion for the aid of the law in his pleadings, you have of
necessity joined legal knowledge to eloquence as a
handmaid and attendant.
(De Oratore, Book I, 236)
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Based on the quote above, we could envision this distinction that Cicero makes
between a lawyer and an orator as akin to the difference between a transactional or
research attorney and a trial attorney, or between an attorney that does not do trials and a
trial attorney, as Cicero seems to be separating those who are mere acute legalists on the
one hand, from orators who use the law eloquently in their pleadings, on the other hand.
The problem with stopping our analysis at this distinction is that no other trial attorney
(aside from the American prosecutor) is suited to fill the ethical requirements that Cicero
outlines elsewhere for his orator. In fact, it would likely be misconduct for any modern
attorney to even attempt to follow those ethical guidelines, as only the prosecutor has the
legal duty to punish the guilty and protect the innocent.

Cicero goes on to describe the relationship among justice, truth, and morality, and
also seems to address the need for an equal justice under the law, in the following
fragments from Book I of De Officiis:

“no occasion arises that can excuse a man for being guilty of injustice”

“But let us remember that we must have regard for justice even towards the humblest.”

“nothing that lacks justice can be morally right.”
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“…we demand that men who are courageous and high-souled shall at the same time be
good and straightforward, lovers of truth, and foes to deception; for these qualities are
the centre and soul of justice.”

(Those who seek to serve in the government should)… “…keep the good of the people so
clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action
conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in
serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest.”
(De Officiis, Book I).

In describing the role of a government magistrate, Cicero says that person must
remember the following:
…(the magistrate) represents the state and that it is his duty
to uphold its honour and its dignity, to enforce the law, to
dispense to all their constitutional rights, and to remember
that all this has been committed to him as a sacred trust.”
“Justice is, therefore, in every way to be cultivated and
maintained, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would
not be justice) and for the enhancement of personal honour
and glory.
(De Officiis, Book I).

Here, Cicero does allow the magistrate to take some personal pride, but not to the
exclusion of the pursuit of justice for its own sake. The central role that duty to the
sovereign plays is readily apparent here, as this servant of the law seeks to enforce the
law while also protecting constitutional rights in the pursuit of justice. The role described
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for the magistrate here is fairly consistent with the role of the modern American
prosecutor, though also clearly inconsistent with the role of prosecutors during Cicero’s
lifetime. Prosecutors during Cicero’s era were not servants of the law, acting on behalf of
the sovereign, protecting the innocent and seeking truth while protecting the
constitutional rights of the defendant. It seems the closest role to the modern American
prosecutor during Cicero’s lifetime was probably the magistrate.

Cicero viewed criminal defense as more honorable than prosecution (Kennedy,
1994; Borowitz, 1969), but that appears to mainly be a function of the apparent
corruption in the Roman legal system. There was no unified criminal code, prosecution
was initiated by private parties rather than state agents, and each case was heard in courts
created only to hear cases related to that specific crime (Kennedy, 1994; Borowitz, 1969).
Fraud, bribery and perjury in the Roman bar were widespread (Rayment, 1948). So often,
it was the defense attorney protecting the innocent. In fact, Cicero made it clear that his
reputation would be negatively affected if he defended someone in court who was
actually guilty (Goodwin, 2001). Thus, a modern defense attorney (who is required to
defend guilty clients) could not likely meet the demands of Cicero’s high priest of the
profession.

As a successful trial attorney in his own right, Cicero was no doubt acutely aware
of the various maladies that plagues the Roman legal system. Some of the issues with the
Roman legal system during Cicero’s time as a trial attorney included a lack of any effort
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to unify the criminal code, the fact that criminal prosecution was instituted by private
parties by the attorney of their choice (regardless of the motives of the prosecutor), and
the fact that each crime was tried in a separate court that was specially created by the
statute for the crime itself (Borowitz, 1969). These citizen-prosecutors frequently had a
vested interest in the outcome of their cases, and apparently had no strict ethical
obligation to ‘do justice’ (Borowitz, 1969). Those issues, coupled with the opportunity to
achieve criminal convictions by bribery (Id.), are some of the crucial differences that
inform Cicero’s view of the prosecution. Despite the failings of prosecutors during
Cicero’s time, he did express the view that prosecutors must have training, education, and
a blameless character (Tempest, 2013).

Due to the nature of the court system and privatized prosecution, prosecutors in
Cicero’s lifetime were not the ideal orators or high priests of the law (in fact, it seems
unlikely that any advocate in Cicero’s day lived up to his image of the ideal orator), but
even given the sad state of prosecutors during his lifetime, Cicero acknowledged that
prosecution should only be done as a service to the sovereign:

“ if it shall be required of anyone to conduct more frequent prosecutions, let him do it as
a service to his country.” (De Officiis Book II).

Cicero also emphasizes the importance of avoiding false charges:
Again, the following rule of duty is to be carefully
observed: never prefer a capital charge against any person
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who may be innocent. For that cannot possibly be done
without making oneself a criminal. For what is so unnatural
as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men the
eloquence bestowed by Nature for the safety and protection
of our fellowmen?
De Officiis, book II
Finally, in Book II, Cicero speaks of justice as the highest of all virtues (“the
queen of all the virtues”), and also refers to justice as a sovereign mistress. So this justice,
this queen of all the virtues, is a sovereign unto itself, which implies that justice is this
independent entity, as if all who come before the law are equal, and in any case, no one
and no idea is above justice. Cicero’s justice seems consistent with the justice that the
American prosecutor pursues.

Although prosecutors during Cicero’s time could not have possibly lived up to the
ethical ideals that he assigned to the ideal orator, the unique ethical requirements of
American prosecutors suggest that the American prosecutor may be the true, long-lost
heir to Cicero’s concepts of the ideal orator and high priest of the law.

The American Prosecutor Translated as Quintilian’s Perfect Orator
Quintilian’s work leans heavily on Cicero, whom he quotes more than 600 times
in Institutes (Walzer, 2006). In Quintilian’s own words we see numerous references to
the connection between the perfect orator and the perfect person. Indeed, in nearly all of
Quintilian’s written works that address the virtue of justice and the character of the
perfect orator, the reader is left with the impression that not only must the perfect orator
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be of a just and perfect virtuous character, but that the orator’s work must always be in
pursuit of justice. When we consider how Quintilian defines the characteristics of a moral
or perfect person, the inevitable conclusion we reach is that if any modern attorney could
meet Quintilian’s standard, it would be the American prosecutor.

Although Quintilian generally views the defense of the guilty as a moral failing,
in book XII, Quintilian does cautiously outline scenarios where there may be some
benefit even to the perfect orator to consider how to argue in defense of the guilty.
Although defending the guilty is inconsistent with Quintilian’s concept of the ideal
orator, Quintilian himself suggests that an ideal orator might consider such arguments for
the express purposes of knowing how to defeat such arguments as the orator pursues
justice. Quintilian uses academics and field commanders as examples of this tactic. For
the academic, as an academic exercise, orators can learn much defending unjust
arguments by playing devil’s advocate.
Similarly, the field commander who uses war games to anticipate the enemy’s
next move can learn much and use what is learned to enhance his ability to defeat the
enemy. The orator who thus anticipates the unjust argument does not thereby become
unjust himself, any more than the academic becomes unjust simply because they engage
in an academic exercise, or anymore than the general becomes a traitor and serves the
enemy because the general engages in war games. The point is, Quintilian seems to
tolerate—and even encourage—the perfect orator’s consideration or role-play as the
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advocate for an unjust position, but only to the extent that such an exercise better
prepares the perfect orator to better pursue justice in future controversies.

As the quotes below illustrate, among modern American attorneys, only the
prosecutor’s role is compatible with Quintilian’s perfect orator.

“My aim, then, is the education of the perfect orator. The first essential for such
an one is that he should be a good man, and consequently we demand of him not merely
the possession of exceptional gifts of speech, but of all the excellences of character as
well. (Quintilian, Book I, p. 10).

This concept of the ideal orator as someone who is skilled in speech but also of
exceptional character fits well within the role outlined for the American Prosecutor. It is
true that in theory all attorneys in the US are required to be of ‘good moral character’, but
the concept of moral character in the context of bar associations is not consistent with
Quintilian’s definition, since under his rules, a good person would generally not defend
the guilty (except in one particular instance, basically to prepare to anticipate the
defense’s arguments in later cases), and under the bar rules that govern defense counsel,
those attorneys are actually required to defend the guilty. This means that even if all other
attorneys meet the state bar definition of being of good moral character, those other
attorneys could never meet Quintilian’s standards without violating their ethical duties as
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attorneys, since by definition, every attorney (other than the American Prosecutor) has an
obligation to represent the interests of their clients, even where those clients are guilty.
But Quintilian doesn’t merely say that the perfect orator should also be a good
person, in addition to being a good speaker. Quintilian goes further, by indicating that
being a good person is actually the first essential component of the perfect orator,
apparently indicating that good moral character is more important to the perfect orator
that even the ability to speak well. Arguably there is no other attorney position in the
United States that would prioritize good moral character (not as defined by the bar, but as
defined by Quintilian) above the ability to argue well, except for the American
prosecutor.

Within the penumbra of the various definitions of the American prosecutor as a
humble servant of the law, who approaches her task with humility, as a “gentleman”
would, who does not strike foul blows, who is a minister of justice, who seeks truth, and
who protects victims and defendants alike by ensuring that constitutional rights are
respected, in a criminal justice system that uses the presumption of innocence and the
highest burden of proof in the law to further the idea that we would rather let the guilty
go free than punish the innocent, whose job is not to win a case, but to do justice, we do
get the sense that if the prosecutor had to prioritize effective argumentation or ethical
conduct, that ethical conduct would have to take precedence over effective argumentation
or oratory skill. When we compare how attorneys in other roles would so prioritize those,
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it is difficult to imagine any other attorney role prioritizing Quintilianic ethics (as
opposed to ethics according to the bar) over effective argumentation or oratory skill.

Quintilian goes on to describe how courage, justice, and self-control are related to
the eloquence that is demanded of the orator:
“I shall frequently be compelled to speak of such
virtues as courage, justice, self-control; in fact scarcely a
case comes up in which some one of these virtues is not
involved; every one of them requires illustration and
consequently makes a demand on the imagination and
eloquence of the pleader. I ask you then, can there be any
doubt that, wherever imaginative power and amplitude of
diction are required, the orator has a especially important
part to play?” (Book I).

The self-control that Quintilian describes here is entirely compatible with the sort
of restraint that the role of the American prosecutor demands. Similarly, that Quintilian
speaks of justice in relation to his ideal orator is relevant to our study, since his definition
of justice is consistent with the sort of justice that the prosecutor must pursue; namely, a
justice that is fair, impartial, uses legitimate means to bring about legitimate results,
exposing the truth, to exonerate and protect the innocent while seeking to hold the guilty
accountable. As discussed earlier, this notion of Quintilianic justice necessarily excludes
any attorney who would be obliged to defend a guilty client (i.e. virtually any attorney
other than a prosecutor) from consideration as the ideal orator.
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In the following two fragments, we get the sense that Quintilian’s construct of the
ideal orator may be motivated by what he sees as a prevailing corruption and pervasive
immorality among those with a reputation for eloquence:

“As soon as speaking became a means of livelihood and the practice of making an
evil use of the blessings of eloquence came into vogue, those who had a reputation for
eloquence ceased to study moral philosophy” (book I).

“The greatest part of rhetoric concerns goodness and justice” (book XII, as quoted
by Ramus, against Quintilian).

When we read these two fragments together, it begins to sound like a call to
action for orators to return both to moral conduct and to the study of moral philosophy.
Indeed, many authors have noted that Quintilian distrusted philosophers of his day, and
was generally displeased with the direction that rhetoric was headed (Kennedy, 1962). In
fact, some have argued that Quintilian’s appropriation of the moral aspects of philosophy
and incorporating those into his instruction on rhetoric had to do with political
expediency and Quintilian’s realization that many people distrusted philosophers
(Walzer, 2006). Appropriating morality and justice from philosophy may have been the
only way to ensure its survival in the orator’s education (Walzer, 2006).
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In the second fragment, we see Quintilian specifically connect justice to rhetoric,
in the strongest terms possible; Quintilian is not merely saying that justice and rhetoric
are related, he is actually saying that justice is a part of rhetoric. What’s more, justice and
goodness are not just some secondary or tertiary part of rhetoric; justice is the greatest
part of rhetoric. So for Quintilian, it does seem like rhetoric without justice either is not
rhetoric at all, or is the lesser part of rhetoric, that he wishes to exclude from the field,
and that does not inform his ideal orator.
If a case be based on injustice, rhetoric has no place
therein and consequently it can scarcely happen even under
the most exceptional circumstances that an orator, that is to
say, a good man, will speak indifferently on either side
…
The orator cannot be perfect unless he is a good
man. Consequently, I demand from him not only
outstanding skill in speaking but all the virtuous qualities of
character
(book I)
Throughout Quintilian’s writings on rhetoric and the orator, we see time and time
again that the idea of justice and morality makes up a substantial portion of Quintilian’s
rhetoric. An orator who is not just and moral cannot be the ideal orator, and when they
speak, it cannot be called rhetoric, no matter how eloquent. In the first paragraph, we see
the role that justice plays in the work of Quintilian’s orator, as Quintilian spells out the
idea that an orator cannot argue either side of a given issue, since one side is based on
justice (and truth), and the other side is based on injustice (and lies).
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So justice—rather than the interests of a particular client—dictates which side of
an issue the orator argues. Here again, Quintilian implicitly excludes all other
attorneys—aside from the American prosecutor—from his definition of the orator. All
other attorneys must argue the issue in the way that benefits their client, even if the client
is guilty. Since the American prosecutor’s client is the sovereign itself, the prosecutor
must act guided by truth, justice, and impartiality, without regard for the desires or
interests of a single client.

It does seem that it precisely this moral component of Quintilian’s rhetoric that
earned him the scorn and criticism of Ramus, some of which I have included below. To
be fair, Ramus did specifically write extensive criticisms against Aristotle, Cicero, and
Quintilian. However, it does appear that he was especially disapproving of Quintilian, as
revealed in the following fragment:

Therefore let us allow Aristotle as sharp an intelligence in
various subjects and branches of knowledge as any
Aristotelian could imagine, for I admit that that philosopher
had an amazing fecundity of talent. Thanks to the
generosity of Alexander, he compiled a natural science
from the inventions and books of all nationalities; in his
logic he questioned all philosophers, physical as well as
moral and political; sometimes he showed as much
syllogistic reasoning in judgment and as much method in
arrangement as could be sought in the best of philosophers.
If you wish, attribute to Cicero these equal ornaments of
dialectic, invention, and arrangement. I shall not demur. In
fact I shall not only gladly but also perhaps truly admit that
of all the men who are, have been, and will in the future be,
he was the most eloquent. One could scarcely hope for such
excellence of style (which we see in his books) and of
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delivery (which we learn from stories about him). I would
be acting impudently if I were to admit anything similar
about Quintilian
(Ramus, Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian, p. 2-3)

The following passage, written in response to Quintilian’s definition of the perfect
orator as someone who is moral and good, with a character for justice, succinctly outlines
Ramus’ main (but certainly not his only) criticism of Quintilian:

What then can be said against this definition of an
orator? I assert indeed that such a definition of an orator
seems to me to be useless and stupid: Why? Because a
definition of any artist which covers more than is included
in the rules of his art is superfluous and defective. For the
artist must be defined according to the rules of his art, so
that only as much of the art as the true, proper principles
cover - this much is attributed to the artist, and nothing
further. For a definition is not only a short, clear
explanation of a subject but also it is so appropriate to the
subject which is being defined that it perpetually agrees
with it and is consistent within itself. The grammarian is
defined as skilled in speaking and writing correctly; he is
not defined as skilled in speaking, writing, and singing.
Why not? Because grammar provides no precepts about the
last. The geometrician is not defined as skilled in
measurement and medicine. Why not? Because there is no
precept in geometry which teaches how to cure illnesses.
(Ramus, Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian, p. 4-5)

At first blush, before we consider the unique ethical obligations of the American
prosecutor, it is tempting to side with Ramus in his criticism of Quintilian’s definition of
the ideal orator, as it would seem that an unethical person could likely persuade as well as
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an ethical person. However, given everything we know about the very unique ethical
obligations of the American Prosecutor, and considering what has been written in
Chapter Two about the author’s lived experience under Assumption Number Ten (that
prosecutors who are unethical in their personal lives tend to eventually be unethical in
their professional lives as prosecutors), Quintilian’s definition of the good person
speaking well can likely survive Ramus’s criticism here, if we substitute the American
Prosecutor for Quintilian’s ideal orator.
Even though it might be a stretch to say a good orator must also be a good person,
wouldn’t it be reasonable to say that a good prosecutor must also be a good person? At
the very least, given all that we know about the unique ethical obligations of the
American prosecutor, we can at least say that the ‘good person’ requirement for
prosecutors seems more reasonable than a similar requirement for orators, even good or
ideal orators.

Could we say that a ‘good person’ requirement in the definition of the American
prosecutor is superfluous? To borrow from Ramus, does the ‘good person’ requirement
cover more than is included in the rules of the art of being an American Prosecutor?
Doesn’t the ‘good person’ requirement for the American Prosecutor perpetually agree
with the definition of that role and isn’t such a requirement consistent with that role?
Doesn’t the role of the American Prosecutor specifically provide some precepts about the
‘good person’? The answers to these questions lead us to conclude that the ‘good person’
requirement as applied to the American Prosecutor is likely not superfluous, and given all
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that we know about the duties of the American Prosecutor, the realities of her work, and
the consequences of that work, the ‘good person’ requirement likely does attach to the
definition of the American Prosecutor.
Substituting the ‘American Prosecutor’ for Quintilian’s ‘Ideal Orator’ makes that
definition less vulnerable to Ramus’ definitional criticism above, thus furthering both the
idea that the American Prosecutor is the ideological heir to Quintilian’s ideal orator, and
the idea that whether or not the Ideal Orator was overly naïve or unrealistic, the same
cannot be said for the American Prosecutor, who must first be a good person.
Quintilian’s primary contribution to the prosecutor’s rhetoric concerns the
recognition that the ideal orator (the American Prosecutor) must pursue justice above all
else, and that justice must form the very foundation of their rhetoric. But Quintilian has
more to offer the prosecutor’s rhetoric than ethics. Quintilian also felt that the ideal orator
should be committed to serving the sovereignty (Kennedy, 1962).
Quintilian’s thoughts on the other essential skills of the ideal orator also serve to
enhance the prosecutor’s rhetoric. Quintilian posited that in addition to being a good
person, the ideal orator must be particularly adept and improvisation and
contemporaneous speech (Holcomb, 2001). Quintilian refers to improvisation as ‘the
crown of all our study’ and ‘the greatest reward for all our long labors’ (Holcomb, 2001).
Skill in improvisation, coupled with an abiding commitment to pursuing justice, and to
achieving just results using legitimate means, perfectly captures what makes a good
prosecutor. Like Quintilian, I would prioritize the commitment to justice over the skill in
improvisation, but certainly, both are important.
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When I look back on the trial stories that I included in Chapter Two to highlight
the assumptions that have guided my preparation and trial practice over the past fifteen
years as a prosecutor, it is clear to me that nearly every single one of those verdicts
depended on my ability to improvise, in response to an everchanging trial environment.
In fact, the vast majority of the assumptions listed in Chapter One exist precisely because
the prosecutor, more than any other trial attorney, must be prepared to improvise in trial.
Most other trial attorneys (particularly criminal defense attorneys) will have ample notice
of surprises at trial. To be clear, witnesses can be unpredictable (even when they meet
with defense attorneys and rehearse testimony before trial), but the sort of ‘trial by
surprise’ that prosecutors face, that has come to be emblematic of what it means for a
prosecutor to go to trial, would not likely happen to a defense attorney. This is so because
the entire system is designed—as it should be—to ensure the defendant has a fair trial.
If the prosecutor meets with a witness and they tell the prosecutor something new,
the prosecutor has an obligation to disclose that information to the defense 30 days before
trial, or if it is on the eve of trial or during trial, as soon as possible. If that new
information means the defense attorney needs more time to prepare, then most courts
would give that attorney more time to prepare, once the client waives time for speedy
trial. In fact, even if the client refuses to waive time for speedy trial, if the defense
attorney claims that he cannot adequately represent his client at trial without more
preparation time, the judge will likely give the defense attorney more time to prepare,
even over the defendant’s objection.
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So the defense attorney can find a way in most cases to get as much time as they
need to prepare, and at the same time, the prosecutor cannot withhold witness statements
from the defense. But the prosecutor is not generally afforded the same luxury of
preparation, nor is the defense similarly prohibited from surprising the prosecutor.
Because of the attorney client-privilege, the 5th amendment privilege against selfincrimination, speedy trial rights, Brady discovery obligations, and due process
requirements, the defense attorney can meet with his client for hours to prepare for the
client’s testimony, and then reveal some brand new defense for the first time, where the
prosecutor learns of the story at the same time as the jury. Unlike the defense, the
prosecutor cannot get more time to prepare when caught off-guard by some surprise
testimony.

Not only can the defense surprise the prosecutor with testimony from the
defendant, they can also surprise the prosecutor with testimony from otherwise unknown
witnesses in addition to the defendant. In theory, both sides are obliged to reveal
witnesses (along with a proffer of idea of what the proposed testimony will be) 30 days in
advance, or as soon as possible. In practice, defense attorneys routinely fail to disclose
witnesses they plan on calling, and also routinely refuse to reveal any indication of what
the witness might say, and to do so, they claim they did not know they were going to call
the person as a witness until the middle of trial.
This has happened in some fashion in every serious case that I’ve prosecuted, and
in most of the non-serious cases that I’ve dealt with as well. And when the defendant gets
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up and tells a story for the first time in front of the jury, after having met with her
attorney and rehearsed what she would say, after reviewing the written statements and
reports of all the prosecution’s witnesses, and then the defense attorney calls a few more
surprise witnesses to support the story the defendant just told (since he didn’t intend to
call those supporting witnesses until he knew the defendant would testify, which of
course he did not know until 5 minutes before, and even then, could not anticipate what
the defendant would say that could make those witnesses necessary), the prosecutor must
be prepared to respond. If the prosecutor cannot improvise, a guilty criminal is likely to
go free, and a victim does not get justice.

For all of these reasons, the American Prosecutor is the heir to the ideal orator that
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian described, and the interests of justice demand that the
American Prosecutor have a prosecutor’ rhetoric, built around the ethical duties discussed
herein, to prepare the prosecutor for the ethical pitfalls and endless demands for
improvisation that her career will undoubtedly require of her. This prosecutor’s rhetoric
will seek to harness the teachings that once formed the basis of legal education (but that
never made it to the American Law School), while also leveraging creative practices that
flourished around rhetoric while it lived in literature and the ‘polite arts.’
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CHAPTER FOUR
POETICS, NARRATIVE, AND ULMERIC MYSTORIES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

From the beginning, this research project has attempted to stay narrowly focused
on pragmatic changes to how the American Prosecutor is trained, to eventually make the
prosecutor more effective at working within the U.S. criminal justice system as it exists
today. This research project will continue to resist the urge to advocate for a change to
the formal rules that govern prosecutors, instead focusing on how prosecutors can work
within the existing rules.
Given these modest goals, our project is bound by the rules that govern pre-trial, trial, and
post-conviction procedures for criminal cases, and as such, a review of those rules now
makes sense.
Instead of viewing the existing rules of criminal procedure as barriers to
implementation for the creative practices that we are seeking to situate within the
prosecutor’s rhetoric, it will be more productive to imagine these rules as the structure
and scaffolding for what we are seeking to build. In other words, our prosecutor’s
rhetoric may actually derive some strength and stability from these structures, which is
fortunate, since this research project is not well-positioned to change the rules that
dominate the space of criminal justice in the United States, given all that we know about
both the pace and the avenues for change to the Constitutional procedures that govern
criminal processes in the United States.
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Given the grounding effect of these rules of criminal procedure, and the relatively
immutable nature of those rules (at least from our research perspective) it makes sense
that before we become too invested in establishing the prosecutor’s rhetoric, we should
first examine to what extent existing restrictions on criminal procedure (at all stages)
permit a shift toward the kinds of creative practices that the prosecutor’s rhetoric intends
to leverage. In this way, the boundaries that we outline in this chapter can shape the
creation and the evolution of the prosecutor’s rhetoric as will be developed in later
chapters, so that we don’t end up wasting our efforts creating methodologies and
procedures that would end up eventually being excluded from the prosecutor’s rhetoric
due to a procedural restriction in the criminal justice system.
After further developing how and why the prosecutor’s rhetoric has tentatively
advocated for the creative practices of narrative, poetics, and the MyStory, the remainder
of this chapter will be divided chronologically at the major waypoints in the criminal
justice process, beginning with pretrial, continuing to trial, and ending with post-trial
opportunities for poetics, narrative, and Ulmeric Mystories. As will become evident, the
opportunities for a more creative practice tend to expand as we move past conviction, due
in large part to the fact that the most restrictive constitutional controls on the conduct of
trial and prosecution tend to be triggered before a conviction is achieved, and this makes
sense, since most of the fundamental constitutional protections for criminal defendants
seem to focus on the right to fair trial. These fundamental constitutional protections that
concern the right to a fair trial include the right to jury trial, the right to a jury of one’s
peers, the right to counsel, the right of confrontation, the privilege against self-
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incrimination, the presumption of innocence and the corresponding burden of proof for
criminal trials, and various other substantive and procedural Due Process rights. Once the
trial is concluded, many of the constitutional protections cited above no longer apply,
although these protections will still be examined on appeal, based on the trial record.
At the same time that the opportunities for creative interventions tend to expand
after conviction, the events leading up to conviction (and particularly for the prosecutor,
the jury trial) tend to offer the most compelling need for a prosecutor’s rhetorical
intervention. In this way, the need for creative interventions is most pronounced at the
precise stage in which the ability to institute creative interventions is most restricted. But
there is still a narrow gap (between what we do and what is possible) within which to
work, and the need for intervention is compelling enough to toil within this gap, narrow
though it may be.
Within this chronology of criminal procedure—with its variable path that
progresses from relatively open expanses, to narrow chasms, and back again—we will
examine the various ways that poetics, narrative, and MyStories can influence the
thoughts, words, and actions of major actors in the criminal justice system, including
prosecutors, defendants, witnesses, jurors, and judges. As alluded to in earlier chapters,
our focus on poetics, narrative, and MyStory should be viewed as a starting point,
influenced primarily by the author’s own limited experience with literature and the ‘polite
arts’. In other words, the exclusion of a particular technique or concept from the
prosecutor’s rhetoric may be a failing of the author, rather than an indication that the
particular concept would not or should not fit into the prosecutor’s rhetoric.
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Throughout our exploration here—not only of what has been, but what may yet
be—we will keep in mind the lessons learned thus far, not the least of which concern the
ethical expectations of the American prosecutor, as a high priest of the law, and a good
person speaking well. In this sense, it may be expedient to adopt Quintilian’s assumption
that we cannot separate ethics from the prosecutor’s rhetoric. Whether Quintilian’s
perspective was naïve for his time—at least as applied to the generic orator, in the context
of the then-existing legal system—is largely beyond the scope of our study, but that
Quintilian’s concept of ‘the good person speaking well’ applies to the modern American
Prosecutor to a greater degree than it ever did to the orator (in practice) during
Quintlilian’s time should be largely beyond question, given all that we now know about
the unparalleled ethical requirements of the modern American Prosecutor.

Finally, as we are discussing naivete, we should clarify that the comparison
between the ideal orator (a high priest of the law, a good person speaking well) and the
modern American Prosecutor is necessarily a comparison between the role of the
prosecutor (the American prosecutor in her ideal form) and the ideal orator, and not a
comparison between the ideal orator and any particular prosecutor in fact.
It would be naïve (and contrary to my lived experience, as noted in Chapter Two)
to assume that every prosecutor always lives up to every ethical imperative that purports
to govern her conduct in every case. In this way, the role of the prosecutor may be similar
to the role of the ideal orator, since neither are describing a particular person, and that we
know intuitively that few people likely live up to that role at all times in all aspects.
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Despite the fact that both describe a role (that may not be possible for most people
to follow at all times in all aspects), rather than a particular person, our thinking with
regard to the American prosecutor must deviate from how we think about Quintilian’s
ideal orator in that the role of the prosecutor—as defined by case law and statutory
authority—is actually binding and enforceable, rather than merely aspirational. It is still
worthwhile to examine this role as we articulate the prosecutor’s rhetoric, since that role
actually impacts what happens in the real world. Prosecutors who deviate from their role
can be subject to discipline, and criminal cases can be dismissed with prejudice, so this
role has a real impact on the criminal justice system as well as the major actors who work
within that system. Thus, to the extent that Ramus and others were successful in labeling
Quintilian’s work on the ideal orator as inconsequential, that label wholly fails to attach
to the role of the American prosecutor. For better or worse, the degree to which the
American prosecutor follows the ethical mandates of her statutory and common law role
in the criminal justice system can and does have very real consequences.

What’s the Story? The Promise of Poetics, Narrative, and MyStory in the U.S.
Criminal Justice System
We endeavor below to provide the reader with a sufficient foundation to later
analyze opportunities within existing criminal justice procedures for creative practices
inspired by the spirit (though not always the letter) of poetry, narrative, and MyStory, and
to also establish between the reader and the writer a sufficient shared meaning of these
terms, so that the writer can write in a manner that makes sense to the reader. Although
we have thus far discussed these three topics as distinct—and will largely continue this
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approach for the sake of organization and readability—it would be misleading to think of
poetics, narrative, and MyStory as entirely separate from one another.
Many have argued that poetry and narrative represent two different ways of
telling stories, and while their format may be different, the creative methodologies
employed therein often overlap, and both share a creative, generative potential (Edwards,
1996; Schneck, 2011). All three of these types of writing share an approach that is
creative, and that uses language and pattern formation in a way that can be persuasive and
that can trigger emotion or a change of heart for the audience. In all three forms of
writing—as is true in nearly all methods of persuasion—the image can play an important
role in persuasion (Spencer, 2004; Burke, 1931; Conti, 2001; Denham, Cacciatore &
Caves, 2021; Gibson & Zillman, 2000).
Analogy and metaphor are two specific rhetorical devices that are shared by
poetry, narrative, and MyStory. Analogy and metaphor have long been associated with
legal rhetoric (Berger, 2013). Ulmeric MyStories are a form of narrative, but one whose
format at times may more closely resemble poetry than the typical narrative story.

Poetics
Similar to rhetoric, poetics is considered to be an art of production (Gentes &
Selker, 2013). Although much of the substance of what we think of as poetics has been
reduced to issues of style and format over the centuries, some scholars have advanced a
theory of poetics (that echoes the ancient roots of poetics as defined by Aristotle) that
would include the creative or productive process itself, as an art that goes beyond linear
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logic and reason (Gentes & Selker, 2013; Hansen, 2004; Schneck, 2011; Eden, 1986).
This creative process goes beyond mere persuasion to build social consensus, instead
actually creating new meaning (Gentes & Selker, 2013).

Legal rhetoric and poetics have been described as ‘two sides of one coin,’ as both
use linguistic methods of proof in order to ‘bring something before the eyes,’ and both
seek to move an audience (Schneck, 2011). Visualization and the concept of ‘bringing an
idea to life, before the eyes of the audience’ both play a central role in legal rhetoric and
poetics, as does the use of the metaphor (Eden, 1986; Schneck, 2011; Ricoeur, 2004).
This is true even though the purpose of poetics—unlike legal rhetoric—is not necessarily
to persuade the audience to adopt a particular view (Schneck, 2011).

That the professed goal of poetry is not to persuade does not negate the fact that
poetic practices can be persuasive. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Two, those methods
that do not strike the audience as intending to persuade can sometimes have a greater
persuasive effect than a more apparent persuasive method, since the audience that is
unaware that a given persuasive technique or method is being employed will not have the
requisite cognition to guard against the impact of that method. Our working definition of
poetics includes this broader scope, which addresses production itself, rather than the
veneer, style, or format of poetry.
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This broader perspective of poetics has been described by Paul Valéry as an
unfolding of what is possible, rather than an attempt to persuade an audience (Gentes &
Selker, 2013). Although poetry may persuade, and can teach, defend, and demonstrate,
poetics does more than that; poetics can expand the way we view the world and how we
think about the world (Gentes & Selker, 2013; Hansen, 2004).
For Aristotle, poetics refers to the nature of an artistic effect that can be used to
create meaning in a way that can join emotion and reason (Hansen, 2004). Aristotle
believed that emotion and reason were both essential to a balanced rhetorical
presentation; cold logic in the absence of any emotional considerations could lead to
immoral results, while emotional appeals that wholly lack any reason could be equally
unjust (Hanson, 2004; Eden, 1986). More modern scholarship echoes Aristotle’s original
thesis on emotion and reason:
Emotion and cognition, to the extent they are separable, act in concert to
shape our perceptions and reactions. But more than that, much of the
scholarship posits that it is not only impossible but also undesirable to
factor emotion out of the reasoning process: by this account, emotion leads
to truer perception and, ultimately, to better (more accurate, more moral,
more just) decisions.
(Bandes, 1996 at 368).
Aristotle’s original concept of the symbiotic relationship between reason and
emotion in good oratory has been explored by others specifically in the context of jury
trials, and many researchers have noted both the legal field’s general resistance to
emotions in trial, on the one hand, and the very real impact that emotion has on actual
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trials, on the other hand (see generally, Little, 2001; Posner, 2000; Carlson, 1989; Bayer,
2001; Bandes, 1996; Massaro, 1989).

It has long been recognized that metaphor plays a central role in poetics
(Hansen, 2004). We see this central role that metaphor occupies in the field of poetics as
early as Aristotle, and this idea has been furthered by a number of modern thinkers,
including Paul Ricoeur (Schneck, 2011; Eden, 1986). Ricouer describes metaphor as
having a foot in both the domain of rhetoric and the domain of poetics (Ricouer, 2003).

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson describe the role of metaphor below:
Metaphors are not merely things to be seen beyond. In fact, one can see
beyond them only by using other metaphors. It is as though the ability to
comprehend experience through metaphor were a sense, like seeing or
touching or hearing, with metaphors providing the only ways to perceive
and experience much of the world. Metaphor is as much a part of our
functioning as our sense of touch, and as precious.
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, at 239, as quoted in Hansen, 2004, at 126).

Metaphor holds particular promise for the prosecutor’s rhetoric, as we attempt to create
meaning. Metaphor goes beyond mere signification, to actually create new meaning
(Hansen, 2004). As Berger explains, the role that metaphor can play in legal practice
seems obvious:
Transferred to legal persuasion, these findings support a persuasive
method intuitively recognized by lawyers: by shifting the way decision
makers perceive and interpret situations involving people and events,
novel characterizations and metaphors are sometimes able to compete with
entrenched stereotypes and conventional categories. Moreover, the same
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research may provide guidance for lawyers working to craft the right kinds
of characterizations and metaphors to meet specific goals

(Berger, 2013, at p. 150).
Similarly, Schneck highlights the basis of comparison between legal rhetoric and poetry:
Legal oratory and dramatic poetry can be compared not because their
rhetoric is similar, but because they share a similar purpose: to move an
audience to judgment. In fact, it is the shared functional aspect of speaking
purposefully in front of a judging audience that gives the rhetoric of poetic
and legal oratory their similar form.
(Schneck, 2011, at 29).
As other researchers have noted, poetry proceeds without any claim to truth, and
in this way, poetry deviates from how we traditionally view legal rhetoric. Ricoeur writes
that “…poetry does not seek to prove anything at all: its project is mimetic; its aim…is to
compose an essential representation of human actions; its appropriate method is to speak
the truth by means of fiction.” (Ricoeur, 2004, at 13). The absence of a claim to truth
may help explain why poetics never found a home in legal rhetoric. Similar to the
suspicion that befell orators beginning in the 16th century, and not unlike the distrust of
the sophists before them, poets have long suffered under the adage that poets lie
(Schneck, 2011). Ricoeur describes the suspicion that attached to the sophists as follows:
“…rhetoric is philosophy’s oldest enemy and
its oldest ally. ‘Its oldest enemy’ because it is always possible for the art
of ‘saying it well’ to lay aside all concern for ‘speaking the truth.’” (Ricoeur, 2004, at
10). Just as that assumption of dishonesty warranted critical examination when leveled
against the sophists and the orators, it also warrants such examination here, especially as
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we are considering injecting poetics into the prosecutor’s rhetoric, a rhetoric that must be
ethical and fair or not exist at all.

First, just as with the sophists that Ricoeur described, that poets can lie does not
mean that they must. Blumenberg has observed that the assumption that ‘poets lie’ has to
do with how the poet uses representation and illusion, thus creating a difference between
reality and what the poet conveys (Schneck, 2011). Blumenberg further explains that this
prejudice against poetics grew from an implicit assumption that the truth or reality is selfevident (Schneck, 2011). In the context of a criminal jury trial (or likely any trial, for that
matter), the truth is rarely self-evident, since every form of evidence is representation. No
juror will have personally witnessed the facts of the alleged offense, so their decisions are
informed not from what they ‘know’ based on seeing the crime occur, but rather, what
they believe, based on the representations in court.

In a very real sense, the prosecutor must ‘bring before the eyes’ of the jury the
facts that led to the criminal allegation, but in doing so, there is nothing inherently
dishonest about the prosecutor’s poetics, notwithstanding the fact that it is all
representation. Not only does the jury never personally witness the facts that led to the
criminal charges, but most often, neither has the prosecutor. So the prosecutor’s efforts at
trial—in creating this representation of reality—is itself based on a representation of
reality. Since the prosecutor was not there when the crime occurred, and cannot truly
‘know’ what happened (as much as they may believe it to be true, or believe that they can
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actually know what happened), the prosecutor pursues a version of truth that is logical
and probable (eikos, to borrow from Aristotle), but a version of eikos that the prosecutor
actually believes. So there is both an objective element (is this version reasonable?) and a
subjective element (does the prosecutor actually believe it?) that guides the prosecutor’s
unparalleled ethical obligations.

It is true that poetry involves metaphor and representation, but that does not mean
those metaphors and those representations must be untruthful or misleading. Once we
understand that all trials involve representation, we begin to realize both how critical
poetics will be to the prosecutor’s rhetoric, and also how important ethical controls will
be to the prosecutor’s rhetoric. The representational nature of trial work requires the
competent prosecutor to be well-versed in poetics, while the prosecutor’s unparalleled
ethical obligations serve as a safeguard against the risk that ‘poets lie.’

Narrative
Including narrative in the prosecutor’s rhetoric makes sense, storytelling is a key
component of effective trial practice (Winter, 1989; Conti, 2001; Rideout, 2008; Robbins,
2005; Massaro, 1989), and trial practice is key to prosecution. Witnesses tell their stories
while testifying, attorneys weave their own narratives in closing argument (Conti, 2001;
Massaro, 1989). Even judges craft narratives after trial, whether in the form of a
statement or ruling at sentencing or post-conviction motions, or on appeal in the form of a
formal written opinion (Conti, 2001; Spencer, 2004). Even the study of law concerns the
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study of stories, as students look to the narratives of prior cases to evaluate how those
rules would apply to a new narrative (Conti, 2001; Edwards, 1996).

This focus on narrative seems logical when we consider that stories are how we make
sense of the world around us (Rideout, 2008; Conti, 2001). That narrative is connected to
understanding and cognition is reflected in the very etymology of the word, which
derives from the Latin narrare (“to tell”) and also from the Latin gnarus (“having
knowledge or experience”) (Winter, 1989). Indeed, the capacity of narratives to describe
the dynamics of a lived experience is unparalleled among discursive forms (Presser,
2016). The education and professional practice of prosecutors is already intrinsically
connected to narrative.

Walter Fisher’s description of the role of narrative in court cases is illustrative
here: “"No matter how strictly a case is argued - scientifically, philosophically, or legally
- it will always be a story, an interpretation of some aspect of the world that is historically
and culturally grounded and shaped by human personality” (Fisher, 1987, at 49, as quoted
in Conti, 2001, at 472-473, and in Rideout, 2008. At 56). James Boyd White described
the role of narrative in the law as follows:

the law always begins in story: usually in the story the client
tells, whether he or she comes in off the street for the first time or adds in
a phone call another piece of information to a narrative with which the
lawyer has been long, perhaps too long, familiar. It ends in story, too, with
a decision by a court or jury, or an agreement between the parties, about
what happened and what it means.

166

(White, 1985 at 168, as quoted in Rideout, 2008 at 53).

Within the broad structure of narrative, we see the persuasive power of emotion,
which is often more persuasive than logic or reason, even in court cases (Conti, 2001;
Koehlert-Page, 2015). As previously discussed, mystory, narrative, and poetics will
frequently overlap, and with emotion, we see a persuasive feature that has a central role
in all three modes of expression. While some have argued that the persuasive ability of
narrative is equal to logic at trial, others have argued that narrative is more persuasive
than logic (Rideout, 2008). This ability of narrative to go beyond logic and reason in
persuading audiences (so-called ‘narrative rationality’) is connected to the foundational
nature of narrative to human understanding, and narrative rationality is both broader and
deeper than the traditional forms of logic and reason as originally defined by Aristotle
(Rideout, 2008; Fisher, 1987). We make our own identities through narratives, and
likewise our understanding of the world around us is largely defined by narratives
(Presser, 2016; Presser & Sandberg, 2019).

The degree to which a narrative seems coherent is highly relevant to whether the jury will
ultimately find it to be persuasive (Rideout, 2008). Internal narrative coherence has to do
with the degree to which the story seems complete and consistent with itself, while
external coherence contemplates the degree to which the story is consistent with the life
experiences and social expectations of the jury (Rideout, 2008). Similar to external
coherence, some of the most persuasive narratives in trial are those that resonate with
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universal themes or cultural patterns that are shared by the jury (Robbins, 2005). Indeed,
it is precisely that resonance with a juror’s preexisting social or cultural beliefs that can
make narrative so persuasive (Winter, 1989). This concept is sometimes referred to as
‘cognitive bootstrapping,’ and is related to the idea of bricolage, as described by LeviStrauss (Winter, 1989). In this sense, the power of narrative to persuade jurors in court is
still tied to social norms (Winter, 1989; Edwards, 1996). In building their own narratives
as they piece together evidence from a case, jurors (and to a lesser extent, judges) have to
place that evidence in the context of conceptual structures that already existed in their
minds, before they heard any evidence in the case (Bandes, 1996; Edwards, 1996). So
narrative is bound by social norms, but at the same time, because of the foundational
nature of how narrative impacts how we learn and communicate, narrative also has a
long-term role in shaping social norms (Winter, 1989).

The narrative form of persuasion has proven particularly adept at reducing
skepticism (Mazzocco & Green, 2011). As the audience is emersed in the story, they can
begin to ‘feel’ the emotion of the story and ‘feel’ for the characters in the story before
their preexisting beliefs and attitudes dismiss the story and the characters; it is the
immersive aspect of the story that permits the audience to see the legitimacy of
perspectives they would otherwise reject (if presented in a different manner) from
characters they might otherwise ignore. Good narrative taps into a shared sense of
humanity, and where the audience is immersed in the story before characters can be
ignored and their perspectives dismissed, the persuasive effect will likely be greater than
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what would have resulted if those same characters and perspectives had been presented in
a non-narrative format. In simple terms, when the audience is swept up in a good story,
they are less likely to notice flaws or inconsistencies (Mazzocco & Green, 2011).

We know that narrative plays a critical role in the persuasion and decision-making
that forms the basis of criminal prosecution, and that narrative has also played a role in
how we teach and learn the law more broadly. This makes sense when we consider that
narratives are how we make sense of the world around us; humans are predisposed to
organize our experiences as narratives (Rideout, 2008; Winter, 1989). The transportation
-imagery model of narrative persuasion posits that narrative can be so powerful that
audiences can in some sense become ‘mentally transported’ into the world of the
narrative (Mazzocco & Green, 2011). This description seems reminiscent of Ricœur’s
account of the power of the metaphor, as well as Schneck’s discussion of how metaphor
can bring-to-ones-eye (as if the audience is actually experiencing the story), and although
that discussion dealt primarily with poetics, we know that metaphor also plays a crucial
role in narrative, so the similarity makes sense. The transportation-imagery model of
narrative persuasion also seems entirely consistent with Lakoff & Johnson’s description
of metaphor as a sort of ‘sense’ of its own, where the metaphor becomes a way of
knowing and understanding (and may be the only way to see that concept) in the same
way that we see with our eyes and hear with our ears. Finally, some have noted that the
examination of narratives (particularly in the field of criminal law) should not limit itself
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to only what is said in narratives, but must also seek to comprehend what is left out of
those narratives (Presser & Sandberg, 2019).

Because narrative affects not only how the student-lawyer learns, but also how
the jury (and everyone else) makes sense of the case and the world around them, narrative
offers the prosecutor’s rhetoric not only a substantive area of instruction (‘what to teach’)
but also a procedural method of instruction (‘how to teach’). Knowing how important
narrative storytelling is to the legal profession, it is surprising that the legal academy still
resists actually teaching narrative storytelling (Foley & Robbins, 2001; Edwards, 1996).
The resistance to teaching storytelling in law school echoes many of the arguments that
we here against teaching rhetoric in law school, including the argument that students
should already know how to write in the narrative form, or in the alternative, that this
kind of writing can’t really be ‘taught’ (Foley & Robbins, 2001). This resistance
highlights the need for narrative in the prosecutor’s rhetoric. The specific methods for
teaching and learning the prosecutor’s rhetoric will be covered in depth in Chapter Five.

Mystory
Having already discussed poetics and narrative, the transition to Ulmer’s mystory
makes intuitive sense here, as the mystory itself is described as a form of narrative, that
uses an approach that is consistent with the changes in how people learn and
communicate with the world around them. Like poetics, the mystory is concerned with
inventive practice. Like many narratives, the mystory involves self-disclosure, and like
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narrative, the mystory shapes how we think about the world around us and our place in
that world, while also offering some insight into how we learn.
Without attempting to prove a causal relationship, it is enough for our purposes
to state what Ulmer and others have written about the need for the mystory in the first
place: technology, socialization, and learning have changed, and our methods of writing
and teaching would do well to adapt to those changes (Gye, 2003; Colibaba, Colibaba &
Petrescu, 2013). Ulmer’s mystory technique is one example of how rhetoric (in actual
practice, if not in teaching) has changed in response to new technologies (Gye, 2003).
The specific cultural changes that Ulmer describes as providing the impetus for the initial
move (and the fuel to sustain that forward progress) toward the mystory have to do with
the shift from a mostly literate culture to a mostly electronic culture (Gye, 2003).
Ulmer’s interest in that cultural shift, that Ulmer refers to as electracy, is focused on how
learning has been impacted, and how teaching should change in response to that impact
(Gye, 2003). The relevance of this social shift in learning and communicating is two-fold
for the prosecutor’s rhetoric: this shift can inform the procedures for teaching the
prosecutor’s rhetoric (since prosecutors themselves will have been affected by this social
shift), as well as the substance of the prosecutor’s rhetoric (since the jurors that
prosecutors attempt to persuade will have also been affected by this social shift).

For Ulmer, the mystory is as much about producing new ways of thinking and
learning as it is about gaining knowledge about the world and the self (Gye, 2003). This
move toward the mystory is an explicit recognition that the dominant pedagogy
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surrounding academic writing seems inconsistent with ‘learning how to learn’, at Ulmer
describes in Heuretics: “the modes of academic writing now taught in school tend to be
positioned on the side of the already known rather than on the side of wanting to find out
(of theoretical curiosity) and hence discourage learning how to learn “(Ulmer, 1994: xii;
as quoted in Gye, 2003 at 3). One of the primary goals of the mystory, then, is to
encourage theoretical curiosity, which Ulmer argues has been suffocated by traditional
pedagogy in many academic fields, including in the field of creative writing (Magolda,
1999).

Ulmer suggests that the construction of a mystory can assist in efforts to invent
(or at the very least, to anticipate) a rhetoric or poetics that is suited to the electronic
space, where much of modern society dwells (Gye, 2003). This need for a new rhetoric or
poetics based on social demands seems similar to the ancient punctum that brought about
the need for rhetoric in the first place; then, as now, social structures, dominant political
narratives, and the available channels and methods for public persuasion required citizens
to become competent in a particular method of persuasion, in order to protect their rights
and to participate in public discourse in the fashion that is typical for a particular time and
a particular place. That public discourse has moved from the agora and public square to
online social media sites does not change the social drive to participate and to be heard.
One of Ulmer’s criticisms of the modern methods of teaching creative writing is
that those methods encourage reproduction, as opposed to exploration (Gye, 2003).
While the former has a tendency to position the student within the dominant ideology that
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will tend to reproduce and repeat similar forms and structures, the latter may open
students up to unique and new ways of knowing and producing (Gye, 2003). Perhaps as a
result of this move from reproduction, Ulmer himself refuses to provide a specific model
for the mystory; although Ulmer does provide some guidance in crafting the mystory, he
is clear that “…the mystory does not repeat, is not reproduced, in that no two are alike”
(Ulmer, 1989 at 170, as quoted in Gye, 2003 at 5). Thus, instead of thinking of Ulmer’s
work on the mystory as a blueprint for building our own mystory, we should consider
Ulmer’s work as a source of “…raw material for invention” (Tofts & Gye, 2007 at 3).
As was likely evident from the author’s attempt at a mystory at the end of Chapter
One, the lack of any strict formula can be difficult for someone who has been trained to
think and learn in a particular way (some might call this a learned incapacity) after
decades of higher learning in a variety of disciplines. But the format of the mystory
should be forgiving, if nothing else. The mystory should address academic discourse or
professional discipline, pop culture/ entertainment or creativity, and personal narrative
that deals with family in some way (Mauer, 2013; Hill, 2008; Ulmer, 1989; Magolda,
1999; Rust & England, 2018). One component of the mystory involves an account of
one’s personal history in some way, focusing on the individual and the patterns that
emerge from the materials that they choose (Gye, 2003).

This process is intentionally idiosyncratic, in that we are attempting to shed the
dominant model of learning and teaching that tends to emphasize verification and
justification (Gye, 2003; Rath, 2009). Instead of limiting connections and patterns to
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those that ‘make sense,’ the student is openly encouraged to embrace chance
comparisons and unexpected, serendipitous links (Ulmer, 1994; Tofts, 1999; Gye, 2003).
A second component of the mystory has to do with a mastery or study of a creative
practice that can be seen as an alternative to the conventional academic discourse (Gye,
2003). The third component can be thought of as an effort to find an intuitive connection
or experimental pattern recognition (Gye, 2003).

In many ways, the philosophy behind the mystory is more important than the
particular structure or format, since so much of the format is left open to the student’s
own idiosyncratic choices. Magolda (1999) describes how the mystory approach deviates
from the approach that tends to take its place in many academic writing programs:
Mystory, a narrative of the discovery process, replaces linear logical
structures of writing with a montage and encourages the writer and reader
to self explore. Mystory writers do not simply paste together pieces of
preordained knowledge from print. Authors ask readers and writers to
grapple with what is known and not known. Mystory is a translation
process researching the equivalencies among the discourses of science,
popular culture, everyday life, and private experience.

(Magolda, 1999, at 211).
The mystory format has the potential to elevate traditionally marginalized voices and
perspectives (see generally, Soyer & Soyer, 2017). Although that aspect has clear
political and social benefits, the real promise of the mystory approach is the degree to
which it could allow the prosecutor to consider alternative perspectives that would be
foreclosed by traditional legal pedagogy. Perhaps most critical to our proposed
prosecutor’s rhetoric, the mystory is not designed to eliminate analytical thinking, but
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instead encourages us to adopt a wider scope of reasoning, that leaves us open to
alternatives that might otherwise be stamped out by the dominant discourse (see
generally, Magolda, 1999, at 212). The mystory does not challenge the dominant
discourse from a position of privilege: the mystory “…seeks to develop a reflexive praxis
that constantly questions both its subject and its authority to be subjective” (Rath, 2009 at
2).

It may also be beneficial to our research to examine how and when this ‘stamping
out’ tends to occur, as the end goal of this project is to inform a new model for teaching
prosecutors. In my own practice (both as an attorney, and as an educator who has been
trained in traditional academic discourse across numerous disciplines), that stamping out
occurs well before ideas ever make it to a notepad or a screen, frequently at a level that is
just below cognition. Since much of this filtering occurs without the student even
realizing it, many of those chance comparisons and serendipitous links are never made.

Legal training and practice (particularly, as a prosecutor) tends to cause most
practitioners to reject alternative views and connections even before they can be
considered; it is as if decades of ‘traditional’ research and learning have caused us to be
unwilling (or even unable) to consider anything that does not seem to immediately fit the
mold of what we have come to expect. This is the real promise that Ulmer’s mystory
offers to a discipline that is notorious for ‘stamping out’ ‘illogical’ connections; even if
the mystory format is never committed to paper in a criminal case, there is legitimate
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value in an approach that would allow the prosecutor to consider alternative connections
that would not otherwise be possible to even consider but-for the mystory intervention.

While the primary relevance of the mystory lies in how it can impact how the
prosecutor approaches a case and how we teach and learn the prosecutor’s rhetoric, there
may also be some direct application of the mystory (particularly, the self-disclosing
narrative portion) when it comes to statements from jurors during jury selection, and
statements from victims and offenders before, during, and after trial. While statements
made after trial by victims and witnesses will not affect the primary persuasive aims of
the criminal prosecutor, such statements can be beneficial to the overall ethical
obligations of the prosecutor to ‘do justice’ in a broad sense.

Having these broad concepts related to poetics, narrative, and mystory in mind,
we now turn to examining the specific opportunities for these creative practices within
the matrix of existing rules of criminal procedure. Although we will address steps in the
criminal justice process chronologically, our primary focus will be on those steps that are
most relevant to the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

Pretrial opportunities for a more creative practice
Before trial, the first broad chronological division for the suspect or defendant
occurs at the separation between in-custody and out-of-custody, with ‘custody’ defined
here as it is in the statutory and common law scheme that surrounds the Fifth Amendment
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and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This concept of ‘custody’ (and what is
considered a custodial interrogation) has entered the public consciousness in some form
or another through Miranda warnings, so named for the U.S. Supreme Court case that
gave rise to the requirement for these warnings. Largely through entertainment and
popular media, many lay persons have come to believe that the police are not permitted to
arrest someone unless they first advise the person of their rights under the Miranda
decision.

Like most popular myths from criminal justice that find their way into public
consciousness, the public perception around Miranda warnings takes some inspiration
from the actual state of the law, but like a game of telephone played in a senior center on
Margarita night, the version of Miranda that some people assume is accurate is quite
different from the actual law, and at the risk of offending true crime fans everywhere, we
do need to pull back the curtain a bit on the related concepts of ‘custodial’ and
‘interrogation’ so that we can understand how those variables tend to impact the
opportunities for creative practices in the criminal justice system.
Police are not required to Mirandize a suspect in order to arrest them; Miranda
advisals are only required if the police are going to interrogate a person who is in custody
[Miranda v. Arizona (1996) 384 US 436]. So failing to Mirandize a suspect does not
somehow invalidate an arrest, it simply puts the admissibility of subsequent statements
(obtained through custodial interrogation) in jeopardy. A person is considered to be ‘in
custody’ for the purposes of Miranda if a reasonable person in the suspect’s position

177

would not feel free to leave, based on what the suspect knew at the time. Under Miranda
and the subsequent case law that has developed over the past five decades since, an
interrogation has been defined as words or conduct that is reasonably likely to illicit an
incriminating response.

So the legal definition of ‘custody’ for the purposes of Miranda may be different
than the legal definition of arrest, just as the definition of ‘interrogation’ under Miranda
may not always be the same thing as the definition of questioning. A person can feel like
they aren’t free to leave during an encounter with the police, and that feeling may be
reasonable (thus triggering ‘custody’ for the purposes of Miranda) even where that
person is not handcuffed and under arrest. Although not common, It is also possible for
someone to actually be handcuffed and yet not be ‘in custody’ for the purposes of
Miranda. For example, in an environment where people are already restrained—such as
prison—the nature of that restraint that exists independent of any suspicion of a new
crime, does not automatically make every interrogation a ‘custodial’ interrogation.
Questions ‘reasonably anticipated to illicit an incriminating response’ will likely meet the
legal definition for interrogation, but other questioning may not trigger that definition.
For example, asking someone for their name or similar types of questions would not
likely qualify as interrogation, since no reasonable person would anticipate those
questions could illicit an incriminating response. So not all questions will meet the
definition of interrogation, and on the other hand, conduct or words that do not meet the
definition of questions can also qualify as ‘interrogation’ under Miranda.
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Along this dividing line of custody, we do see at least the potential for a
narrowing of the creative opportunities available to criminal justice actors (specifically,
law enforcement officers and suspects) as a suspect crosses the threshold into custody
status, mainly due to the advisal of rights pursuant to the Miranda decision, which is
reproduced below:
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney. If you
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you. Do you
understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind,
do you wish to speak to me?

The potential chilling effect on suspect statements when they hear these warnings is clear,
although surprisingly, many suspects continue to talk even after the advisal. Once this
advisal is given, the potential for more creative practices tends to narrow, at least to the
extent that the advisal could trigger the communication between the officer and the
suspect to end, and this can happen in several ways. A suspect could simply stop talking,
or the suspect could affirmatively state that he is invoking his right to remain silent or
that he wants a lawyer present before he answers any questions. Although the manner of
the invocation can impact whether or not the police can continue to interact with the
suspect, those distinctions are largely beyond the scope of this research. For our purposes,
it is important that we see how merely giving the advisal can cause some suspects (who
might otherwise want to tell their side of the story) to stop talking to police.
Before custodial status attaches—or after custody attaches, where the suspect
chooses to speak to officers—there are ample opportunities for law enforcement officers
and suspects to engage in the kinds of creative practices that we’ve discussed in this
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chapter. Officers frequently use narrative storytelling and emotion to convince suspects to
talk. Not unlike poets, officers frequently use lies or ruses (as they are permitted, with
some limits) to trigger a response from a suspect or otherwise encourage a suspect to talk.
Similarly, suspects who talk to officers tell their stories in narrative form and use emotion
(whether real or feigned) to escape liability or mitigate their culpability. In these
interactions, we see familiar themes, tied to guilt, shame, and moral and legal
justification, nearly always told in a narrative fashion, frequently using images and
emotion to prompt a particular response.

Depending on the nature of the crime, we could also see a form of narrative and
mystory play out in how a particular victim or witness presents to officers. There tends to
be even more time and space for creative practices with witnesses and victims than with
suspects, since we typically are not dealing with 5th and 6th amendment restrictions
(except in the case where a ‘witness’ is also a potential suspect, which does happen). We
can also see opportunities for a more open, creative practice in other aspects of the
investigation. Although beyond the scope of our research for the prosecutor’s rhetoric,
there is real potential for these same creative practices to benefit criminal investigations.

The next major chasm in the criminal justice chronology (from the perspective of
the suspect) occurs at the dividing line between pre-accusation and post-accusation. Here,
as with our description of ‘custodial’ above, ‘accusation’ is defined in this section as it is
in the statutory and common law scheme that surrounds the Fifth Amendment and Sixth
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. While the definition of ‘accused’ may vary slightly
from State to State, it is widely understood under Federal Constitutional jurisprudence
that a suspect is considered ‘accused’ at the time of arraignment in court on the initial
charging document, at the latest. At this waypoint, again we see that the options for
creative practices by criminal justice actors tend to narrow further, at least in terms of
actual practice. In terms of chronology, this transition into ‘the accused’ is also the first
stage at which we can reasonably expect interaction from the prosecutor in nearly every
case, so this stage tends to be more relevant to the prosecutor’s rhetoric than the prior
stage.

When we discussed the narrowing that tends to happen once custody attaches, we
were largely contemplating a potential for reduced opportunities for creative practices,
where the actual reduction of opportunities for creative practices depended on whether or
not the Miranda warnings would have a chilling effect on the suspect’s willingness to
talk, and whether the suspect invoked his rights thereafter. When we cross the threshold
into the accused, we are no longer contemplating a contingent or potential narrowing; law
enforcement and prosecutors are restricted in their words and actions as it relates to the
accused, even without any affirmative objection or invocation by the accused. In fact,
rather than merely restricting the prosecutor, the suspect’s transition to the accused
actually creates a number of affirmative duties for the prosecutor, including the duty to
make sure the accused has been advised of his right to counsel and the procedure for
obtaining counsel, and that the accused has had reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel
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(ABA Rule 3.8; Cal Bar Rule 5-110). Similarly, once the defendant is represented by
counsel for a particular criminal charge, both law enforcement and the prosecutor are
generally prohibited from questioning the defendant about that charge without the
presence of the defendant’s attorney. These restrictions and obligations attach regardless
of the defendant’s actions.
It is true that an accused person could still talk to prosecutors or law enforcement
with their attorney present. In theory, the presence of a defense attorney would not
necessarily narrow the chances for creative interventions, but in practice, it almost always
does. A competent defense attorney would likely not allow his client to speak to law
enforcement or the prosecutor about pending charges, in the absence of an immunity
agreement or some other protection from criminal liability for the client. This taps into a
broader theme that we see in the criminal justice system as soon as attorneys get
involved; criminal defendants are strongly discouraged from talking to the court, law
enforcement, and prosecutors.
Our third major waypoint as a suspect moves chronologically toward conviction
in a felony case occurs at the preliminary hearing. In a felony case, this process occurs
after appointment of counsel and arraignment on the charging document, but before trial.
For our purposes, it will be helpful to consider both the informal negotiation session that
occurs on the eve of preliminary hearing (typically referred to as ‘pre-preliminary
hearing’) as well as the formal probable cause examination that occurs with live
witnesses in front of a judge (usually referred to as ‘preliminary hearing’ or ‘preliminary
examination’). At the negotiation session, attorneys from both sides meet, usually in the
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presence of a judge, and the parties have a chance to discuss the case, to see if both sides
can agree on a resolution.
If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the case will proceed for formal hearing.
During this negotiation session, it isn’t uncommon for the defense attorney to present a
narrative of the client’s conduct and background that is designed to cast doubt on whether
the client is guilty, diminish the client’s culpability for the crime, or otherwise question
the ability of the prosecutor to prove guilt, whether or not the client is actually guilty.
This process from the defense perspective involves the use of narrative storytelling, and
sometimes we also see the use of emotion and metaphor as well, although we do expect
less passionate or emotional arguments at this stage than at trial, since this negotiation
takes place between the attorneys and off the record. The judge is present, but does not
typically act as a finder-of-fact (someone that needs to be persuaded) in this capacity, and
even when the judge does adopt a fact-finding role or does need to be persuaded, the lack
of a record and lack of a public audience implies to the attorneys that overt appeals to
emotion will likely fail, and should be saved for the jury.
The formal preliminary hearing is the first stage in our chronology at which sworn
testimony will be received in open court. We might assume that the opportunity for actual
witnesses in court will bring greater opportunity for the kinds of creative practices that
we have discussed so far. The formal rules of evidence—and to a lesser extent, courtroom
decorum and convention—significantly restrict the opportunity for narratives and other
creative practices, at least in terms of actual testimony. Aside from time and resources,
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nothing prevents the prosecutor from using creative approaches in preparation for the
preliminary hearing.
In reality, it would be highly unusual for any witness to have free reign to tell
their story in court, notwithstanding the fact that the hearing takes place in front of a
judge, rather than in front of a jury. There are a number of procedural and substantive
rules of evidence that control the manner and scope of testimony in criminal cases. While
it is generally true that those rules are typically more relaxed when the finder-of-fact is a
judge (who could arguably set aside otherwise inadmissible testimony that happens to
come out at the hearing), rather than a jury, witness testimony will still be restricted to
what is relevant to the charges and what is admissible.
First, there are specific prohibitions on narrative answers. In general, the lawyer
asks a question and then the witness is permitted to respond to that question, and only
that question. If the question itself calls for a narrative answer, the question itself is
objectionable. Witness testimony is also generally limited to matters about which the
witness has actual personal knowledge, and even then, those matters must be relevant to a
contested issue of fact in the case. Some types of testimony will be prohibited regardless
of apparent relevance and personal knowledge, such as character evidence, or other
evidence in which the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the
risk of undue prejudice (see generally, California Evidence Code Section 352; Federal
Rule 403). Aside from the formal rules that are largely designed to protect a defendant’s
rights, there will also be some pressure on both attorneys (although the prosecutor will
typically bear the brunt of this pressure) to move quickly, given the typical number of

184

cases on calendar for a preliminary hearing court and the relatively low standard of proof
at a preliminary hearing. Unlike a criminal jury trial, which requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the standard of proof at a preliminary hearing is probable cause, which
means that the prosecutor only needs to present facts that would lead a reasonable person
to entertain a strong suspicion that the defendant is guilty of the crime as charged [People
v. Ingle (1960) 53 Cal. 2d 407].
Although the defendant does have an opportunity to testify at preliminary
hearing, I have never actually had a defendant testify at preliminary hearing. I’m sure it
has happened, but I suspect most defense attorneys would prefer to protect their client
from potentially damaging questions on cross-examination, especially where the
testimony at preliminary hearing would give the prosecutor an idea of what the defense
will be at trial, and since ‘winning’ at preliminary hearing has less value than winning at
trial, it makes sense that most defense attorneys save a defendant’s surprise testimony for
trial. When a defendant ‘wins’ at preliminary examination—in that the judge does not
find there is probable cause to hold the defendant to answer on the felony charges that are
alleged in the charging document—the prosecutor can simply refile the case. A failure to
get a holding order is not a bar to prosecution. In contrast, when the defendant ‘wins’ at
trial—as when jurors return a not guilty verdict—that ‘win’ acts as a complete bar to
future prosecution on the same charges, even if there is new evidence.
Our fourth relevant period occurs after the preliminary examination and ends at
the start of trial. This period is largely defined by preparation, since there generally is no
requirement for witness testimony between the time of the preliminary examination and
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the trial. Since this period of preparation occurs largely outside the limits imposed by the
evidence code, the prosecution and defense are free to use creative methodologies to
prepare their cases for trial, although even here, the prosecutor still carries her heavy
ethical burden to ‘do justice.’

My normal trial preparation includes building narratives around the anticipated
testimony of each witness, organizing witnesses and evidence in an order that will be
most persuasive to the jury, finding patterns in the evidence that I can highlight
throughout the trial, exploring the proper balance in my presentation between emotion
and logic, gaming out different scenarios and anticipating how the defense will try to
exploit weak points in the evidence, and using the specific characteristics of my case to
develop a sense of my ‘ideal juror’ (which usually just means a juror who has common
sense and won’t be misled easily). My trial preparation typically involves technical
areas—designed for presentation to the judge, usually concerning the admissibility of
particular evidence—as well as nontechnical areas—designed to persuade the jury,
usually concerning the meaning and interpretation of particular evidence. For both
technical and nontechnical areas, my preparation is structured around the rules of
evidence (that control what evidence the jury gets to see and hear at trial) and the jury
instructions (that guide the jury as they try to understand the law and how it applies to the
evidence in the case).

186

Trial Opportunities for Narrative, Poetics, and Mystory
The fifth stage (and ironically, likely the most critical stage under the 5th Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution) that we will examine is the actual trial. Trial is arguably the most
important stage of criminal prosecution for the prosecutor’s rhetoric; the significance of
all other stages of criminal prosecution owe their significance to this stage. Stages before
trial are significant largely because of how they will impact trial. Similarly, the stages
after trial are only significant because of what occurred at trial. A criminal jury trial is the
ultimate stage, where the rhetorical situation unfolds with extremely high stakes. As
alluded to previously, a not guilty verdict is a complete bar to future prosecution on the
same charges, even if new evidence arises after trial. If someone is charged with murder
and is found not guilty, they can’t be prosecuted for those same charges again, even if
they later confess to the police that they actually committed the murder.
Trial typically begins with attorneys from each side meeting with the assigned
trial judge to conduct pretrial motions, before jury selection begins. Most pretrial motions
are in writing and only rely on a written recitation of the evidence that is expected at trial,
but some pretrial motions require live witness testimony (outside the presence of the jury)
before the judge can rule on the motion. Regardless of what the individual motion
actually addresses, all pretrial motions concern issues that logically should (or must) be
decided before the trial begins, or at least before a relevant piece of evidence is presented
to the jury. The rulings on these motions impact the scope of the trial. At this stage, the
judge will examine the pretrial motions of the two attorneys in light of the rules of
evidence to decide whether or not the jury will be allowed to receive certain evidence.
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The judge’s rulings on the pretrial motions control whether or not particular witnesses are
allowed to testify, whether they can testify on particular matters, and whether other
pieces of physical or demonstrative evidence will be permitted at trial. Looking back at
some of the concepts that we’ve previously discussed, some of the motions we expect to
see during this phase include motions to exclude a defendant’s statements for Miranda
violations, motions to exclude character evidence, and motions to admit prior bad acts to
show motive, opportunity, or identity, among others.
In general, the judge’s rulings on pretrial motions depend on assumptions about
how the evidence will come out at trial. If those assumptions turn out not to be true, the
parties will usually ask the judge to re-consider earlier rulings. In this example from
Chapter Two involving the attempted murder defendant who claimed he was a good
Christian, the judge had already ruled during pre-trial motions that I could not introduce
evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts, including his conviction for raping an 8 year
old boy, and the prior instances when he threatened to kill his cellmates. The judge’s
initial ruling was based on the general prohibition on character evidence, and also based
on the risk of undue prejudice that such information would have on the defendant. With
undue prejudice and the exclusion of character evidence, the court was concerned that the
prior child rape conviction and the prior threats to murder cellmates would put the
defendant in such a bad light that the jury might be tempted to convict him of this new
crime because he’s done bad things in the past. The initial exclusion of the child rape
conviction seemed fair to me when I prosecuted the case, and in my pretrial motions, I
specifically stated that I would not seek to introduce such evidence unless something
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occurred in the case that would make that evidence relevant. I did argue that the prior
threats by the defendant to kill two other cellmates should have been admitted to show
intent, absence of mistake, or identity, but as is common with so-called 1101 motions, the
judge denied my request, implicitly finding that the jury might be tempted to convict here
just because he has threatened to do this same crime on previous occasions.

As discussed in chapter 1, the 1101 motion is essentially pattern recognition, and
in the few cases where my 1101 motions have been granted, the motion has always
included drawing unlikely parallels and pointing out otherwise obscure patterns that
would be meaningless on their own, and only take on a persuasive character when
presented in conjunction with all the other similarities among the current offense and the
prior bad acts.
Initially, I did not try to admit evidence of the prior threats or child rape, but when
the defendant testified, his testimony opened the door to that information coming in, even
if only to impeach the defendant’s credibility on the stand. So when the defendant
testified that he would never have tried to kill someone because he was a good Christian,
suddenly ANY evidence that was inconsistent with the defendant’s claim of being a good
Christian became relevant and likely admissible, not to prove that the defendant
committed this charged offense, but rather, to show that he is being untruthful in his
testimony when he says he was a good Christian. In terms of procedure, I approached the
judge we argued about the admission of those otherwise inadmissible facts outside the
presence of the jury before I ever questioned the witness about those facts. The jury was
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also instructed that those facts were only relevant to impeach the witness’s credibility and
could not be used by the jury as character evidence.
Although it is unclear whether the individual jurors may have used the prejudicial
information about the defendant’s history (particularly, the child rape conviction) for an
improper purpose, the limited purpose of the admissibility of those prior acts could have
led to exclusion, if the defendant had answered some questions a little differently, where
the existence of those prior acts would not actually impeach his claim that he was a good
Christian. For example, if the defendant had claimed that he became a good Christian at
some point before the attempted murder, and that point in time happened to occur after
those prior bad acts, I likely would not have been permitted to introduce those prior bad
acts because they would not disprove his transformation to becoming a good Christian.
So my first question was whether he was a good Christian in 1994 (the date of the child
rape). When he eventually testified that he was, I was permitted to ask about the child
rape and the two more recent bad acts.

After pretrial motions, the parties conduct jury selection. Jury selection is the first
opportunity that the attorneys have to speak to the jury. A number of potential jurors
(anywhere from 12 to 18, depending on the method of selection) are selected at random
from a panel of eligible jurors (anywhere from 50 to 100, although multiple panels are
sometimes needed), and after being screened for hardship or disqualification, the judge
has an opportunity to ask some basic questions of the smaller group. These questions
usually lead to the potential jurors disclosing their marital status, area of residence,
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occupation, and similar information about their spouse or significant other and any adult
children. After this basic information, the judge also asks whether the potential jurors
know any of the witnesses or attorneys, or are otherwise familiar with the case. Finally, in
a criminal case, the judge also usually asks whether the potential jurors have ever had a
negative experience with law enforcement. Once the judge has completed the initial
round of questioning for the small group, the attorneys have a chance to ask questions.
Attorney questioning during jury selection is really the first opportunity for the
attorney to begin persuading the jury. Although the questioning is supposed to be limited
to evaluating the potential juror’s ability to be fair and impartial, that assessment cannot
really be done in a vacuum, and effective jury selection necessarily involves the attorneys
discussing some concept or issue that will be relevant to the case. The successful
prosecutor is aware that while the prosecutor is evaluating potential jurors, those potential
jurors are also evaluating the prosecutor, and by extension, the prosecutor’s case.

Most judges will stop the prosecutor from asking questions that could not
reasonably illicit responses that would be relevant to the juror’s ability to follow the law
and be fair and impartial. However, a prosecutor will generally not be prohibited from
asking an otherwise proper question—one that is relevant to the potential juror’s ability
to follow the law, fairly and impartially—simply because that question might also give
the prosecutor an idea about how that potential juror might view an issue that may arise
in the case, or because the question itself could also give the juror a sense of how the
evidence might eventually come out it trial. To be clear, the jury selection process itself is
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not evidence in the case, but it is not improper for the prosecutor to explore some
hypothetical scenarios with potential jurors in order to evaluate whether they can be fair
and impartial in this particular case. That kind of evaluation is necessarily shaped by the
specific issues in the case, and such questioning is permissible, though it will be
controlled by the judge.
As prosecutors ask questions to evaluate how a potential juror might interpret an
issue or a piece of evidence that will arise in the case, the specific framing used in the
question and the variables given in the hypothetical can begin to precondition the jury to
at least be open to viewing the evidence in a particular way, even before they hear any
actual evidence. This choice in framing can have a powerful impact on how those
variables are received (see generally, Caves, 2018c). To be clear, questions that have a
dominant purpose of preconditioning the jury are objectionable. However, questions that
could reasonably illicit a potential juror’s ability to follow the law do not become
improper merely because the question might also precondition the potential juror to view
the evidence or issues in a certain light.

Within the restrictions that dominate the space of jury selection, there is still
latitude for some of the creative practices that will inform the prosecutor’s rhetoric.
Mystory in particular has significant potential to impact jury selection, not only because
the prosecutor in jury selection is literally asking the potential juror to tell their story, but
also (and primarily) because the same social changes that affect students—and that gave
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rise to the need for Ulmer’s mystory technique in the first place—have also affected
jurors.
Mystory arose out of a recognition that the way that people learn and
communicate has changed with technology (Gye, 2003). The same changes that have
influenced learners have also influenced jurors. The mystory approach has the very real
potential to enhance jury selection methods for prosecutors, in a number of different
ways. First, the topical areas of a mystory could form the rough basis for questioning of
prospective jurors. Second, the open-ended narrative approach to mystory—that
encourages self-disclosure—is not inconsistent with the goals of jury selection. To the
extent that mystory could offer a different method for prosecutors to get potential jurors
to talk, and to the extent that it could also offer alternative ways for the prosecutor to
think about how the potential juror might view the evidence, the spirit of mystory does
offer some benefits to jury selection. Admittedly, this is an area that needs further
research, but at a basic level, the mystory technique seems to hold potential for jury
selection, to the extent that the answers to a mystory-type inquiry could reveal something
about a potential juror that the prosecutor might not otherwise be aware of, the same way
a mystory might reveal something about ourselves or our students that we would not
know otherwise.
After jury selection, each attorney will have a chance to give an opening
statement. The opening statement is a chance for the prosecutor to explain to the jury
what the prosecutor reasonably expects the evidence at trial to show. But a good opening
statement does more than provide a preview. A good opening statement tells the story of
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the case, and provides the frame or lens through which the evidence should be viewed,
with that frame or lens designed to lead to a conviction. The opening statement will
usually take a narrative form, so the connection to narrative seems clear enough, but there
are also connections to the performative elements of poetics in the opening statement, as
well as some of the pattern recognition elements of mystery. In addition, a good opening
statement frequently incorporates key elements that cut across all three of our creative
practices, including emotion and metaphor.
As was previously discussed, there is significant resistance to emotion in the legal
field, even though nearly every criminal jury trial is impacted by emotion in some way.
Even drug sales cases—that many would argue are victimless crimes—still involve some
element of emotion, as many jurors will have been affected by addiction at some point in
their lives, and most jurors will likely also consider the potential punishment to the
defendant, even though they are specifically told not to consider punishment as part of
their deliberations. The emotional influence is even stronger with serious cases that
involve victims. As the prosecutor prepares her opening statement—particularly in a case
with the potential for powerful emotions—she has to balance the persuasive potential of
emotion with her ethical duty to use only proper methods to convict, while remaining
cognizant of the legal field’s general resistance to emotion.

Attorneys are specifically prohibited from appealing to a jury’s passions and
prejudices, but such a prohibition is fairly amorphous, and open to interpretation. The
basic standard is, is the proffered appeal (whether it is an opening statement, a question to
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a witness, a statement by a witness, or closing argument) of the sort that would make it
reasonably likely to illicit an emotional response that is so powerful it would tend to
override the fair deliberations of the jury, to render a verdict based on the actual evidence
in the case. This general concern is codified in the federal rules under Rule 403, and each
State has its own version of this rule (Koehlert-Page, 2015). California’s version is
Evidence Code section 352. In theory, the prosecutor can use some elements of drama
and emotion in opening statements (at least where there is a good faith belief that those
elements will be supported by the evidence that will be admitted at trial), but in practice,
there is significant pushback against any emotional appeal that could be interpreted as
speaking to a juror’s passions or prejudices, or that could be seen as unduly prejudicial
(Koehlert-Page, 2015).
Rule 403 (or the California equivalent, Evidence code section 352) is the most
often-cited justification for excluding overly emotional material (whether argument or
evidence) as unduly prejudicial (Koehlert-Page, 2015). Perhaps due in part to the
longstanding suspicion of emotion in the American legal system, judges that cite to risk
of undue prejudice as a basis for excluding emotion (especially when that emotion works
against the defense case and/ or in favor of the prosecution’s case) seem to ignore the
kind of balancing test that they are required to consider when invoking rule 403 or
Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence. Those code sections do not require (or
even allow) exclusion of evidence merely because it presents a risk of prejudice or even
undue prejudice. Both rules require the court to weigh the risk of undue prejudice against
the probative value of the evidence (see generally, FRCP 403 and California Evidence
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Code section 352). In other words, the more probative a particular piece of evidence is on
a material fact or dispute in the case, the more prejudicial (even unduly prejudicial) that
evidence is allowed to be, while still being admissible.
Rule 403/ Evidence Code 352 exclusion typically does not occur until jury trial,
since it is assumed that only the jury (rather than the judge) will be subject to being swept
up in emotion to the extent that they may render verdicts based on emotion instead of
based on evidence. The logic of this assumption is fatally flawed in a few ways, but that
doesn’t change the fact that Evidence Code 352 exclusions usually arise only in jury trial.
The idea that jurors would render verdicts on emotion instead of evidence ignores the fact
that frequently, emotion is evidence. The state of mind of the defendant and the victim,
and the thought process, emotional state, and demeanor of witnesses are all proper
considerations for the jury when they render their verdict. it is true that jurors should not
let their own emotions override the evidence in the case, but it would also be incorrect to
say that emotions have no role in the deliberative process. Even the juror’s emotions are
relevant to that process, since as finders of fact, they are asked to view the evidence from
a reasonable person standard. This reasonable person standard is necessarily tied to social
constructs and the emotional aspects of the human condition. In short, the fact-finding
mission of jurors does not require that they divorce themselves from the human
condition; it is precisely that human condition that puts jurors in a better position to
assess facts than judges, at least where a defendant is unwilling to waive his
Constitutional right to a jury trial. In this way, the addition of lay jurors as finders of fact
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is one way that we introduce emotion to balance out the apparent cold logic of otherwise
rigid, rule-driven criminal justice system.
So the assumption that only the jury (rather than the judge) will be subject to
being swept up in emotion is flawed because emotions are a proper consideration for
jurors, and also because judges themselves are impacted by emotion, as much as the legal
community may deny it (or may actually be unaware of it) (Koehlert-Page, 2015).
Since the burden of proof is on the prosecution, the prosecution puts on their
evidence first. The Evidence Code substantially restricts the form of the questions that
prosecutors can ask and the form of the witness’s answer (see generally, Evidence code
section 764 and 767), the scope of those questions and answers (see Evidence code
section 210 and 352), and also outlines the requisite foundation or qualification required
for witnesses to testify as to specific matters (see Evidence code sections 700, 701, 702,
1200).

Once the prosecution is done putting on their case-in-chief, the defense has an
opportunity to put on evidence. As previously discussed, the defense can call the
defendant to the stand to testify, but the defendant is not required to testify [see generally,
Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609; Craig, 2016]. Because the failure to testify can
cause the jury to assume the worst about the defendant, the prosecutor is actually
prohibited from commenting on the failure of the defendant to testify, and the jury is
specifically instructed that they cannot draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s
failure to testify (Griffin, 1965; Craig, 2016).
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As we saw in Chapter Two, there are significant risks for a defendant who
chooses to testify, at least where the prosecutor is prepared and attentive, and the
defendant plans on being untruthful on the stand. There is always a risk that a wellprepared prosecutor who is comfortable with improvisation may be able to get the
defendant to make a statement that can be proven to be false, or that the defendant may
open the door to prejudicial but otherwise-inadmissible evidence, or in the worst-case
scenario, the defendant may actually admit to the elements of the charged offense,
essentially guaranteeing a guilty verdict. A defendant who takes the stand may open the
door to information about the defendant’s prior criminal history that the jury might not
otherwise know about (Natapoff, 2005). Finally, as discussed previously, any witness
(including a defendant) who testifies untruthfully runs the risk of being prosecuted for
perjury (Natapoff, 2005). For these reasons and many others, most criminal defendants
do not testify. Over 95% of criminal cases do not go to trial, and of those that do, only
about half of those trials involve a defendant testifying in front of the jury (Natapoff,
2005).
However, against these risks, the defense attorney weighs a number factors, not
the least of which is the fact that—despite instructions to the contrary—there is still a
substantial risk that jurors will draw negative inferences about the defendant who chooses
not to take the stand (Craig, 2016; Natapoff, 2005).
Often times, having the defendant testify may be the only way that the jury can
hear the defendant’s story, since the jury is only permitted to hear evidence, and in
general, the hearsay rule would prohibit the defense from having another person testify as
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to what the defendant told them. For many defendants, telling their story on the stand
may be the only way for them to feel like they’ve ‘had their day in court’ and may also be
their only hope to get the jury to see the case from the defendant’s perspective (Natapoff,
2005).

Surprise testimony of the defendant is often the best way to catch the prosecutor
off-guard, as there is no discovery obligation for the defense attorney to disclose the
anticipated testimony of their client (in fact, such disclosures could actually violate the
defense attorney’s ethical obligation to prevent disclosure of information obtained by
virtue of her attorney-client relationship with the criminal defendant).

Although it is generally considered unethical for the attorney to call a witness to
the stand where the attorney has a good-faith belief that the witness will testify falsely,
there is a broad ethical exception for criminal defense attorneys when it comes to calling
their criminal defendant clients to the stand. Since a criminal defendant does have an
absolute right to testify if they so choose (even if their own defense attorney advises
against it), the defense attorney cannot prevent her lying client from testifying. At the
same time, because the attorney is—at least in theory—prohibited from suborning
perjury, the method of questioning for a defendant can be very different from the method
of questioning permitted for other witnesses. We discussed earlier the general prohibition
on testifying in a narrative fashion; all other witnesses are essentially required to respond
only to the question asked, and then wait for the next question. In contrast, criminal
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defendants are permitted to testify in a narrative fashion. Thus, criminal defendants are
typically the only witnesses in any case that are permitted to testify in a narrative fashion,
to actually tell their story to the jury. However, that narrative story that the defendant
tells—although open in terms of format—may still be restricted in many of the same
ways as other witnesses.
The narrative testimony of the defendant will still generally be limited to matters
about which the defendant has personal knowledge, that are relevant to a material issue in
the case, that is not hearsay, and that is not otherwise excluded for an extrinsic public
policy.
After the defense concludes their case, the prosecution may be permitted to put on
rebuttal evidence. As previously discussed, the success of the prosecution’s rebuttal case
will depend heavily on the degree to which the prosecutor prepared, based on anticipated
‘surprises’ at trial. Like Quintilian, the author considers improvisation to the crown of our
study as prosecutors. Obviously improvisation involves attentiveness and reacting to an
ever-changing situation, but the best improvisation also includes anticipatory preparation,
for a variety of contingencies that may never come to fruition.
The rebuttal case is really the only time in trial when the prosecutor can catch the
defense attorney by surprise or force the defense attorney to think on her feet, and this is
due to the nature of rebuttal cases and the scope of a prosecutor’s discovery obligations.
The prosecutor has an affirmative obligation to disclose all evidence that they intend to
present at trial, the identity of all witnesses that they intend to call at trial (as well as an
offer of proof of what they anticipate the witnesses will say, if known), and of course, the
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prosecutor must disclose any evidence known to the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s team
that could be exculpatory, whether or not the prosecutor intends to present that evidence
at trial. But the prosecutor has no obligation to disclose the various anticipatory rebuttal
theories—and potential evidence to support those theories—where the contingency upon
which the relevance that those theories depend has not yet occurred (so long as the
evidence is not exculpatory). Unlike the evidence that supports the charges alleged—
which is relevant as soon as the prosecutor files criminal charges—rebuttal evidence, by
definition, is not relevant until there is something to rebut. Frequently, the prosecutor
does not even know about the evidence until the defense puts on their case; the ‘surprise’
by the defense—usually through a defendant’s testimony—is the impetus for the
prosecutor to seek out additional evidence to confirm or negate the story that the
defendant tells on the stand. Some of the examples from earlier chapters can help
illustrate this point.
In the attempted murder by an inmate discussed in Chapter Two (first mentioned
under assumption number two), I did not know that the defendant’s feigned disability and
that his use of a wheelchair, cane, and crutches as props while in prison would be relevant
until the defendant himself made a show out of struggling to get to the witness stand in
front of the jury, and specifically testified that basically his disability made this a selfdefense case. I did not need to disclose the observations of him walking without
assistance until he made that relevant, and by the time that became relevant and I
disclosed to the defense attorney, it was too late for him to coach the defendant or prevent
the evidence from coming in.
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In the drug sales case at the food truck mentioned in Chapter Two (first
mentioned under assumption number four), I had no idea that the photograph of the sole
of the defendant’s shoes would be relevant until the defendant testified in a way that
made his footwear the keystone element to his claim that he never actually possessed
cocaine that that he did not intend to sell cocaine. I had no obligation to disclose that
photo until it became relevant (which did not happen until midway through his
testimony). In fact, at the time that the defendant demonstrated to the jury how someone
could run in cleats on the street without damaging the cleats, I only had a hunch that he
was wearing street shoes and not cleats when arrested. Just like the demonstration by the
inmate who claimed he hid a weapon in the defendant’s shoe, I didn’t know exactly what
the outcome would be. I had a hunch that the drug dealer was wearing street shoes, just
like I had a hunch that the inmate witness had not actually practiced how to hide a
weapon in a shoe.
In the embezzlement case where the defendant claimed the extra money was a
loan from the business owner (who committed suicide before trial), I didn’t actually
know whether I would be able to disprove the claim. In fact, I didn’t even know the name
of the other employee until the defendant herself mentioned his name on the stand. I had
no obligation to disclose that name or what he would say, not only because I did not
know his name and did not know what he would say, but also because that evidence did
not become relevant until the defendant made it relevant. Similarly, at the end of my case
in chief, I knew nothing about the three striker (not even a name) defense witness who
tried to take the fall for the woman who was dealing drugs with her son out of the rehab
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facility. There would not have been any way for me to disclose his custody status because
I didn’t know that information until he testified.
Once all of the testimony concludes, the jury is instructed on the law of the case,
and then both parties have a chance to present closing arguments. As with opening
statements, the prosecutor gives her argument first since she has the burden of proof. The
defense gives their closing argument, and then the prosecutor gets one final rebuttal
argument before the jury begins to deliberate. Of all the different phases of jury trial,
closing argument stands out as the most unfettered opportunity for the prosecutor to tell
the story of the case. It is true that the prosecutor has some limited opportunity to preview
what she anticipates the evidence will show during opening statements, and similarly
may have some latitude to prepare the jury for various issues through jury selection, these
steps take place before the jury has heard any evidence. The prosecutor can’t argue what
the evidence in the trial means during these phases, both because there hasn’t yet been
any evidence received during that time, and also because argument to the jury is
explicitly prohibited at any time before closing arguments.

During closing arguments, the successful prosecutor has the time and space to
employ the creative, generative practices that embody poetics, narrative, and mystory.
Image plays a critical role in closing argument, as prosecutors use graphic representations
of evidence and ideas to display information to the jury, so that each juror can build their
own narrative around the evidence of the case. Jurors are likely to relate their own
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experiences and similar memories to visual clues from a case and the memories that
witnesses and victims recall on the witness stand (Butler, 2013).
As the prosecutor argues the evidence, the law, and what both mean, the
prosecutor weaves a story, and applies the facts of the case to the legal framework
outlined in the jury instructions. While most prosecutors will use linear logic and reason,
there is also a role for emotion, and creating new meaning, based not on a cold reading of
the facts of the case, but based on the shared experience of the jury, that sat through the
live testimony of witnesses, and that each bring their own common sense and life
experiences to the deliberative process. A simple recitation of the facts isn’t enough for
closing argument for a prosecutor in a criminal case. The burden of proof for the
prosecutor is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest burden of proof recognized
under the law. It isn’t enough for the jury to believe the defendant is guilty, they must
know the defendant is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. That level of certainty
requires the prosecutor to guide the jurors on a journey of making meaning that is of
course based on the evidence in the case, but that goes beyond the prosecutor merely
telling a story, that the jury might reject or accept. For a juror to know a crime occurred,
even though they did not witness the crime, the juror must make that meaning for
themselves, and must have that narrative of guilt in their own mind not because a
prosecutor told them to, but because they experienced the evidence and lived through the
trial and were guided to a narrative that they built themselves.
Each juror comes to the process with their own values, experiences, and social
norms, and a narrative that the prosecutor feeds them could be rejected as inconsistent
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with a juror’s individual norms and expectations. The narrative that the juror builds
herself won’t face the same risk of rejection, but the prosecutor needs to provide the raw
material (through the evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence) so each juror can build that narrative in their own mind.
Although the narrative that leads to guilt is built in the minds of the jury, and the
prosecutor presents the raw materials for those individual narratives, there is still an
opportunity for the jury to reject those raw materials. In closing arguments, it seems more
likely that the jury may reject the prosecutor’s arguments if it is not clear that the
prosecutor actually believes those arguments. To be clear, prosecutors are prevented from
vouching for witnesses or expressly injecting their own opinion on the weight or meaning
of evidence (through statements like, “I believe this witness”) during closing argument.
So the prosecutor cannot expressly say that she believes a witness or even that she
believes her own argument, but at the same time, if the manner of the prosecutor’s
presentation leaves the jury with the impression that the prosecutor herself does not
actually believe what she is saying, the jury will be more likely to reject the arguments of
the prosecutor, and to build their own narrative (without the prosecutor’s raw materials)
that may not lead to a guilty verdict. Jurors will likely view a prosecutor’s argument as
lacking authenticity if the prosecutor herself does not seem to believe that argument.
Quintilian spoke to this risk of inauthentic arguments failing in their persuasive
intent when he asked in Institutio Oratoria, “will the hearer feel sorrow, when I, whose
object in speaking is to make him feel it, feel none?” (Quintilian, as quoted in Butler,
2013 at 844). Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian believed that the degree to which the
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orator would be successful at moving an audience depended in part on the extent to
which the orator herself was actually convinced and transformed by her own argument
(Butler, 2013). As previously discussed, many of the ancient writings on the ideal
orator—particularly those from Quintilian—seem naïve or otherwise incompatible with
the role of almost every modern American attorney, but the notion that the attorney
should not make an argument that they themselves do not actually believe is entirely
consistent with the role of the prosecutor…and only the prosecutor.

The narrative that leads to a guilty verdict is built through representation and
analogy. This narrative leverages images and emotion, in a way that is consistent with
reason and common sense. The best closing argument will ‘bring the case before the
eyes’ of the jury. In this way, the story becomes something the jury can feel and
experience for themselves. The prosecutor is permitted to employ a fairly broad range of
theatrical elements in this process of persuasion in closing arguments, so long as the
arguments are based on the evidence or reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the
evidence, and so long as the arguments otherwise comply with the law.

Narrative, Mystory, and Poetics after Trial
Once a criminal defendant is convicted at trial, the opportunities for the kinds of
creative interventions discussed previously in this chapter open up significantly. The first
post-trial stage is sentencing, which is often followed by appeal, custodial time in prison
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(or alternative forms of punishment and rehabilitation), parole hearings, and for most
inmates, release from custody.

At sentencing, crime victims actually have an opportunity to tell their story,
mostly unrestrained by the rules of evidence and extrinsic policies that restrict victim
statements at trial. Here we begin our definition of ‘victims’ by reference to how the term
is defined in the California Constitution, which is probably more expansive than a lay
definition of the term, and in another sense is more restricted in one important way. The
definition that we use under the California Constitution is largely consistent with the
definition used in the Crime Victims’ Rights Act that was signed into law in 2004, but I
will use the definition under the California Constitution as that is the controlling authority
that I am most familiar with, having done criminal prosecution exclusively in California
since 2007, under California law.
The generally expansive definition of victim under the California Constitution
basically includes anyone who, as a result of the crime, suffers direct or threatened
physical, financial, or psychological harm, and also includes that person’s spouse,
parents, children, and siblings (California Constitution, article 1, section 28). Our
definition of victim will incorporate the more expansive concept under the California
Constitution as described above, but we will exclude from our definition the restrictive
language of the constitution, that specifically excludes anyone in custody for a criminal
offense from the definition of a victim. While there may have been financial or pragmatic
reasons for the State refusing to grant particular rights to inmates who are victimized by
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crime, those considerations do not impact our research. Under our definition, a person is
a victim of crime if they (or a spouse or family member) suffer direct or threatened
physical, financial, or psychological harm, whether or not they are in custody for their
own criminal offense.
The risk of undue prejudice, the prohibition against character evidence,
foundational issues, and even questions of relevancy are largely removed from
consideration at sentencing, and the victim is permitted to tell the court how the crime
affected them, in a way that simply wouldn’t be permitted at trial. Victims do usually
testify at trial and sentencing, but the scope and nature of their testimony at trial is very
different, due in large part to the right to a fair trial and the evidentiary restrictions we
discussed earlier. Many of those restrictions have to do with the risk of undue prejudice
and the possibility that an overtly emotional narrative might cause jurors to convict based
on passions and prejudices, rather than the evidence. Years ago I had a case where I
charged a drug dealer with manslaughter when his customer overdosed and died while at
the dealer’s house. The dealer panicked when the man died, and eventually burned and
dismembered the body. The family searched for the man for weeks, and finally learned of
his death when a dog dug up a piece of the victim’s body and brought it in the house.
At sentencing, the victim’s family was allowed to play a video of the man’s 2 year
old daughter hugging her father’s casket, and family members were allowed to testify
about how that little girl asks when her daddy is coming home, and how she couldn’t
even see her daddy one last time at the funeral, because his body was so badly burned.
That kind of evidence would never be allowed in the guilt phase of a jury trial, due to the
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risk of undue prejudice, and also due to the fact that the impact on the victim’s family is
irrelevant to the question of whether or not the defendant is legally responsible for his
death. These statements were allowed at sentencing because there is an assumption that
the risk of undue prejudice is not a factor with a neutral, detached, trained judge (as
opposed to a lay jury), and because unlike at the guilt phase of a jury trial, the impact of
the crime on the victim is relevant at sentencing.

There are significant therapeutic and restorative benefits associated with
permitting the victim to speak and to confront the defendant with stories about how their
crime has impacted others (Roberts & Erez, 2004; Caves, 2018a). This process of ‘being
heard’ and having a voice in the process helps the victim to regain some of the sense of
autonomy that they lost in the crime, and legitimizes the victim and the criminal justice
process itself (Giannini, 2008; Caves, 2018a). Even having the choice to speak or not at
sentencing (whether or not the victim actually exercises that right to speak at sentencing)
is a restoration of autonomy of sorts (Giannini, 2008).

The court described the role of victims at sentencing in United States v. Degenhardt
under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”) as follows:

the sentencing process cannot be reduced to a two-dimensional,
prosecution versus defendant affair. Instead, the CVRA treats sentencing
as involving a third dimension-fairness to victims-requiring that they be
‘reasonably heard’ at sentencing.. .. the CVRA commands that victims
should be treated equally with the defendant, defense counsel, and the
prosecutor, rather than turned into a ‘faceless stranger’.
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[United States v. Degenhardt (2005) 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341 at 1347, as
quoted in Giannini, 2008 at 435].

Some have even described the process of victims telling their stories as Ulmeric
mystories (Smith, 2007). These mystories provide insight into the lived experiences of
the surviving victims, and humanizes the victim’s experiences (Smith, 2007). In the wake
of a crime, victims are often left struggling to make sense of why the crime happened to
them, and to make sense of their place in the world in the aftermath of the crime.
Narrative is how we make sense of the world around us, so it makes sense that narratives
in the aftermath of trauma could help victims grow and make sense of their world
(Neimeyer, 2004; Pasupathi, Fivush & Hernandez-Martinez, 2016). Narrative—whether
it is the stories we tell ourselves, or the stories we tell others—are critical to our own
understanding and development of our identity and how we fit into the world and the
larger social structures around us (Pemberton, Mulder & Aarten, 2019). This is what
Ricoeur referred to as ‘narrative identity’ (Pemberton, Mulder & Aarten, 2019). Allowing
victims to tell their story can help to establish their sense of agency and their place in
their community (Pemberton, Aarten & Mulder, 2017).

Beyond our own understanding, a publicly-delivered narrative takes on special
significance for the victim, especially where that public delivery takes place in a formal
setting that lends its authority and amplifies the voice of the victim. Victim impact
statements are not merely ‘stories we tell ourselves;’ these statements take place in open
court, in a forum and a manner that is both public and ceremonial or official. The victim’s
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story, largely unfiltered by the rules of evidence, has a legitimate place in the formal
criminal justice process for the first time at sentencing. These aspects heighten the
potential restorative effects of the victim’s narrative. On the other hand, where that
formal setting and authority restricts or discourages the victim’s ownership over the
narrative, the victim impact statement is unlikely to contribute significantly to the victim
healing going forward, and in some cases, denying the victims ownership of their own
stories can be a form of secondary victimization (Pemberton, Aarten & Mulder, 2019).
The prosecutor should leverage the criminal justice process to allow victims to tell their
own stories, rather than leveraging victims to tell the stories of the criminal justice
system.
Victim impact statements are important for victims, and can also be important to
defendants. The timing of the victim impact statement is critical to its potential to
encourage change and meet broader therapeutic ends (Roberts & Erez, 2004). Usually,
the victim impact statement is the last thing a defendant hears before judgment in the case
is pronounced, and the defendant is sent off to serve their time in custody. The timing of
those statements in relation to the end of the case and the beginning of the punishment
phase, and the change in housing and circumstances for the defendant, likely play a role
in how impactful the statement is on the defendant. In custody, with nothing but time, it
is probably impossible for a person not to re-live the moments that led up to them being
sent to prison. Also, the emotion (or lack of emotion) in the victim impact statement
probably impacts different defendants in different ways. Some defendants may seem
unmoved by harsh words from the victim’s family, but may not be able to hold back tears
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when a widow describes how her baby girl asked for “daddy” and tried to open the coffin
at Daddy’s funeral to give him a kiss goodbye (but could not, since the defendant burned
the body beyond recognition), or may be caught off-guard when a decedent’s mother
forgives a murderer in court. In this way, the victim impact statement can give the
defendant a greater understanding than they would otherwise have of the harm that their
conduct caused to the victim (Roberts & Erez, 2004).
In theory, the defendant (like the victim) also has a greater opportunity to speak
after conviction. Since the defendant has already been convicted, we might assume that
the defendant would finally ‘come clean’ at sentencing, and finally tell their side.
Afterall, there’s no additional risk of conviction since that has already happened.
Sentencing is one of the few times the defendant will have an opportunity to speak,
relatively unrestrained by procedural or substantive rules (Thomas, 2007; Chan, 2009;
Burger-Caplan, 2017). The problem is that many defendants are still not fully
incentivized to be truthful and to tell their story at sentencing, for a few reasons. First,
many defendants are hesitant to admit guilt as they hold out hope that their convictions
might be overturned on appeal (Burger-Caplan, 2017). Second, to the extent that the
judge has discretion to give the defendant more or less punishment, the defendant that
does speak is often coached on what to say in order to persuade the judge to consider a
lesser sentence, and in any case, most sentencing statements will be specifically geared
toward mitigation (Giannini, 2008; Chan, 2009). Since the defendant’s statement is
transcribed and preserved, that statement will be available at the defendant’s parole
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hearing as well, and could be used as part of the basis for a denial of parole (BurgerCaplan, 2017).
Where the court does have discretion in sentencing, the defendant’s statements
can have an impact on the punishment the defendant eventually receives (Burger-Caplan,
2017; Giannini, 2008). Just like jurors, judges have expectations about what a defendant
should say, and like jurors, judges are likely to reject narratives of remorse when those do
not appear to be genuine (Burger-Caplan, 2017). During a defendant’s allocution, judges
tend to be most impressed by defendants who express remorse that the judge views as
genuine (Bennett & Robbins, 2014). Under this mitigation theory of defendant allocution,
there is a risk that remorse and apology will be expressed for a reduced sentence, whether
or not the expression is genuine (Bennett, 2006). So the defendant may tell a story, it just
may not be his story. Finally, many defendants are not prepared to actually take
responsibility for their actions at the time of sentencing. So the risk that sentencing
statements carry for a defendant has a tendency to discourage defendants from making
such statements, and when they do make sentencing statements, defendants are
incentivized to only discuss those factors and tell those narratives that are likely to reduce
their sentences (Burger-Caplan, 2017).
However, there may be benefits to the defendant telling his story at sentencing
that go beyond merely mitigating his culpability to achieve a lesser sentence. Just as the
transactional-type justification for a victim-impact statement—that a victim-impact
statement’s real purpose is to get the toughest sentence possible for the defendant—that
justification falls short when applied to the defendant as well. Clearly, mitigation (and a
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reduced sentence) is one goal in sentencing statements for many defendants, but it is not
the only goal. Like victims of crime, there is social and psychological value for criminal
defendants who tell their story at sentencing (Thomas, 2007; Burger-Caplan, 2017;
Wexler, 2006). Like victims, offenders make sense of their crimes largely through
narrative (Youngs & Canter, 2012). The criminal process has a way of dehumanizing and
silencing the defendant, and while the notion of ‘restoring’ the defendant (after the
defendant committed a crime) may seem antithetical to the goals of the criminal justice
system, social structures and human connections are key components of rehabilitation for
criminal defendants. For defendants who choose to make a statement at sentencing and
express a genuine sense of remorse, such statements can be empowering and have a
restorative impact as offenders attempt to rehabilitate themselves after being convicted
(Burger-Caplan, 2017).
Victims, defendants, and prosecutors are not the only actors in the criminal justice
system who have the opportunity to use more creative, narrative practices, particularly
after trial and sentencing. Judges (at least at the appellate level) also have an opportunity
to engage in creative practices after conviction and sentencing, through written decisions,
which typically would occur on appeal from the trial court conviction.
In one sense, the potential for the kinds of creative processes typified by mystory,
narrative, and poetics seems to open wide in the context of a post-conviction judicial
opinion, at least in the sense that the judge has the ability within the rules to adopt an
approach that leverages creative processes to both persuade readers and bring the fact and
ideas of a case to life. On appeal, there is no risk that the judge’s comment on the
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evidence or the law will cause a lay juror to become swept up in emotion and render a
decision based on passions or prejudices, as opposed to the law and the evidence, since
the intended audience for the written judicial opinion is not the lay jury.
But that time and space for creativity does not always (or often) lead to a more
creative approach in fact, due largely to the perception (within the professional culture
and norms of judges) that the rule of law is more important than emotion, creativity, or
individualized case factors (Massaro, 1989). In many ways, it may be easier for judges to
hide behind the rule-of-law convention than to deal with individualized justice (Massaro,
1989). At least some of the judicial inclination to avoid creativity, emotion, and
individualized justice may be due to the fact that judges fear that if their written opinions
cannot be classified as ‘objective,’ then the judicial opinion is nothing more than a
political act, and an undemocratic one at that (Kahn, 2016). One problem with this
perspective is that no written judicial opinion can be purely objective; these opinions
must necessarily make normative judgments (Kahn, 2016). The laws do not speak for
themselves as applied to specific facts; if they did, we likely would not need lawyers or
judges to begin with (Kahn, 2016). So even though the ‘objective’ written opinion is a
myth, the convention to present opinions as such is still alive in most courts. How the
court tells the story of the case necessarily involves normative value judgements that are
more akin to a political decision than one based on a sort of objective logic.
So the rules would permit an expansion of creative expression in the written
judicial opinion, but convention still frequently restricts that expression. But convention
is not binding, and convention can change from judge to judge, court to court, and from
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generation to generation. Perhaps the first step to opening judicial opinions to more
creative interventions would be an explicit admission that the judicial opinion involves
normative judgements that operate within social constructs and that are necessarily
influenced by politically-defined prioritizations. The myth of objective logic must yield
to the reality of narrative meaning-making embodied by the written judicial opinion.

Of course, even on appeal, the judge’s ‘voice’ is not the only one heard, even
though it is typically the only one that is published. The appellate attorney is free to argue
her client’s story on appeal, but unlike at trial, that argument will be heard by judges
alone, and not by members of the community (i.e. jurors). What’s more, even those
arguments are generally limited to what is contained in the trial court record. But even
where the arguments are limited to the record on appeal, and even where the audience is a
judge (or panel of judges) rather than a lay jury, the appellate attorney’s job is still to tell
the client’s story, and that story is, inevitably, a narrative one (Kahn, 2016). Like the
court of appeals judge, the appellate attorney is free to engage in creative processes, but
since the finder-of-fact or audience (court of appeals judges) will likely resist overtly
creative or apparently emotional appeals, most appellate attorneys try to conform to the
expectations of their audience, and in doing so, these attorneys tend to avoid overtly
creative or apparently emotional appeals.

Further downstream in the criminal justice process, the benefits of and
opportunities for mystory, poetics, and narrative tend to increase for inmates, but here,
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the focus tends to shift from persuasion to rehabilitation and healing (Presser &
Sandberg, 2019). Many of the creative processes discussed earlier—that offer therapeutic
promise for victims of crime—also have the potential to help offenders as they attempt to
rehabilitate themselves while in prison, before reentering society. Some of the more
creative practices that are being employed to help prisoners deal with their own crimes
and trauma include the use of literature in prison, inmate mystory projects, and prisoner
poetry (Presser & Sandberg, 2019). Many long-term inmates who are able to get out of
prison and abandon their criminal tendencies are able to do so by changing their selfnarrative, and creating a story for their future and identity that separated their present and
future from their offending past (Liem & Richardson, 2014). Since we make sense of
ourselves and form our identities through the stories we tell others and ourselves,
changing those stories could lead to meaningful changes in our identities over time. The
new, intentional pro-social self becomes the filter through which all decisions are
processed, and over time, the antisocial past no longer has a place in the narrative that the
former inmate has fashioned for their present and future self (Stevens, 2012). Another
successful tactic for former inmates in their effort to remain crime-free is the strategy of
sharing their story of change with others (Liem & Richardson, 2014).

It isn’t surprising that poetics, mystory, and narrative are being used successfully
by inmates and the formerly incarcerated as they attempt to reintegrate into society and
build their own identities, since these same processes are how we make sense of
ourselves and the world around us, how we establish our own identities, and how we
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generate and organize information. The same processes that have been the site of
invention and creativity provide the conditions for reinvention as well.
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CHAPTER FIVE
A PROSECUTOR’S RHETORIC

So far, much time and energy has been spent in this research to show how and
why training for prosecutors is lacking, and to show the reader how the American
prosecutor stands to benefit from both ancient rhetoric (particularly as theorized by
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian) and more modern rhetorical developments. The
unparalleled ethical obligations of the American prosecutor—and the corresponding,
relatively unchecked authority that the prosecutor exercises over important rights like life
and liberty—require that the prosecutor’s rhetoric be centered on ethics. At the same
time, the fact that the prosecutor, more than any other attorney in the criminal arena, will
routinely be subject to ‘trial by surprise,’ the prosecutor’s rhetoric must also be imbued
with creative practices and techniques that will prepare the prosecutor to master the art of
improvisation, the crown of all our study.
In this final chapter, my goal is to outline the ‘action step’ of this research, so we
can begin to understand what a training program for prosecutors will look like, and so
that we can start to examine where such a program would fit within the existing legal
pedagogy. This chapter will close by exploring areas for future research, to ensure that
the prosecutor’s rhetoric keeps pace with the social and heuristic changes that will impact
the jury, arguably the most important audience for the prosecutor in her pursuit of justice.
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It may seem strange to save the definition of a critical term in our research for the final
chapter. I have used the term ‘rhetoric’ without any definition, because an introduction to
the law-as-literature movement and a description of what I am not trying to do were both
necessary preconditions to any meaningful discussion of the kind of rhetoric to which I
seek to lead prosecutors. It was also important for the reader to see that the unique ethical
obligations of American prosecutors made otherwise naïve concepts of ‘good rhetoric’
from the ancients more pragmatic today than those concepts were in their own time. The
potential benefit to the modern American prosecutor—and by extension, the benefit to
the American criminal justice system at large—justifies the intellectual heavy lifting that
is required to reconnect the modern American prosecutor to those ancient rhetorical roots.
These benefits also justify creating ideological connections between ancient rhetoric and
the modern American law school, even though we now know that the American Law
School tradition developed independent from ancient rhetoric, as rhetoric was already
relegated to the ‘polite arts’ by the time formal programs of legal education began to take
shape in the United States. We are seeking to enrich the prosecutor’s rhetoric with both
ancient rhetorical techniques (both in terms of the substance of persuasion, and the
methods of teaching rhetoric), and with modern developments in rhetoric and other
disciplines. This bridge that cuts through broad historical divides as well as theoretical
divides among academic and professional disciplines, relies on the assumption that the
role of the prosecutor in American society—perhaps most evident when we look at how
much damage a bad prosecutor can do to communities, individuals, and institutions—is
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important enough (in terms of the potential for harm or for good) to justify invading the
sanctity of siloed disciplines and theories.

In short, the rhetoric that I envision—a rhetoric that informs the study and work of future
prosecutors—is a modern rebirth of legal rhetoric inspired by the otherwise naive, valueladen concepts of the ‘ideal orator’ or ‘good (person) speaking well,’ as articulated by
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, coupled with the pragmatic spirit (though not always
the letter) of the ancient rhetorical use of tropes, commonplaces, narrative storytelling,
analogy, and poetics, along with some more modern rhetorical techniques, such as
Ulmer’s mystory. Just as emotion plays a crucial role in jury trials, so too must emotion
play a role in the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

Prosecutorial rhetoric deviates from the standard legal rhetoric that we might acquire
from the casebook method (the dominant mode of instruction in modern American law
schools) in three important ways: ethical considerations underlie every single tactical and
strategic decision in crafting and delivering a persuasive message, seemingly illogical
influences, such as emotion, can play a critical role in the decision-making process and
must be taken into account, and that within the otherwise restrictive legal environment of
a courtroom, there are opportunities for creativity (particularly in jury trials) that can
enhance criminal prosecution.
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The justification for this seemingly-outdated idea ethical rhetoric is both a function of the
very real, unique ethical obligations of prosecutors, and a reflection of importance (and
potential for abuses of power) inherent in the concept of pursuing justice on behalf of a
sovereign government or ‘the people’.
Though the prosecutor’s rhetoric may reference classic rhetoricians and address prevalent
philosophies of rhetoric, the goal is a pragmatic one, to inform ethical, effective criminal
prosecution. In that vein, those ancient concepts that still hold rhetorical water, such as
the use of analogy, will still be used, both those ideas that serve no practical function will
be left to history. This evaluation of which techniques and theories are worthy of
resurrection is an area ripe for future research.
Aside from the ethical portion (which is specific to prosecutors), there may be a question
about whether this prosecutor’s rhetorical training is really necessary, and whether the
law school casebook method is already rhetorical, even if by a different name.

First, the ethical portion of prosecutorial training cannot be apportioned or separated; the
ethics in prosecutorial rhetorics is enmeshed in the practice and being, as it must be. The
ethical considerations are inherent and foundational to the rhetorical practices of
prosecutors, because the rules related to the conduct of prosecutors are not simply
technical legal requirements, they are imperatives that define prosecutors and attempt to
prevent the abuses of power and the kinds of injustice that can flow from unchecked
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government control over a person’s life and liberty. They are foundational to our entire
system of government in the United States.

To carry out their obligation to ‘do justice,’ using legitimate means to bring about
legitimate ends, prosecutors are granted substantial discretion (Caves, 2008). This
exercise of discretion—that has meaningful impact on individuals and communities—
relies on the prosecutor’s good judgement, and that judgement must be exist within the
context of a well-developed sense of professional ethics. There is no point at which a
prosecutor is no longer required to ‘do justice’ when acting in their professional capacity,
even if those actions hurt the chances of conviction. As discussed in previous chapters, a
prosecutor will regularly encounter situations where the omission or neglect of an ethical
duty would make a conviction easier to obtain, and where no one but the prosecutor
would likely every know about the omission or neglect. In this kind of scenario, the need
for a clear sense of ethics is essential. Otherwise, those words from Justice Sutherland in
Berger are hollow and merely aspirational.
If these ethical concepts are so important, and the stakes are so high, how do we keep the
idea of ‘pursuing justice’ from sliding into an amorphous, philosophical abyss that leaves
prosecutors curled up in the fetal position under their desks as cases pile up? These
ethical considerations are more concrete than those of the ancient rhetors, as they are
informed by case law, statutes, and the Constitution. But these ethical restraints do not
and must not compel prosecutors to ignore the art and science of persuasion.
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The utility of rhetoric created for prosecutors lies in its specificity. The generic rhetoric
of law school won’t suffice for prosecutors, not only because of the unique ethical
obligations of prosecutors, but also because the vast majority of law school argument is
designed around judicial opinions and appellate work, while the vast majority of a
practicing prosecutor’s rhetorical work (at least at the local level) is designed to inform
jury trial work, with a special emphasis on closing arguments (Clason, 2010).

There is value in connecting prosecutorial rhetoric to its ancient roots, and in comparing
that rhetoric to what we see in the humanities. There are immediate and long-term
benefits to explicitly tracing the prosecutor’s rhetoric to its ancestral roots. In terms of
immediate benefit, there are a number of ancient rhetorical concepts that still have
relevance to modern legal practice (Hogan, 2013). Two examples of ancient rhetorical
concepts that have stood the test of time are analogy and commonplaces or topics. That
the analogy—in all its various forms—has broad application in modern legal practice is
widely accepted as true (Brewer, 1996; Berger, 2013; Goodrich, 1984). Likewise, the
ancient concept of topics or commonplaces still has applicability in modern legal
practice, although the topics themselves have changed (Balkin, 1996). With regard to
narrative storytelling, law is literally created from storytelling, and the profession has
been infused with storytelling since the birth of ancient rhetoric (Edwards, 1996). From
witnesses who tell their on the witness stand, through the prosecutor’s storytelling in
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closing arguments, to an appellate judge’s storytelling in a written opinion, the trial
process is replete with storytelling, and for good reason: storytelling brings to life for the
jury a series of events that they did not witness themselves but that they are nonetheless
required to judge. Narrative storytelling is integral to the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

In terms of long-term benefits, tracing the historical roots of the prosecutor’s rhetoric
provides context that allows us to locate the sources of and inspiration for the various
ideas that shape the prosecutor’s rhetoric. This locational information is not merely some
historical triviality; naming the sources of inspiration for the prosecutor’s rhetoric will
allow future scholars to situate their own discourse into a broader historical and cultural
context, enabling interdisciplinary studies, while also affording the field of prosecutorial
rhetoric the orientation that in needs in order to expand and evolve. Such locational
information could also be helpful to the academic dismantling/ humanistic critique of the
prosecutor’s rhetoric.

The focus on jury trials in the prosecutor’s rhetoric will require this rhetoric to address a
topic that many jurists would rather avoid: emotion. Many scholars (including Immanuel
Kant, Owen Fiss, and John Rawls) have sought to excise emotion from the decisionmaking process or otherwise de-legitimize how emotion impacts the decision-making in
the pursuit of justice (Bayer, 2001). Some have even argued that emotion impacts
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verdicts more than logic does (Conti, 2001). Despite this, the role that emotions play in
the practice of law is often neglected by legal theorists (Posner, 2001).

Certainly, prosecutors (and judges) instruct jurors not to let bias, sympathy, or prejudice
influence their verdicts, but regardless of our instructions to a jury, emotions impact
verdicts. This is true even if the prosecutor does not view emotion as legitimate in the
decision-making process, and since prosecutorial rhetoric is primarily designed to work
within the existing criminal justice system, we have to account for emotion. Emotions are
a fundamental part of the decision-making process, and even though Plato denigrated
emotion in rhetoric and decision-making, Aristotle recognized how emotion was relevant
to rhetoric and persuasion (Bayer, 2001). The impact of emotion on criminal jury trials in
particular makes sense when we think about the nature of a criminal charge and the
specter of a public trial. Members of the community are tasked with judging facts, in a
courtroom that is open to a public audience, where the outcome of the trial will be public
knowledge, and where the witnesses and accusers come face-to-face with the defendant,
in front of twelve members of the community who are specifically required to deliberate
together after the close of evidence, and to reach a unanimous verdict (together) if
possible. A jury trial is clearly a social endeavor, and we cannot avoid emotion in that
rhetorical process, no matter how hard we may try.
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Whether there would be any benefit to a system of justice/judgment that was sterilized of
all emotion is beyond the scope of this study. As previously discussed, what we build
here is intended to improve the practice of criminal prosecution within the existing
criminal justice structures in the United States.
Related to the concept of emotion is the tendency of some so-called legal rhetoric to
place the somewhat mythical concept of objective logic at the center of all discussions as
it relates to decision-making, persuasion, and argument. This tendency seems particularly
prevalent among prosecutors. It makes sense that prosecutors would take comfort in
absolutes, given that their work results in the loss of liberty (and sometimes, life), based
on proffered facts that they themselves cannot know with absolute certainty. Embracing
the idea of objective logic may provide some degree of comfort and the façade of
objectivity, but even the ethical prosecutor is ‘taking sides’ when pursuing justice in a
case that involves competing theories (as every case does). The truth is, jury trials are the
quintessential human endeavor, with verdicts shaped as much—if not more—by the
biases, assumptions, and idiosyncrasies of individual jurors as they are by the law and the
evidence.

Philosophers like Chaim Perelman and John Searle have noted that logic alone cannot
account for the various nuances of a given argument, and that variables outside of some
ultimate sense of logic, such as audience and individual values and interests, influence
legal argument and outcomes (Bench-Capon, 2003; Bench-Capon, Atkinson & Chorley,
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2005). This idea that logic alone cannot account for how persuasive a given argument
may be makes sense intuitively. Afterall, if a sort of shared universal logic existed within
any given culture and if that shared logic could fully account for the relative
persuasiveness of a given argument, it would seem that jury trials would be extraneous,
as a particular verdict would be a forgone conclusion, such that the parties would not
waste the resources of going to trial, simply to confirm what they already know.
Finally, within this broad heading of seemingly illogical effects on decision-making are
those revealed in the fields of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology. The
researchers that come to mind include Alexander Todorov, Daniel Kahneman, Robert
Cialdini, and Gary Klein. Since the prosecutor’s rhetoric must persuade the
unpredictable, sometimes illogical human decisionmakers on a jury, any rhetoric that
purports to specifically serve prosecutors should at least touch on basic concepts of
cognitive science that inform or color the decision-making process (particularly those
concepts that may not be intuitive and would thus otherwise go unnoticed). The concepts
include, at a minimum, primacy, salience, and priming. Primacy deals with the cognitive
effect of the order in which information is presented, while salience has to with how we
attend to things that appear new, unique, or prominent, and priming refers to the impact
of hearing or seeing a concept shortly before you are presented with a scenario in which
that concept could apply (Berger, 2013).
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Cognitive biases of various types can influence juror perception and understanding,
which can ultimately impact the verdict in a case (Clements, 2013). Most attorneys who
persuade others by taking advantage of cognitive biases do so intentionally and are aware
of the expected outcome of such persuasive techniques, even if they cannot specifically
name them as cognitive biases (Clements, 2013). However, attorneys themselves are also
affected by cognitive biases, and most are unaware of how those biases affect their own
judgement and perception (Clements, 2013). Awareness of such biases is critical to the
prosecutor’s rhetoric not just for the potential that those biases could impact a juror’s
perceptions and judgements, but also because those biases could impact the prosecutor’s
own perceptions and judgements. Such self-awareness seems foundational for
prosecutors to be able to pursue justice, since that pursuit relies heavily on the
prosecutor’s own perception and judgment. This is so because much of the prosecutor’s
exercise of discretion takes place without any oversight from the defense or the court.
The decision to charge someone with a crime, the decision to dismiss a case, the decision
to discover certain information, all occur without any real oversight. Since those
unchecked processes—all of which can have a profound impact on individuals,
communities, and the broader criminal justice system—rely on the judgement of the
prosecutor, a prosecutor’s cognitive biases could have a detrimental impact on the pursuit
of justice. As such, the prosecutor’s rhetoric must encourage prosecutors to identify and
confront their own cognitive biases.
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As with all features of the prosecutor’s rhetoric, borrowing from cognitive science only
makes sense if it can lead to better results at trial, within specific ethical guidelines; to the
extent that a borrowed technique proves unworkable for a given rhetorical situation, or
could become ethically problematic, that technique has no home in the prosecutor’s
rhetoric.

There are a number of relatively recent rhetorical techniques and perspectives that have
been brought into particular areas of legal discourse and law school pedagogy, but for
various reasons (some of which are described below) some of these new schools of
thought may not have a proper home for their philosophical assumptions and
underpinnings in the prosecutor’s rhetoric, though useful concepts will be liberally
poached.

So-called ‘new rhetoric’ is worth discussing here, as it has been applied to legal
pedagogy with some apparent success. The central crux of new rhetoric sees writing as a
method of making meaning, rather than merely a method of expressing, organizing, or
presenting meaning (Berger, 1999). This process of making meaning through writing is
described as disorienting and productive, where the writer has no sure predestined path to
follow and no ultimate destination in mind (Berger, 1999). That new rhetoric could
benefit creative writing students, and perhaps any student that endeavors to develop new
ideas that are introspective and self-reflective, without a particular destination in mind,
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seems beyond dispute. As attractive as new rhetoric is for generating ideas and creating
meaning, it is difficult to see a direct application to prosecutorial rhetoric, at least at the
trial phase, since by definition, the prosecutor has a particular destination in mind—
namely, a guilty verdict—and the prosecutor’s rhetoric should be designed (within
specific ethical limitations) from start to finish to get the jury to that destination. Still,
even within that framework, it would be hard to argue that the writing process itself does
not contribute to the making of meaning, and it that respect, certainly some of the
philosophical assumptions inherent in new rhetoric would apply to prosecutor’s rhetoric.
Among those irrefutable assumptions is the idea that the writing process shapes the
meaning and form of persuasive arguments, at least with regard to the arguments
themselves, even if it leaves the ultimate goal of conviction untouched. Suspending
judgement and engaging in self-reflection are both important components of new rhetoric
(Berger, 1999).

Self-reflection, suspension of judgement (at least long enough to evaluate and generate
options and to anticipate responses from opposing counsel), and continuously monitoring
and updating the message would also be beneficial practices in the prosecutor’s rhetoric,
although as applied to prosecutors, the purpose of these practices has more to do with
anticipating arguments from the defense and resistance from the judge or jury, and less to
do with the creation and formation of meaning for its own sake. By definition,
prosecutor’s rhetoric will always have a goal in mind, and although that makes wholesale
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adoption of new rhetoric impossible, a number of new rhetoric’s individual features do
hold promise for the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

One final feature of new rhetoric that has particular application to the prosecutor’s
rhetoric is that second thoughts and revision are intrinsic to the process. The linear model
of writing tends to look at revision as something that takes place after the writing is
complete, but in new rhetoric, revision is seen as a method for generating second
thoughts (Berger, 1999). This idea of intentionally considering second thoughts is
appealing for the prosecutor’s rhetoric, particularly as it applies to closing arguments.
Closing arguments have widely been recognized as the most unrestricted, direct appeal to
the jury that an advocate may make in a jury trial (Carlson, 1989; Clason, 2010).
Admittedly, there are legal and practical restrictions on what an attorney may do in
closing argument, and specific ethical restrictions on what a prosecutor may do, but
closing argument is the only occasion in the trial where the attorneys are permitted to
argue directly to the jury (Carlson, 1989).

Since the jury (the audience that prosecutors need to persuade during jury trials) are not
generally permitted to ask questions of the attorneys during the presentation of evidence
or otherwise give any clear indication of how individual jurors view the evidence or the
arguments, a prosecutor must anticipate those second thoughts or doubts that some jurors
may entertain, and present closing argument in a way that preemptively deals with those
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potential doubts, even if the defense never raises them. A process that builds-in a form of
second-guessing could be particularly helpful for prosecutors, who would likely feel
more comfortable focusing on the theme of their case and their strongest arguments. This
aspect of intentional second thoughts as a method of generating ideas (rather than as a
threat to the ultimate goal of a guilty verdict) would encourage the prosecutor to consider
new ideas (as late as closing argument) that the prosecutor might not otherwise be willing
to consider.

The Limits of the Prosecutor’s Rhetoric
Aside from the practical and ethical limitations of the proposed prosecutor’s rhetoric that
have already been discussed, there remains one additional limitation that seems to occur
in every field in which expertise develops over time, wherein the experts are engaged in
the ‘making’ or ‘doing’ of the day-to-day profession, where experts tend to see repeated
patterns, even without a critical evaluation of that profession and its processes. Over time,
prosecutors will develop some of their own rhetorical practices that seem purely
anecdotal, driven apparently by intuition alone, and seem particularly difficult to teach or
explain to new prosecutors, and yet, experienced prosecutors continue to engage in these
rhetorical practices because they seem to work (and in this sense, ‘work’ means achieving
convictions that are not overturned on appeal).
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Gary Klein’s research reveals that experts often use an intuitive process to identify
methods of solving problems, whereby the expert recognizes a pattern in a new scenario
of problem that makes analogy to a prior solution easy, and so without much
contemplation, the expert intuitively recognizes the need to test that prior solution in the
new scenario (Berger, 2013). This flash of recognition that likely only comes with
experience likely cannot—and definitely should not—be taught in any sort of
prosecutor’s rhetoric course for new or aspiring prosecutors. Not only would attempting
to ‘teach’ all of the nuances and habits of thoughts that result from decades of expertise
prove unworkable, but teaching that ‘flash of recognition’ without the prosecutor having
the necessarily-related foundational experience to be able to adequately make sense of
that flash of recognition would be at the very least useless, and at its worst, would be
detrimental to justice. As an initial course for new or aspiring prosecutors, the
prosecutor’s rhetoric will not seek to ‘teach’ this flash of recognition—that can only
come from years of experience—but at the same time, our approach will not seek to
‘undo’ the valuable lessons that experienced prosecutors have learned over the years. In
this way, it is important to see our prosecutor’s rhetoric and the bricolage rhetoric that
prosecutors have developed for themselves as complimentary, rather than mutuallyexclusive. I do not see the prosecutor’s rhetoric as a replacement for the ten assumptions
that I developed in my own career as a prosecutor (detailed in chapter two), and I would
not attempt to undo or override the legitimate expertise that individual prosecutors have
developed in their own careers, at least to the extent that their expertise remains
‘legitimate.’ In the context of criminal prosecution, legitimacy here must be defined
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consistent with Justice Sutherland’s immortal words in Berger; using every legitimate
means to bring about a just conviction.

The prosecutor’s rhetoric—that is, what we expect to gain from building and crossing the
humble bridge discussed in the introduction—traces its roots to classic rhetoric (if not
historically, than fictionally), without ignoring the potential for creativity and invention
that can emerge from various rhetorical theories and ideas that were born and/or
raised/razed in the literary disciplines, particularly those ideas that emerged after rhetoric
made its home in the humanities. As previously discussed, the prosecutor’s rhetoric seeks
to connect a rhetoric for modern American prosecutors to classic rhetorical roots, while
also taking inspiration and specific practices from the humanities and other fields. The
emphasis here on “American” is not an ethnocentric assertion, but rather, a reflection of
the ethical obligations that are unique to prosecutors in the United States.

Just as Aristotle, Cicero, and especially Quintilian faced criticism (especially from
Ramus) for their apparently naïve description of the moral or ethical requirements of an
ideal orator (a good person, speaking well), it is easy to see how a lay person might view
our elevation of the American prosecutor’s ethical imperatives above all other attorneys
as somehow naïve or (given the author’s professional background) self-righteous.
However, distinguishing American prosecutors from all other attorneys is a function of
the American prosecutor’s very real and very unique ethical obligations, which are
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themselves a function of the unique role that the prosecutor occupies in the American
criminal justice system.

This distinction is important because these ethical obligations both inform the
prosecutor’s rhetoric and compel its creation; without these ethical distinctions, a generic
legal rhetoric or trial attorney rhetoric might suffice for prosecutors. Ethics mark the
critical difference in both the need for and the form of the prosecutor’s rhetoric. As an
agent of change, the initial focus of the prosecutor’s rhetoric is on training that will lead
to the application of techniques to improve prosecutorial performance at trial; the
prosecutor’s rhetoric is pragmatic, above all, designed with practical application in mind.
Although every aspect of the prosecutor’s rhetoric will be viewed through an ethical lens
(and not a generic ethical lens, but one specific to prosecutors), within a rhetorical
structure, there is no other overriding philosophical loyalty to any particular practice or
discipline; if it works in ethical persuasion at trial, we keep it, and if it does not work, it
does not have a place in the prosecutor’s rhetoric. This means the prosecutor’s rhetoric is
dynamic and unstable in some ways, and that instability will be met with resistance from
the legal community. A stagnant prosecutor’s rhetoric will not be pragmatic for long,
given that convictions at trial rely on the judgements and opinions of lay people, who are
part of larger cultural systems that are constantly changing.
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The author also anticipates a general resistance to more creative practices being
introduced in the prosecutor’s rhetoric, especially among experienced prosecutors.
Particularly, referencing Gregory Ulmer’s mystory concept and poetics within the context
of rhetoric that seeks to be pragmatic, will be met with some skepticism. However, most
seasoned prosecutors would have to admit that the unique world of jury trial practice
often requires advocates to utilize techniques and access skillsets that fall outside the
prevalent structured, linear models that emerge from a standard legal rhetoric or a law
school pedagogy. The prosecutor’s rhetoric implicitly assumes what most practicing
attorneys realize, that jurors (and even judges) do not always base their decision-making
on logic or purely legal principles. In the case of prosecutors, who have unique ethical
requirements, who are forced to grapple with conflicting theories, factual claims, and
laws, and whose success depends on their ability to persuade twelve strangers to see
evidence and testimony in a particular way as it applies to a particular law, the tools of
creativity and invention are surprisingly helpful, even if some (most?) prosecutors do not
yet feel comfortable employing them within the context of their own professional
practice.

As a starting point, the introduction of the mystory as a narrative/ storytelling process to
the prosecutor’s rhetoric seeks to take advantage of the power of narrative in the
courtroom. The use of the narrative or storytelling process within the context of the
criminal justice system has been studied extensively. Admittedly (as discussed at length
in chapter four) there are legal and practical limitations to the use of narrative form in
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criminal trials, but even with those limitations, narrative already plays a significant role
in criminal justice, and has the potential to further important criminal justice goals
(Bandes, 1996; Braithwaite, 2006; Champion, 2017; Hajdu, 2019; Pemberton, Aarten &
Mulder, 2017; Presser & Sandberg, 2019). It seems obvious that narrative can help the
jury to understand how a crime has affected the victim and the community, but the
narrative structure can also help the jury see events from the perspective of witnesses
who testify (Bandes, 1996). This perspective-taking aspect of narrative is critical in jury
trials, since we are asking jurors to decide whether an event happened, where none of the
jurors actually witnessed the event themselves. Narratives are how we make sense of our
world, and how we grapple with understanding traumatic events, like crime (Braithwaite,
2006; Caves, 2018a).

As most of us probably know intuitively, narrative can also help us fill in the blanks as
we evaluate gaps in knowledge or ambiguous information. Even so, the retributive model
of American criminal justice—particularly at the jury trial phase—has a tendency to
suppress or exclude the narrative (Brandes, 1996; Braithwaite, 2006). That suppression or
exclusion does not mean that narratives do not work in persuasion; if anything, that
suppression seems to suggest that narratives work too well, since suppression or
exclusion are usually borne out of a Constitutional interest in protecting the defendant’s
right to a fair trial. Our process of filling in gaps does not always lead to the correct
result, and there is a risk that the human tendency to fill gaps may result in unfair trials or
wrongful convictions.
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While witnesses in a jury trial are generally prohibited from testifying in a narrative
(uninterrupted) format, the court does not have a way to effectively prohibit or otherwise
interfere with how individual jurors organize testimony and think about the case. The
narrative is the predominant way that people make sense of what they see and hear
(Champion, 2017). If jurors are predisposed to organize a case as a narrative, the
relevance of the narrative to the prosecutor’s rhetoric seems apparent, particularly as it
relates to closing argument. During closing argument, the prosecutor has the opportunity
to shape how that narrative is constructed in the minds of the jurors, so long as the
prosecutor’s arguments are supported by the evidence and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the evidence. Given the role that narrative plays not only in how we
express ourselves but also in how we think and make sense of the world around us, it is
perhaps no surprise that the narrative has been used extensively within the criminal
justice system, both as an advocacy tool and also as a method of critiquing criminal
justice processes (Presser & Sandberg, 2019). In other words, narrative can be used
effectively to work within the existing criminal justice system, and also to challenge how
that system works. As was discussed in the introduction, this study deals with the former,
and leaves the latter for another day.

Beyond the basic concept of narrative in the prosecutor’s rhetoric, the specific relevance
of the mystory and poetics to my research is fourfold: there is a direct application for both
the mystory and poetics to the prosecutor’s rhetoric, an indirect benefit to prosecutors, a
benefit to how this research project is received by readers, and finally, a benefit to the
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making/remaking, the study, and the teaching of the prosecutor’s rhetoric. In terms of
direct benefit to the prosecutor’s rhetoric, the mystory format is a creative, inventive
practice that can assist prosecutors as they attempt to view evidence and testimony in new
ways. The mystory technique can assist with both the making and the study of rhetoric,
and the making and studying of theory (Gye, 2003). We know mystory arose out of a
recognition that the way that people learn and communicate has changed with
technology, and that those same changes that have influenced learners have also
influenced jurors. The mystory approach has the very real potential to enhance jury
selection methods for prosecutors, as the topical areas of a mystory could form the rough
basis for questioning of prospective jurors. Admittedly, this is an area that needs further
research, but at a basic level, the mystory technique seems to hold potential for jury
selection, to the extent that the answers to a mystory-type inquiry could reveal something
about a potential juror that the prosecutor might not otherwise be aware of, the same way
a mystory might reveal something about ourselves or our students that we would not
know otherwise. Ulmer’s approach intentionally moves away from the conclusion-driven
essay style, where alternate interpretations are shut down, toward a more inventive
methodology that actively encourages the generation of new ideas and different ways of
thinking (Gye, 2003). For the prosecutor’s rhetoric, the benefit of being able to adopt a
more open, inventive perspective is not to suggest that prosecutors in trial should not be
conclusion-driven (that is, focused on achieving a guilty verdict). The ability to see
evidence and testimony in the case in new ways and to generate alternate views (that is,
views that do not lead to a guilty verdict) is helpful for the prosecutor to anticipate the
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arguments of the defense as well as the possible doubts of the jurors. Once those alternate
possibilities are known to the prosecutor, they can use that information to inform the
direction of the case, with a special emphasis on closing argument. This creative
technique offers some of the same benefits as the technique recommended by Quintilian,
where the perfect orator can take up an unjust cause in order to anticipate what the
defense will argue.
Poetics offer an alternate method of presentation that could be very helpful in closing
argument, and poetry (and the broader practice of creative writing) can be a liberating
practice, that allows the individual to think about factual claims or events in a new way,
and might also help the individual process events creatively that they are not willing or
able to address directly. The concept and definition of metaphor in Aristotle links rhetoric
to poetics, such that poetics and rhetoric have been described as two sides of the same
coin (Schneck, 2011; Ricoeur, 2004). Poetics is described as vivification, or bringing
something to one’s eye, without any claim to truth or persuasion (Schneck, 2011).
Metaphor has a poetic and rhetoric meaning, but the goal of rhetoric is different from the
goal of poetics; of the two, rhetoric has the aim of persuasion (Ricoeur, 2004; Schneck,
2011). However, poetry can still be persuasive even without being rhetorical (without
being designed to persuade), and rhetoric can still be poetic (Schneck, 2011). A poetic
rhetoric, then, is one that is intended to be persuasive, that brings evidence to life
(Schneck, 2011). An effective prosecutor’s rhetoric then would seem to be one that is
persuasive and brings the evidence (and the story of the case) to life, addressing both
sides of the metaphorical coin.
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In addition to enhancing the story of the case, poetics can be liberating for the attorneywriter. This is true because the structure of writing within the context of legal practice is
particularly formulaic, that attempts to fashion itself as logical. The dominant mode of
writing for prosecutors does not lend itself to overtly creative practices. Writing poetry
can free the prosecutor from that oppressive structure of legal writing. The promise
offered in such liberation is further elucidated when we consider (as posited by ‘new
rhetoric’) that the writing process itself is key not only to organizing ideas, but also to
generating ideas and theories.
On a personal level, there is something liberating about writing poetry, specifically
because it does not lay claim to truth. It can be completely fictional, with no claim to
reality, and this can be written without jeopardizing the ethos of the author. It is nontestimonial, and relatively free from the conventions of persuasive writing. Through this
process, prosecutors can view events from different perspectives. This intellectual
flexibility is crucial to the prosecutor’s ability to improvise at trial in reaction to the
inevitable ‘trial by surprise.’

The indirect benefit of the mystory format and the use of poetry and narrative to
practicing prosecutors is that the use of such techniques by respected prosecutors could
signal a form of permission to the profession to be more creative in its practices.
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The prosecutor’s rhetoric is primarily focused on jury trial, but the prosecutor’s rhetoric
also necessarily includes writing techniques as well, both as methods for invention and
planning, as well as for the substantive production of written documents that will be filed
with the court, rather than presented orally. This focus provides some insight into where
and how the prosecutor’s rhetoric might fit within existing legal pedagogy. Since this
project is focused on leveraging gaps in existing structures to trigger meaningful change
in criminal prosecution and training, rather than the pursuit of theory for its own sake,
where the prosecutor’s rhetoric fits in to existing pedagogy is as important as the
substance of the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

The move by the American Bar Association away from mandatory pre-law undergraduate
education seems unlikely to change, particularly for the prosecutor’s rhetoric, where
prosecutors make up only a small portion of all practicing attorneys. So undergraduate
education does not seem to be the best ‘home’ for the prosecutor’s rhetoric. On the other
end of our timeline, a post-law school program for the prosecutor’s rhetoric may come
too late to be of much use, since most prosecutors are thrown into jury trial shortly after
law school. When we consider how starting salaries of new prosecutors compare to the
starting salaries at most major law firms—new prosecutor salaries are typically less than
half of what new associates earn at major firms—there may be very little financial
incentive for post-law school study. So law school may be the best home for the
prosecutor’s rhetoric as a training course for future prosecutors.
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As we endeavor to find a home for the prosecutor’s rhetoric within the legal academy,
our first task may be to find an existing course in law school to see if that course could be
expanded to incorporate the prosecutor’s rhetoric. Every law school accredited by the
American Bar Association has a Legal Research and Writing (“LRW”) program. These
programs are separate from the substantive areas of legal instruction. This separation
between writing technique and the substantive source of legal material creates challenges
for LRW instructors and students. LRW programs are probably the closest that law
school courses come to teaching some form of rhetoric, but these existing programs still
fall short. LRW programs are typically underfunded, with LRW instructors receiving
lower pay and less academic prestige than their counterparts in the various legal
disciplines at the law school (Greenhaw, 1995). Many LRW instructors have no path to
tenure (Greenhaw, 1995). In my own experience, I found that the LRW program taught
me to produce documents that resembled something an attorney would produce, but not
much else. The course did not even attempt to include any instruction on rhetoric or
persuasion. There was also no real way to distinguish between research errors and
ignorance about the substantive areas of law (that were beyond the scope of the course,
even though every assignment dealt with a substantive area of the law).

In keeping with the general recognition that pattern recognition is an important
component of rhetoric, and that order and arrangement can be persuasive, one method of
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teaching LRW (consistent with the prosecutor’s rhetoric and the move toward creative
pattern formation) that is borrowed from Goeffrey Sirc’s concept of ‘box logic’ (see Sirc,
2004). The box logic concept was inspired in part by Marcel Duchamp’s Green Box
(1934), a book of sorts that was essentially a series of personal notes from Duchamp that
were generated while constructing his piece Large Glass (Sirc, 2004). The box logic
concept involves the collection of artifacts and remnants into a box or journal, that can be
repositioned and arranged at a later date (Sirc, 2004).

At first blush, the idea of storing and sorting artifacts and items in an artful arrangement
seems wholly inapplicable to any writing process, but the task of selecting and arranging
items in a persuasive fashion is a rhetorical exercise. When the items being arranged are
portions of foundational texts, the box logic method starts to look like a form of legal
writing. Afterall, the authority for a piece of legal advocacy usually comes from a
gathered artifact (a written legal opinion or a law). The authority itself is not the original
work of the person using it, it is merely a gathered artifact. The rhetorical, creative act is
not the gathering of the artifact (which is more akin to the research process), but how it is
rearranged and repurposed. The box logic method, as presented here, can be an effective
starting point for a prosecutor who needs to draft a document, but box logic can also form
the basis of an alternate approach to invention and organization throughout trial, offering
many of the same benefits to prosecutors as poetics, mystory, and narrative.
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This box logic concept does not seem inconsistent with the alternative approach offered
by Ulmer’s mystory, with its emphasis on pattern recognition, and also seems consistent
with Derrida’s (1976) idea that student writing involves collecting things already known
and arranging them into something new (see Gye, 2012).

Realistically, given the fact that on the one hand, LRW is required by ABA-accredited
schools, but on the other hand, LRW is not afforded the same funding and prestige within
the legal academy as other substantive areas of the law are, it seems unlikely that there
could be a home for the prosecutor’s rhetoric within the LRW structure. But we can draw
some inspiration from LRW (particularly, as augmented by the box logic method) that
would allow the prosecutor’s rhetoric to be taught before would-be prosecutors have
developed sufficient expertise in substantive areas of advanced criminal law and criminal
procedure. This augmentation should allow the prosecutor’s rhetoric to be taught before
the student completes all of her required legal studies. For most full-time law schools,
this means the prosecutor’s rhetoric could be taught in the first, second, or third year.

Teaching the prosecutor’s rhetoric in the first year of law school seems like a mistake, as
the course will be tailored to a very narrow group (those who would become prosecutors)
and because the first-year schedule for students of most ABA-accredited law schools is
already a set schedule with no opportunity for electives or changes. There will also be
some value to the student if the course is taught after the student has acquired some
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working knowledge of criminal law and has a chance to gravitate towards criminal
prosecution as their chosen career field. So the logical place for the prosecutor’s rhetoric
seems to be during the third or second year of law school at a standard full-time ABAaccredited law school. The details of our course on the prosecutor’s rhetoric are outlined
below.

Course Description
‘A Prosecutor’s Rhetoric: Ethically Knowing, Doing, and Making Justice’ A prosecutor’s
rhetoric examines the ethical and rhetorical aspects of the work of modern American
prosecutors, particularly as it relates to jury trials. Students will learn to know, do and
make justice through a variety of readings, writing exercises, and rhetorical simulations
in class, with an emphasis on ethics and oral advocacy. Given the foundational nature of
prosecutorial ethics to a prosecutor’s rhetoric, students will begin by studying, discussing,
and demonstrating the unique ethical requirements of American prosecutors. Next,
students will review the sources and philosophies of ancient rhetoric, to discover how
those ancient rhetorical concepts are relevant to modern criminal prosecution and oral
advocacy. After working through ethics and ancient rhetoric, the foundational aspects of
the course are rounded out in our work in emotion as it relates to criminal prosecution.
Finally, we trace the rhetorical methods that have emerged out of the humanities, with a
focus on narrative, Ulmer’s mystory concept, poetics, remix, and box logic.
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Who is this Course For?
This course is an upper-level elective that the law school student takes at least
after the first year of law school, but ideally, after two full years of law school at an ABA
accredited, fulltime program. The program is geared toward future prosecutors, although
all trial attorneys could benefit from the course to some degree. Most ABA-accredited
law schools cater to a general legal audience at the J.D. level, so it seems unlikely that
many ABA-accredited schools would be able to limit a particular course to future
prosecutors.
Prerequisites would include satisfactory completion of a Legal Research and
Writing course, as well as the satisfactory completion of at least one course in criminal
law, criminal procedure, or Constitutional law. This course is for anyone interested in any
academic or professional pursuit that overlaps or intersects with criminal justice, the law,
ethics, or the broader concept of persuasion. The most obvious candidates for this course
are those who wish to pursue careers as prosecutors. Less obvious candidates for this
course could be those who want to pursue academic or professional careers related to the
practice and study of ethics, politics, community organization and advocacy, or
rehabilitation, as well as those interested generally in the pragmatic potential of the
creative arts. It would make sense to modify the focus of the course to fit the demands of
the student body.
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Topics for Possible Readings
The readings will be organized around eight major topics: prosecutorial ethics,
ancient rhetoric, emotion in rhetoric, narrative, poetics, mystory, remix, and box logic.
Ideally, after the first or second time teaching this course, the list of potential readings
would be cut down substantially, with the additional reading of my textbook for the
course, A Prosecutor’s Rhetoric. Since that does not exist yet, we are stuck with these
texts, but much of this list is tentative, as is the course itself; the course outline should be
viewed as a starting point, and it is assumed that over time, the course (and course
materials) will change. Just as the course materials and assignments are a place for
invention and shared learning among the professor and the students on the practice and
theory of the prosecutor’s rhetoric, the course itself is also a place of learning and
invention—about the process of learning and teaching—and that learning will inform
future iterations of the course. The course materials are dynamic, as is the course itself,
and the theories that inform both.
The course topics proceed in the order of relevance to the prosecutor’s rhetoric, and
since prosecutorial ethics is the lens through which all work in the course must be
viewed, we start with ethics, and continually revisit ethics in the practice of prosecution
throughout the course, as a component of nearly every assignment. Because of the
transdisciplinary nature of a prosecutor’s rhetoric, the reading list for the course may
appear very long, as we are picking concepts and ideas from various publications, since
no single publication captures what we need, yet. The possible readings are identified
below, organized along the eight major course topics. The inclusion of a text does not
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necessarily mean that the entire book or article will be assigned. However, in the case of
an actual case opinion, statute, or rule, students will likely be expected to read that text in
its entirety. Also, while many of these texts are included because there is some
understanding that the theories espoused therein are consistent with the prosecutor’s
rhetoric, some are included specifically because they are inconsistent with the
prosecutor’s rhetoric. The inclusion of these counter-texts provides material that can
inspire meaningful debate on the nature and legitimacy of the prosecutor’s rhetoric.

Prosecutorial ethics
American Bar Association rule 3.8
Berger v. U.S. (1935) 295 U.S. 78.
California Bar Rule 5-110: Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.
Caves, M. A. (2008). The prosecutor’s dilemma: Obligatory charging under the Ashcroft
memo. Journal of Law and Social Challenges, 9, 1.
Continuing Education of the Bar—California. (2018). California Criminal Law:
Procedure and Practice. Oakland, C.A..: CEB.
U.S. v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218.
Ancient rhetoric
Aristotle. Book II, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross, Delphi Classics,
2013.
Aristotle. Book V, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W. D. Ross, Delphi Classics,
2013.
Aristotle. Book XXIX, Problems Connected with Justice and Injustice. Translated by E.
S. Forster, Delphi Classics, 2013.
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Cicero. Book I, II, and III, De Officiis. Translated by Walter Miller, Delphi Classics,
2014.
Cicero. Book I, II, and III, De Oratore. Translated by J. S. Watson, Delphi Classics,
2014.
Crowley, S., & Hawhee, D. (2012). Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students (5th
ed.). Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson.
Frost, M. (1999). Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage. S. Cal.
Interdisc. LJ, 8, 613.
Herrick, J. A. (2017). The history and theory of rhetoric: An introduction. Routledge.
Quintilian. Book I, II, and XII, Institutes of Oratory. Translated by H. E. Butler, Delphi
Classics, 2015.
Ramus, P. (1986). Arguments in rhetoric against Quintilian. The Rhetorical Tradition,
563-586.

Emotions in rhetoric
Bayer, P. B. (2001). Not Interaction but Melding-The Russian Dressing Theory of
Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with
Suggested Related Maxims for Judges and other Legal Decision Makers. Mercer Law
Review, 52, 1033–1086.
Carlson, R. L. (1989). Argument to the Jury: Passion, Persuasion, and Legal Controls.
Saint Louis University Law Journal, 33(4), 787–822.
Posner, E. A. (2000). Law and the Emotions. Georgetown Law Journal, 89, 1977.
Narrative
Conti, D. B. (2001). Narrative Theory and the Law: A Rhetorician's Invitation to the
Legal Academy. Duquesne Law Review, 39(2), 457.
Presser, L., & Sandberg, S. (2019). Narrative criminology as critical
criminology. Critical criminology, 27(1), 131-143.
Warnock, J. P. (2003). Effective Writing: A Handbook with Stories for Lawyers. Parlor
Press LLC.
Poetics
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Berger, L. L. (2013). Metaphor and analogy: The sun and moon of legal persuasion.
Journal of Law and Policy, 147–193.
Ricoeur, P. (2004). The rule of metaphor: The creation of meaning in language.
Routledge.
Schneck, P. (2011). Rhetoric and Evidence: Legal Conflict and Literary Representation
in US American Culture (Vol. 1). Walter de Gruyter.
Mystory
Magolda, P. M. (1999). Mystories about alternative discourses in a qualitative inquiry
seminar. Qualitative Inquiry, 5(2), 208–243.
Rust, M. D., & England, S. (2018). ‘The Circle Uncoiled, Unwound’: Following
Memory’s Storyline with Mystory. In Matters of Telling: The Impulse of the Story, pp.
107-115.
Ulmer, G. (1989). Teletheory: Grammatology in the age of video. Routledge.
Ulmer, G. (1994). Heuretics. The Logic of Invention. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Ulmer, G. (2003). Internet invention: From literacy to electracy. Pearson Education.

Remix
Gye, L. (2012). On the way to electracy. AAWP conference, Swinburne University of
Technology.
Tofts, D., & Gye, L. (Eds.) (2007). Illogic of sense: the Gregory L. Ulmer remix. Alt X
Press.

Box logic
Sirc, G. (2004). Box-Logic. In A. F. Wysockie, Et Al. (Eds.), Writing New Media:
Theory and Application for Expanding the Teaching of Composition (pp. 111-146). Utah
State University Press.
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Possible Assignments
My tentative list of possible assignments draws from pedogeological research, my own
teaching experience at the undergraduate and graduate level for over a decade, and
perhaps most importantly, my own experience as a student for over thirty years. My goal
with course assignments is to strike the right balance on a number of issues. I want to
balance the need for regular submissions (to make sure students are on track and to be
able to adjust the course as necessary) with the need to avoid busywork that does not
contribute to student learning. I also need to balance the course assignments based on
different student abilities and learning styles. Some students may move quickly through
the materials, so I need assignments that can continue to challenge those students without
leaving the rest of the class behind. Some students will prefer to get information (and
respond to assignments) in written form, while other students may not grasp some
concepts without a discussion.

I also draw inspiration from the substantive areas that I address in the course, in that my
emphasis will be on invention and creation, not rote memorization. Obviously, students
will be expected to retain some information, but I want that retention to come as a natural
side-effect of actually working with the information in scenarios that resemble real-world
situations.

Weekly Notes
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Students will be expected to submit around one page (single spaced, 1-inch margins, 12
point font, new times roman) of notes each week based on the readings, in their own
words. This seems like busy work (at least it did to me when I had to do it as a student)
but this assignment will actually help students understand and retain the readings, and
also provides a discreet method for feedback from students (who might not feel
comfortable asking questions in class or coming to office hours). The writing process
itself is a method of making meaning, and when students are forced to translate the
readings into words that make sense to the student, that increases understanding and
should increase retention as well. Having those notes available for later use may also be
helpful for students in future courses.

Character Quizzes
Students will be given ungraded character quizzes specifically to identify whether the
class as a whole and whether individual class members can understand and apply the
ethical rules for prosecutors, in a variety of scenarios that simulate the real-world ethical
challenges that prosecutors regularly face. I think it is important for the quizzes to be
ungraded because I do not want the quizzes to be a source of undue stress, and quizzes in
general (particularly quizzes given without any notice) can create stress in some students
that is debilitating, and not conducive to actual learning. Although they will not be
graded, the quizzes will provide another indicator for student learning (which can trigger
course adjustments or individual meetings), and working through the scenarios is an
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important exercise for the students, to internalize the idea that ethical challenges are a
critical part of criminal prosecution. There is also some benefit to the unpredictable
nature of the character quizzes. Students will eventually grow accustomed to being ready
to respond to ethical dilemmas without any notice, and even though these quizzes are not
graded, that ability to respond without notice will be helpful for later graded assignments,
and also helpful in future employment.

When I was a sergeant in the Army, one of my extra duties was to provide training to
new soldiers, and one of the goals of the training was to train as we fight. This basically
meant that training and testing should try to resemble how we would actually use the
techniques in the real world. There, the real world meant armed combat, while here, the
real-world means working as a prosecutor. As a prosecutor, I do not often have much
time or notice to contemplate my approach to particular ethical challenges that arise,
especially during trial. Typically, I have no notice that an issue even is an ethical
problem, so even the initial identification or issue-spotting can be a challenge. I want my
students to grapple with ethical dilemmas in the classroom the same way that they would
in the field. The goal is not perfection, but improvement throughout the semester. The
hope is they make their mistakes in a safe classroom environment, learn from those
mistakes, and then avoid those mistakes in the real world, where there are real
consequences.
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Issue Spotting
Throughout the course, students will be presented with a variety of hypothetical scenarios
and asked to spot the relevant factual details for a given line of inquiry. Sometimes the
issue will be related to a crime or ethics, but not always. Issue spotting will likely
(eventually) take on an on-the-spot improvisational character, and will develop into a
form of oral advocacy as well.

Perspective-Taking Narratives
Students will be given hypothetical scenarios (often inspired by actual police reports) and
asked to construct detailed narratives from the perspective of someone mentioned in the
scenario. Sometimes students will be asked to tell their story from the perspective of the
victim, but often, it will be from the defendant, a witness, the police officer, or even a
bystander who is only mentioned in passing. The purpose of this assignment is to help
students understand the powerful role that narrative plays, to help students engage in
meaningful perspective-taking, and to get students accustomed to working with narrative.
It seems likely that most police reports may lack the kind of detail necessary to construct
meaningful narratives, and while those reports may still serve as a source of inspiration
for creative storytelling, it could be helpful to try using an actual piece of literature for
one of these perspective-taking narratives, so that the instructor has a way to evaluate
whether the narrative is actually base on the clues contained in the story, or whether the
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student is merely using common tropes and stereotypes to fill in the gaps left by a vague
scenario.

Crime Poetry
Students will be given legal documents or scenarios (written judicial opinions, crime
reports, or even a notorious criminal case) that will serve as inspiration for a poetry
project, with ‘poetry’ defined very broadly. The focus for students will be on bringing to
life some aspect of the fact pattern, in a way that moves the reader, without much concern
about the direction in which they are moved, implicitly acknowledging that unlike
rhetoric, poetry does not intend to persuade, although it may still do so.

Mystory
The weekly notes and character quiz assignments will take place throughout the course,
while the mystory assignments will not begin until we discuss the mystory method,
sometime after the first half of the course. I want students to continue to add to their
mystories throughout the course and continue to revisit. The mystory will be submitted
and graded, but not until the end of the course, and even then, students will understand
that the entire process is tentative, and is meant to be revised.

Public Rhetoric
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The public rhetoric assignment is somewhat flexible, in that the form of the public
rhetorical performance will depend on what venues are available for performance in the
community during the semester, but the core requirements will be the same, no matter the
venue. Students will be required to deliver a presentation or argument in a public forum
on a topic that is important in the community. For many students, this will mean making
a public comment at a meeting of a local government board or legislative body (such as a
county board of supervisors meeting or a city council meeting). Each board or legislative
body will have its own requirements for public comment, and part of the assignment for
students is to actually figure out what those requirements are and to conform to those
requirements, as there is value in teaching students how to get involved in the public
discourse that affects their lives.

Mock trial
The final exam for the course will be a mock trial of sorts, with each student rotating
through the role of a juror, a prosecutor, and a defense attorney, during closing argument.
This exercise will also include changes that students must respond to, like objections, last
minute changes to witness testimony, and unexpected feedback from jurors. The format
of the mock trial will depend on the class size and the semester length, but ideally, I
would like each student to have a chance to serve as a prosecutor, a defense attorney, and
as a juror.

258

Rationale for Methods, Assignments, and Readings
I will only focus here on the assignments, methods, and readings whose rationale is not
obvious, where the assignment, reading, or method could look peculiar in an academic
course on prosecutorial rhetoric. For most of these methods, assignments, and readings,
the relative ‘strangeness’ of what we do in this course has a practical application both in
terms of enhancing learning for the course and enhancing a student’s preparation for life
after graduation, whether that means being an ethical prosecutor or simply a responsible
citizen.

The overall approach to this course is one that accepts the idea that students and
professors will create meaning through a shared experience of participatory pedagogy.
The idea of participatory pedagogy and the general notion of a shared meaning-making
has been discussed at length by Victor Vitanza, Gregory Ulmer, and others (Arroyo,
2013). Indeed, the traditional methods of teaching in the writing and composition
disciplines has been viewed by some as outmoded for some time (Dobrin, 2011). We see
a similar pattern in law school. Even though law professors keep up with developments in
the fields that they teach (criminal law, torts, contract law, ect.), they do not generally
keep up with changes or research in methods of teaching and learning (Wangerin, 1994).

Where this course differs from some of the pedagogical models entertained by Dobrin,
Arroyo, Vitanza, and Ulmer is that we are still working towards some ultimate, concrete
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conclusions (more effective criminal prosecution within the existing criminal justice
system), and while we can draw much inspiration from these pedagogies, the prosecutor’s
rhetoric may not be able (yet) to ask some of the disruptive—yet productive—questions
to which these pedagogies may ultimately lead, particularly about the nature of justice
and truth.

The focus on ethics in a rhetoric course must seem strange, particularly because the
course is intended to have real practical application. However, this focus on ethics is
fundamental to practice, and it is critical for the students to understand that the prosecutor
is more than an everyday bawler or pleader. Students cannot proceed with instruction in
how to win cases if they cannot first internalize and apply those strict ethical obligations
that are unique to prosecutors.

The focus on performance in the prosecutor’s rhetoric is pragmatic both in the sense that
it may prepare them for professional practice and also because it will help with retention
and understanding, regardless of whether they actually intend on becoming prosecutors or
not.

The emphasis on creativity also likely seems out of place when compared to a typical
legal or criminal justice course, but creativity (along with ethics) is one of the critical
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distinctions between the prosecutor’s rhetoric that we teach in this course and the sort of
rhetoric a law student might learn in their other law school courses.
Some of the assignments (particularly the character quizzes and the mock trial) require
students to react quickly and to think on their feet. The skill of improvisation is critical to
the prosecutor’s rhetoric, as much of the job entails reacting quickly to last-minute
changes. Improvisation has long been recognized as critical to oratory and rhetoric, and is
particularly important to prosecution, as outlined in previous chapters.

I can see how the public rhetoric assignment could look strange to a student, especially
when compared to a typical law school assignment. public rhetoric was once a part of the
community and was a function of citizenship, and some rhetoric scholars have argued
that public rhetoric should be part of academic rhetoric (Hauser, 2017). Public rhetoric is
not just some altruistic goal with no practical application; with regard to the prosecutor’s
rhetoric, students will understand that the rhetoric of prosecutors is quintessentially a
public rhetoric, and that understanding should shape what they do, and why they do it.

How does this Course Differ from “Regular” Legal Courses?
This course will differ from regular law school courses in terms of the subject matter and
the methods used. The traditional law school course uses the casebook method, which
basically involves reading a curated set of written appellate decisions and briefing them,
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and repeated the process over and over again, until hopefully students begin to absorb the
underlying legal rules and principles, as well as the relevant factual distinctions that make
those concepts applicable or inapplicable (Llewellyn, 1930). The typical required courses
for law school include procedure courses, property, torts, contracts, corporations or
business associations, civil law, and criminal law (Llewellyn, 1930). In short, there is no
required course in law school on rhetoric, and even if such a course did exist, the format
(if similar to other law school courses) would look very different from the format of a
prosecutor’s rhetoric.

Even proponents of the casebook method readily acknowledge that learning the
applicable rule from cases is not nearly enough to be equipped to practice law, and that
attorneys must understand how to interpret and apply rules and facts in order to persuade
judges (Llewellyn, 1930). Llewellyn discusses the need for lawyers to be able to
persuade, but never actually recommends any substantive instruction in rhetoric or
persuasion, instead implying that the ability to persuade will flow naturally from briefing
and discussing case after case (Llewellyn, 1930).

While it is true that law schools use a method of questioning students in class, that
method does not look like the kind of collaborative learning and meaning-making that we
seek in the prosecutor’s rhetoric. The law professor’s questioning in class is designed to
encourage students to do the reading, but is not intended as a method for the students and
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the professor to ‘make meaning’ together, nor for the professor to learn anything from the
student.

Also, the casebook method uses appellate decisions as a method of instruction. This
source material is too extreme for practical application in everyday decision-making,
since these decisions typically outline the furthest extent of the application of a rule
(Llewellyn, 1930). By using fact scenarios from police reports or that simulate actual
events at the trial court level, the hope is that students of the prosecutor’s rhetoric will be
more comfortable applying rhetorical, ethical techniques in the kinds of factual scenarios
that they are likely to face in practice. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because the
central issues on appeal are legal disputes rather than factual disputes (since the trial court
decides issues of fact), the skillset that could be developed from analyzing only appellate
decisions may not adequately equip students to deal with factual disputes that form the
basis of the vast majority of trial issues for criminal prosecutors. Unlike in appellate
advocacy, the law is typically not in dispute at the trial court level (although its
application may be), but the facts always are in dispute at the trial court level, where
prosecutors practice.
Although law schools do typically include a required course in the second or third year
that deals with appellate advocacy, many have argued that oral advocacy training in law
schools is severely lacking (Hanrahan, 2003). As previously alluded to, the few advocacy
courses that law schools do require are focused on appellate advocacy (issues of law),
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rather than trial advocacy (issues of fact, and direct application of rules of procedure and
evidence) (Hanrahan, 2003). While the American Bar Association does require students
to receive instruction to be competent in oral communication, it seems that this
requirement is often met by simply requiring students to participate in class (Hanrahan,
2003). Those few courses that do address oral advocacy typically do not include actual
instruction in oral advocacy methods, and often throw oral advocacy in at the end of the
course, rather than integrating it in throughout the course (Hanrahan, 2003). Training in
the actual methods of oral advocacy is noticeably absent from law school courses, and
legal pedagogy lacks any sort of structured method of teaching and learning oral
advocacy (Hanrahan, 2003). Even though ancient rhetoric can offer the kind of structured
training in oral advocacy that law schools lack, most law schools seem unwilling or
unable to adopt or instruct in those ancient methods (Hanrahan, 2003). Training in oral
advocacy for law students is lacking, and judges have noticed (Hanrahan, 2003).

In contrast to the typical law school course, a prosecutor’s rhetoric will include explicit
instruction on oral advocacy that will be introduced in the ethics section of the course
materials, made explicit during the section on ancient rhetoric, and revisited throughout
the course, to culminate in the mock trial assignment. This oral advocacy will be centered
on the kind of factual scenarios that prosecutors are likely to face at trial, rather than the
legal issues that appellate attorneys face.
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Major Course Topics
Ethics must be the first course topic, as that subject is critical to every aspect of the
prosecutor’s rhetoric; ethics define what it means to be a prosecutor. After ethics, the next
major area of instruction deals with ancient rhetoric. The course materials are organized
in the following order, from most critical to least critical:
1. Ethics
2. Ancient Rhetoric
3. Emotion
4. Narrative
5. Poetics
6. Mystory
7. Remix
8. Box Logic

A substantial portion of the course time will be devoted to first four areas of instruction
(ethics, ancient rhetoric, emotion, narrative), with less time devoted to the last four areas
(poetics, mystory, remix, and box logic). This is so not because those last four areas are
not important, but because the first four areas are foundational to the field of a
prosecutor’s rhetoric. The last four areas, while important, are merely different creative
methods of learning and creating meaning. These methods are promising as applied to the
prosecutor’s rhetoric, but they are not essential in the sense that the field could not
survive without them. They are included in the course because they are important to
knowing, making, and doing justice ethically.
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